Homeland Security – HLS.Today

Securing America’s Northern Gateway: Stronger Enforcement Targets Canada–U.S. Smuggling Routes

HLS.Today — Thu, 22 Oct 2026 04:35:53 +0000

Securing America’s Northern Gateway – New prosecutions, aerial surveillance and tighter Canadian immigration rules are strengthening northern-border security. Official figures show reduced migration pressure, while investigators continue targeting the networks behind illegal crossings.

HLS.Today | October 22, 2026

America’s northern border remains an important homeland-security priority, even as official reporting shows a reduction from the elevated crossing levels recorded in 2024.

Recent U.S. prosecutions demonstrate that criminal organizations have used Canada to move people illegally into the United States. At the same time, Canadian authorities have expanded aerial surveillance, strengthened immigration controls and increased cooperation with American agencies.

The challenge is to assess these developments accurately. Canadian asylum applications, unauthorized southbound crossings and organized migrant smuggling are related policy concerns, but they measure different things. Treating them as interchangeable can obscure both enforcement progress and the vulnerabilities that remain.

For readers following HLS.Today’s border-security coverage, the central issue is how effectively intelligence, surveillance and investigations work together to prevent unauthorized entry.

What the official numbers actually show

Canada experienced a substantial increase in asylum applications earlier in the decade. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada reported more than 92,000 claims in 2022, more than 144,000 in 2023 and more than 173,000 in 2024.

That direction subsequently changed. Canada received approximately 114,520 claims in 2025, a reduction of about 34% from the previous year. These figures describe requests for protection in Canada; they do not establish an intention to travel onward to the United States. Canada.ca

The more recent Canadian statistics, covering August 2026, also do not show a nationwide return to the earlier peak.

Canadian asylum indicator	Official finding
January–August 2026 compared with January–August 2024	68% fewer people submitted asylum claims
August 2026	4,575 claimants
August 2025	9,610 claimants
August 2024	12,865 claimants

There was a shorter-term increase from 3,290 claimants in June 2026 to 4,575 in August. That increase deserves monitoring, but it occurred against a much lower baseline than in the preceding two years. IRCC identifies these figures as preliminary and subject to revision. Canada.ca

The evidence therefore supports describing a recent monthly rebound within a broader decline—not a demonstrated nationwide asylum surge feeding illegal entry into America.

Canada as a transit route: a documented concern

There is official evidence that some travelers entered Canada with the intention of continuing illegally into the United States.

In its June 2026 testimony, the U.S. Government Accountability Office reported that Border Patrol officials attributed part of the 2023–2024 increase to foreign nationals arriving in Canada through its Electronic Travel Authorization system and subsequently attempting U.S. entry without valid travel documents.

GAO recorded 24,968 northern-border Border Patrol apprehensions in fiscal year 2024, compared with 6,618 in fiscal year 2019. It also reported that apprehensions declined in fiscal year 2025 and remained broadly at reduced levels through April 2026. files.gao.gov

This establishes a transit-route problem. It does not establish that those travelers had claimed asylum in Canada, or that Canadian asylum applicants generally intended to cross south.

An assessment of that narrower allegation would require linked evidence: immigration histories, interviews, investigative records or court findings showing that particular individuals used Canadian asylum procedures as part of an onward-entry plan.

The official sources reviewed for this article do not provide a population-wide estimate of that behavior.

An October conviction shows the smuggling threat remains real

A recent enforcement result provides a concrete example of the networks authorities are targeting.

On October 15, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice announced a five-year prison sentence for Edgar Sanchez-Solis for his role in an international smuggling conspiracy operating across the Canadian border.

According to DOJ, the organization operated between December 2022 and April 2025 and brought hundreds of people from Mexico and Central and South America into the United States. Participants paid thousands of dollars, and some subsequently worked for the organization to repay smuggling debts.

The investigation involved Homeland Security Investigations and U.S. Border Patrol, with additional CBP support. DOJ identified the prosecution as part of Operation Take Back America and supported by Joint Task Force Alpha. United States Department of Justice

The case illustrates why enforcement must extend beyond intercepting individual crossings. Organizers, transport coordinators and payment arrangements can sustain repeated attempts even when overall crossing volumes fall.

Current U.S. enforcement is targeting facilitators

Another case announced on August 11, 2026, involved Stacey Taylor of Plattsburgh, New York, who pleaded guilty to participating in a northern-border smuggling conspiracy.

DOJ said Border Patrol stopped her vehicle in January 2025 after she collected four people who had crossed illegally from Canada. Investigators recovered communications connecting her to additional smuggling events.

The case demonstrates how an initial interception can generate evidence about a wider operation. United States Department of Justice

These prosecutions are tangible results of the current administration’s enforcement effort. Their significance lies in holding facilitators accountable and disrupting repeat operations.

However, prosecution announcements should be read with their timelines intact: an October 2026 sentence can concern conduct that began years earlier. It is evidence of enforcement activity, not by itself a measure of how many people are crossing today.

Canada is expanding surveillance and operational cooperation

Canada’s response includes its C$1.3 billion Border Plan, combining equipment, intelligence capabilities and measures against illegal migration and organized crime.

An official implementation update describes expanded visa-fraud investigations, international targeting activity and cooperation with U.S. authorities. It also identifies a Joint Operational Intelligence Cell and a North American Joint Strike Force addressing cross-border organized crime and illicit substances.

Canada reported 22,576 enforced removals in 2025, its highest total in more than a decade. These are removals from Canada and should not be presented as U.S. border interceptions. Canada.ca

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police describes a more visible operational expansion:

An Aerial Intelligence Task Force using helicopters, drones and mobile surveillance towers.
Procurement of 60 drones for integrated border-enforcement missions.
More than 40 additional secure drones provided by the Canadian Armed Forces.
Three chartered Black Hawk helicopters supporting patrol, detection and response.
Repositioning of officers toward areas historically associated with irregular migration.

The RCMP states that these capabilities address threats moving in both directions across the border. Its Border Integrity Operations Centre supports surveillance between official crossings. Royal Canadian Mounted Police

For security professionals, the operational lesson is straightforward: detection equipment has value when it helps officers assess an event and respond in time.

This broader use of technology complements the themes explored in HLS.Today’s reporting on DHS technologies for combating fentanyl, although drug interdiction and migrant-smuggling investigations remain distinct missions.

Canadian asylum rules have also tightened

Canada’s Strengthening Canada’s Immigration System and Borders Act received royal assent on March 26, 2026.

According to IRCC’s official explanation, the legislation introduced additional restrictions on referral of asylum claims to the Immigration and Refugee Board. These include claims made more than one year after a person’s first entry after June 24, 2020, and claims made after 14 days by people who entered irregularly from the United States between ports of entry.

The government also retained pre-removal risk-assessment safeguards for people affected by the new rules.

Separately, the Safe Third Country Agreement continues to govern relevant claims made at the land border or within 14 days of irregular entry, subject to exceptions and exemptions. Canada.ca

These measures primarily concern access to Canada’s protection system. They should not be described as evidence that every claimant is a security threat, or as a complete explanation for changes in southbound crossings.

The remaining weakness: staffing behind the technology

Additional surveillance does not eliminate the need for trained personnel.

GAO’s February 2026 report identified staffing gaps among Law Enforcement Information Systems Specialists—the personnel who monitor surveillance systems and help support operational awareness.

DHS agreed with GAO’s recommendation to develop a workforce plan. In a subsequent update, GAO reported that DHS was considering recruitment and retention incentives. As of August 2026, GAO had not received additional supporting documentation, and the recommendation remained open, with planned actions estimated for completion in January 2027. U.S. GAO

This is an important qualification when assessing enforcement announcements. Purchasing sensors and cameras is one step; ensuring that information is monitored, assessed and acted upon is another.

Congress is seeking more regular threat assessments

A September 15, 2026, House committee report on the proposed Northern Border Security Enhancement and Review Act highlights the need for recurring analysis.

The proposal would require northern-border threat assessments every two years, corresponding strategy updates and performance measures for CBP Air and Marine Operations.

The committee identified organized smuggling, unmanned-aircraft activity and other security concerns as reasons for more consistent oversight. These provisions are described here as legislative proposals, rather than completed operational improvements. govinfo.gov

Regular assessments could help policymakers distinguish a temporary increase in one area from a broader change requiring additional resources.

How serious is the current threat?

HLS.Today’s assessment of the reviewed evidence is that the northern border presents a continuing organized-smuggling and surveillance challenge, while the available figures do not establish a new mass influx driven by Canadian asylum claims.

Three distinctions matter.

First, apprehensions measure detected enforcement events. They cannot, on their own, establish the total number of successful undetected entries.

Second, the latest verified figures cover different periods. Canadian asylum data reviewed here extend through August 2026; GAO’s U.S. trend assessment extends through April 2026. The October prosecution provides newer evidence of enforcement activity, but it does not supply an October crossing total. A complete fiscal-year 2026 northern-border total was not independently verified for this article.

Third, asylum status and criminal involvement require separate evidence. Investigations can establish that particular people participated in smuggling or misused immigration procedures. National asylum totals cannot establish those conclusions for everyone seeking protection.

The most useful indicators to watch next are comparable monthly crossing figures, smuggling-network disruptions, staffing improvements and measurable response performance. Together, those indicators will show whether expanded enforcement is producing durable improvements across America’s northern gateway.

Follow HLS.Today’s Homeland Security and Border Security sections for related coverage.

Official sources

From YouTube to the Oval Office: Nick Shirley and Trump’s New Fraud-Rewards Push

HLS.Today — Wed, 21 Oct 2026 03:26:08 +0000

Nick Shirley and Trump – President Trump’s promise of a 1% commission puts citizen investigations in the national spotlight. Behind the headline, a new Justice Department program offers earlier payments for actionable fraud tips, with important eligibility conditions.

HLS.Today | October 21, 2026 – Generated Caption image Illustration

A camera, public spending records, and questions asked outside government-funded businesses helped turn Nick Shirley into a nationally recognized online personality. On October 20, the conservative video creator stood in the Oval Office as President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance promoted a new incentive for Americans to report suspected fraud.

The administration’s message was straightforward: people who help protect taxpayer money should have an opportunity to share in the rewards.

The Justice Department’s official announcement establishes the Fraud Whistleblower Incentive Program, or WHIP, backed by a $25 million Treasury commitment. It offers payments of $10,000–$30,000 for qualifying information leading to criminal charges in covered areas. United States Department of Justice

Trump went further in his remarks, describing a 1% commission. Understanding the relationship between that statement and the published rules is essential for anyone considering submitting a tip.

What Trump Said in the Oval Office

During the October 20 announcement, Trump described a percentage-based incentive:

“we are giving a commission to that person of 1 percent.”

He also said he would resolve competing claims over who deserved a reward:

“I will be the arbitrator of all of these decisions.”

These statements appear in the October 20 remarks transcript and contemporaneous reporting. Roll Call

The percentage naturally attracts attention. As simple arithmetic, 1% of $1 million is $10,000; 1% of $100 million is $1 million. Those examples illustrate the scale of the proposal—not an assurance that an applicant qualifies for either amount.

Shirley framed the effort as protecting people who depend on public assistance:

“When you expose fraud, you help save America.”

The White House also announced a $10,000 award for Shirley. Associated Press reported that no check was handed to him in journalists’ presence, so the announcement should be distinguished from independently verified payment. apnews.com

Who Is Nick Shirley—and How Did He Become Famous?

Shirley’s career began with online entertainment rather than formal financial investigations.

A February 2026 profile by The New York Times, republished by The Salt Lake Tribune, describes a Utah upbringing and early YouTube videos built around pranks, stunts, and personal experiences. He subsequently spent two years on a religious mission in Santiago, Chile.

After returning in late 2023, he shifted toward political street reporting and presented himself as an independent journalist. His videos took viewers to politically charged locations and used direct encounters with strangers to tell stories about immigration, public spending, and government performance. sltrib.com

His breakthrough on fraud came with a December 2025 Minnesota video. The appeal was easy to understand: show viewers a business address, describe public money associated with it, and ask whether the visible activity matched what taxpayers might expect.

That approach made a complicated subject accessible. It also created a significant evidentiary challenge: what a camera records during one visit does not, by itself, establish what services a business provides or how it bills a government program.

Minnesota: The Video That Brought National Attention

In written testimony to the House Judiciary Committee, Shirley described receiving tips from Minnesota residents and later working with a local researcher named David.

According to his account, they visited locations on December 16, 2025, using information about enrollment and public funding. Shirley said his resulting video received more than 100 million views across platforms. That audience figure is his reported total, not an independently audited measurement. judiciary.house.gov

The combination of local tips, spending information, and on-camera visits gave the story a powerful visual structure. His work subsequently reached Congress: the House Judiciary Committee’s January 21 hearing listed him as a witness on misuse of public funds. judiciary.house.gov

However, several early allegations were disputed. Inspectors reported that centers were operating as expected. Those findings matter, just as later criminal cases matter: neither should be omitted to create a simpler narrative. apnews.com

What Was Subsequently Proven?

There is a documented criminal development involving a business featured in Shirley’s coverage.

On July 9, 2026, Fahima Egeh Mahamud, formerly associated with Future Leaders Early Learning Center, pleaded guilty to wire fraud and conspiracy to defraud the United States, according to local court reporting. Prosecutors described more than $4.6 million in fraudulent childcare-assistance claims and approximately $850,000 connected to the federal nutrition program. FOX 9 Minneapolis-St. Paul

DOJ’s official Minnesota case summary separately documents the charges and identifies two schemes involving approximately $5.48 million in federal funds. Case Summaries

This is evidence of wrongdoing in a specific case. It does not establish that every business featured in a video committed fraud, or that every interpretation offered in the reporting was correct.

The chronology also deserves attention. Minnesota’s broader federal fraud investigations did not begin with Shirley: DOJ announced charges against 47 defendants in the Feeding Our Future investigation in September 2022. justice.gov

Shirley’s contribution is most accurately described as bringing additional public attention and pressure to suspected abuses. Establishing criminal liability remained the work of investigators, prosecutors, and courts.

Beyond Minnesota: California and New York

Shirley expanded his reporting to other states.

His July 15, 2026 Senate testimony described investigations into California daycare and hospice services and New York City adult-daycare operations. He alleged irregularities involving public payments and, in New York, participant kickbacks. These were his allegations to lawmakers—not findings established merely by their appearance in a congressional document. hsgac.senate.gov

Reporting by WIRED also described Shirley’s use of publicly released Medicaid spending data in selecting California businesses to examine. wired.com

This illustrates the broader development behind his rise: public datasets can help small reporting teams identify patterns that merit investigation.

But unusually high payments, an unexpected address, or a quiet building should be treated as leads. A substantiated fraud case usually requires additional evidence—such as false claims, fabricated records, financial transactions, admissions, or proof that billed services were not delivered.

What the New Reward Program Actually Offers

DOJ’s detailed guidance calls the mechanism the National Fraud Enforcement Division Criminal Tip Rewards Pilot Program. Its initial term is three years.

The principal innovation is timing: a qualifying tipster may receive an award before the prosecution reaches a final judgment or completes appeals. DOJ retains discretion over whether to pay. Eligibility for an early award does not necessarily prevent a later award under a separate government whistleblower program. justice.gov

Question	What the published materials establish
Who administers it?	DOJ’s National Fraud Enforcement Division.
How much funding was announced?	A $25 million commitment from Treasury.
What is the early payment range?	$10,000–$30,000 for qualifying information.
When can payment occur?	At the charging stage; DOJ’s FAQ specifies after criminal charges are unsealed.
Must the government recover money first?	The early-stage payment is not dependent on a large recovery or forfeiture.
Is payment automatic?	No. Awards remain discretionary.
Is an uncapped 1% payment established in these rules?	The reviewed guidance does not set out such a formula.

Sources: DOJ launch announcement, program guidance, and FAQs. United States Department of Justice

How the 1% Promise Differs From the Written Rules

As of October 21, the documents reviewed do not explain how Trump’s percentage announcement would be calculated or implemented.

Questions remain about whether it would apply to losses identified, money actually recovered, or another measure; whether there would be a cap; and how it would interact with the early-stage award.

Likewise, Trump’s statement about personally arbitrating competing claims is not explained as a procedure in the reviewed DOJ rules. Those rules assign award decisions to the department.

The accurate description is that Trump announced a 1% incentive, while DOJ published a defined early-payment pilot. The relationship between the two needs further written clarification.

That distinction protects the program’s credibility. A person deciding whether to report misconduct should be able to distinguish a public promise from the conditions governing an application.

Which Types of Fraud Are Covered?

The DOJ program overview covers federal healthcare offenses and specified fraud involving government programs and benefits.

The launch announcement identifies programs administered by Agriculture, Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Education, Veterans Affairs, the Department of War, and the Small Business Administration. It emphasizes hospice, home healthcare, daycare, and special-services fraud. United States Department of Justice

This is a targeted program rather than a promise to pay for every allegation of waste or every disagreement over spending.

A costly policy, an administrative error, an improper payment, and deliberate criminal fraud are different things. Effective oversight requires determining which occurred.

Who Can Qualify—and What Makes a Useful Tip?

DOJ’s eligibility overview requires an individual to provide voluntary, original, truthful, complete written information, cooperate fully, and supply information leading to covered criminal charges. Corporations do not qualify as individual tipsters. Whistleblower Rewards Program

The detailed guidance excludes various categories, including certain DOJ and law-enforcement personnel and related individuals, foreign officials, and people who meaningfully participated in the wrongdoing. It also addresses false submissions and other disqualifying conduct. Readers should consult the complete rules before assuming eligibility. justice.gov

The FAQ adds several practical distinctions:

Independent analysis can qualify; merely repeating a news story generally does not.
Identical later submissions may fail the originality requirement.
A reward relates to a distinct tip, not automatically to every defendant.
Confidentiality has legal and procedural exceptions; anonymity is not unconditional. FAQs

A useful submission should explain what happened, who was involved, which program paid, when the conduct occurred, and how the reporter knows. Records connecting a payment to a false representation are more useful than an unsupported accusation.

Where Should People Report?

DOJ directs applicants to the official America.gov fraud portal. Its FAQ strongly encourages that channel and says submissions through other routes may be denied an award.

A social-media post is therefore not a substitute for submitting information through the designated process. FAQs

For reporting purposes, preserving original records and clearly separating direct observations from assumptions helps investigators assess a lead. Citizen reporting can support enforcement without requiring confrontation, unauthorized access, or public accusations against people whose conduct has not been established.

How This Fits With Existing Whistleblower Programs

Financial rewards for exposing government fraud are not new.

The False Claims Act, originally enacted in 1863, allows private individuals to bring certain civil cases on behalf of the United States and potentially receive part of the recovery. That is a different process from submitting a criminal tip under this pilot. The False Claims Act

DOJ also operates a separate Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program, which concerns qualifying original information leading to successful forfeiture. Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program

The new initiative’s distinguishing feature is the prospect of an earlier, defined payment. It should be evaluated as an additional reporting mechanism, not as the first opportunity Americans have ever had to receive a whistleblower reward.

Why the Initiative Matters for Homeland Security

Fraud diverts resources from legitimate recipients and can weaken confidence in essential programs. Protecting those resources belongs within the broader homeland security mission covered by HLS.Today.

The administration’s approach links public reporting to the Task Force to Eliminate Fraud, established in March under Vance’s leadership. Its responsibilities include coordination across agencies, stronger payment controls, and action against fraud networks. The White House

The constructive opportunity is clear: encourage people with useful information to come forward earlier, then equip investigators to verify it.

Shirley’s rise demonstrates how accessible video reporting can draw national attention to public spending. It also demonstrates why attention and proof must remain distinct.

The new program will ultimately be judged by the quality of its leads, the fairness of its decisions, the fraud it prevents, and the money it protects. Clear written rules—including clarification of the 1% promise—will help turn public enthusiasm into dependable accountability.

Principal Sources

SI Takes Center Stage: DHS Race for Secure Super Intelligence

HLS.Today — Mon, 19 Oct 2026 14:42:25 +0000

SI Takes Center Stage – From stronger cyber defenses to domestic computing centers, the federal push for Super Intelligence raises a defining homeland security question: can America build, power, and protect the capacity it needs—when it needs it?

HLS.Today | Analysis | October 19, 2026 – Featured Image: President Trump and Jacob Helberg at SI center illustration.

Super Intelligence, or SI, is entering the vocabulary of the United States government. For homeland security professionals, the significance reaches beyond a new name: it brings renewed attention to the computing systems, trusted data, energy supplies, and human expertise that increasingly support national resilience.

The CISA Super Intelligence topic page and DHS’s Super Intelligence at DHS resources sit within a broader federal effort involving cybersecurity, scientific research, infrastructure development, and national security.

There is an essential distinction at the outset. The new terminology does not demonstrate that DHS has created a machine with intelligence surpassing humans across all fields. Nor do the materials reviewed announce a single DHS-controlled network of “SI factories.”

What they reveal is a combination of an official naming change, established technology programs, newer security guidance, and substantial initiatives to expand American computing infrastructure. Together, these developments offer a consequential opportunity to strengthen homeland security. whitehouse.gov

1. What “Super Intelligence” Actually Means in Federal Policy

On September 29, 2026, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 14434, “Inaugurating the Era of Super Intelligence”.

The order directs executive agencies to adopt “Super Intelligence” and “SI” in place of “Artificial Intelligence” and “AI” in specified official communications and non-statutory documents, to the extent permitted by law.

Crucially, its operative definition initially covers the technologies already encompassed by the existing federal statutory definition of artificial intelligence. It also requests proposed legislative language within 60 days. Previously issued historical documents need not be altered. whitehouse.gov

That makes SI an official policy label, rather than a certification that a particular system has reached a new scientific threshold. A narrowly focused detection model and an advanced generative system may both appear within this terminology.

For readers and procurement teams, capabilities must still be evaluated individually: what does a system do, how reliably does it perform, and what authority does it have?

2. DHS’s Starting Point: Real Missions and Existing Experience

DHS’s use of these technologies predates the September announcement. HLS.Today’s earlier reporting on the creation of the DHS AI Task Force provides historical context for the department’s continuing work.

The current DHS SI Use Case Inventory organizes publicly disclosable applications by component. It explains their purpose and identifies whether they are considered high-impact.

The inventory is not a complete picture of every sensitive government activity: DHS explicitly identifies exclusions, including certain intelligence and national-security uses. Homeland Security

This is useful transparency. Readers can look beyond a broad technology announcement and examine specific missions, deployment status, and oversight arrangements. They should also distinguish a proposed or developing application from a system already operating in production.

The practical opportunity is substantial: help personnel process information faster while keeping responsibility for consequential decisions clearly assigned.

3. CISA’s Dual Mission: Use Intelligent Tools and Protect Them

CISA’s role spans two connected tasks: applying intelligent tools to cyber defense and helping organizations secure the intelligent systems they adopt.

Its archived December 2024 use-case explanation describes applications including network anomaly detection, threat-indicator scoring, identification of potentially sensitive personal information, and assistance with malware analysis.

That page is historical, so its counts and development stages should not be presented as a current 2026 inventory. Nevertheless, it illustrates the operational direction: help analysts find relevant signals in large volumes of information. cisa.gov

Consider a security operations center receiving thousands of alerts. The useful measure is whether analysts can identify a genuine intrusion sooner, investigate it accurately, and act before services are disrupted.

This is the security context explored in HLS.Today’s reporting on China-linked cyber enablers targeting critical infrastructure. More analytical capacity can help defenders, but its value depends on trustworthy data and effective response procedures.

4. The Guidance Behind the Headline

Several official publications turn the broad SI ambition into practical security work.

Protecting operational technology

CISA and international partners’ guidance on integrating intelligence systems into operational technology addresses environments where software interacts with physical processes.

The accompanying guidance identifies four priorities: understand the technology and its risks; assess its suitability for the operational environment; establish governance and assurance; and incorporate safety and security into deployment. CISA

For a utility or industrial operator, this means judging an application against its actual operating conditions. A tool that helps interpret maintenance records presents a different risk from one authorized to influence machinery.

Controlling agentic systems

The May 2026 Careful Adoption of Agentic SI Services publication addresses systems capable of carrying out tasks through connected tools. CISA

The practical implication is that access permissions deserve as much attention as answer quality. An assistant that summarizes an incident and an agent that changes network settings require different controls.

A sensible deployment design limits privileges, records actions, and requires approval for consequential changes. These are implementation considerations, rather than evidence that every agency has already deployed such safeguards.

Knowing what is inside the system

CISA’s Software Bill of Materials for SI—Minimum Elements, released with G7 partners in May 2026, promotes greater supply-chain transparency. CISA

An inventory of components helps organizations understand what they depend on and respond when a vulnerability emerges. It supports security decisions; it does not independently prove that a model is accurate or safe.

5. Strategic Independence Means Keeping Essential Services Available

The concern about dependence on other countries is legitimate, but it needs a precise operational definition.

For homeland security, independence means retaining sufficient control over essential capabilities to continue functioning during conflict, disruption, or a commercial dispute. The location of a server is only one part of that problem.

An organization also needs to understand who controls its software updates, administrative access, encryption keys, replacement equipment, and contractual rights to continued service.

The June 2026 National Security Presidential Memorandum NSPM-11 directly addresses continuity and control within the national security enterprise. It calls for resilient supply chains, rigorous assurance, and arrangements to prevent commercial entities or adversaries from disabling, degrading, or materially changing mission-dependent systems without government knowledge and approval. The White House

Its scope should not be confused with a universal rule governing every civilian application. Nevertheless, the operational lesson is widely relevant: critical users need credible alternatives and continuity plans.

HLS.Today’s coverage of cyber threats to defense supply chains highlights why suppliers and subcontractors belong in that assessment.

6. Domestic Strength and Allied Cooperation Can Reinforce Each Other

Reducing exposure to adversarial control does not require treating every overseas supplier or international partnership as an equal risk.

America’s AI Action Plan, released in July 2025, combines domestic infrastructure and semiconductor priorities with cooperation involving allies and partners. It also recommends stronger protections for sensitive technology and evaluation of risks from adversaries’ systems. whitehouse.gov

For an operator, a useful approach is to map dependencies by consequence: which supplier failure would interrupt a critical service, expose sensitive data, or make recovery impossible?

Domestic hosting may reduce some jurisdictional and continuity risks. Multiple trusted suppliers, tested migration procedures, and accessible replacement equipment can address others.

The objective should be resilience that can be demonstrated. A domestic address alone does not establish that a system is secure, and a diversified allied supply chain may provide valuable redundancy.

7. What Would a National “SI Factory” Actually Deliver?

“SI factory” is a useful descriptive term for a facility that brings together computing hardware, data, software, power, and skilled personnel to produce or operate intelligent services. In this article, it is not the name of a verified DHS construction program.

There are also different kinds of demand.

Training capacity supports the creation or adaptation of models. Inference capacity runs those models to answer requests and perform tasks. Evaluation capacity tests whether their outputs and behavior meet operational requirements.

A large training campus does not automatically satisfy a hospital’s, port’s, or agency’s need for a dependable service. The operating model must also address connectivity, data protection, response time, maintenance, and recovery.

As an architectural recommendation, a resilient national system could combine large domestic computing campuses with regional service capacity and smaller local installations for sensitive or time-critical work.

The relevant measure would be dependable capability delivered to users—not merely the number of processors purchased.

8. The Federal Infrastructure Buildout Is Already Taking Shape

The policy basis for expanding domestic capacity extends well beyond DHS.

The July 2025 executive order on accelerating data-center infrastructure permitting addresses computing facilities and the equipment and energy systems supporting them. It promotes faster development and the use of federal land, subject to applicable requirements. The White House

DOE then identified four sites for potential AI data-center and energy development: Idaho National Laboratory, Oak Ridge Reservation, the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, and Savannah River Site. Department of Energy

Subsequent announcements show the range of activity:

Portsmouth, Ohio: DOE reported in April 2026 that SB Energy, a SoftBank Group company, had announced a public-private partnership to construct a major AI data center on leased DOE land.
Paducah, Kentucky: DOE described an August 2026 partnership involving a planned $100 billion redevelopment into a data-center campus and associated energy infrastructure. It projected approximately 8,000 construction jobs and 600 permanent jobs. energy.gov

These are significant development announcements. They should not be read as proof that all planned capacity is already energized or available to DHS.

The Portsmouth example also illustrates an important distinction: infrastructure located in America can involve international capital. Domestic location, corporate ownership, operational control, and government access are separate questions.

Sources: DOE Portsmouth announcement and DOE Paducah update.

9. Genesis Adds a National Scientific Computing Dimension

DOE’s Genesis Mission provides another part of the picture.

Led by DOE and its 17 national laboratories, the initiative aims to connect advanced computing, scientific instruments, intelligent systems, and research datasets. Its stated ambition includes accelerating discovery and strengthening national security. genesis.energy.gov

The White House announced more than $5 billion for Genesis-related efforts in July 2026. That announcement also describes DHS participation in work on early detection and attribution of biological threats. The White House

This establishes a concrete connection between national computing investment and homeland security research. It does not mean Genesis is a general-purpose DHS cloud or that every department can immediately draw on all of its resources.

For security planners, it offers a useful model: shared infrastructure organized around defined problems, with scientific expertise and data access treated as essential components.

10. Electricity and Cooling Determine How Quickly Capacity Arrives

A computing campus cannot deliver useful services simply because land has been allocated or equipment ordered.

Power generation, grid connections, substations, cooling, fiber links, and trained operators must become available together. A delay in any one of these can prevent the rest of the investment from being productive.

The administration’s March 2026 Ratepayer Protection Pledge addresses part of this challenge. The White House says participating companies committed to bringing additional generation resources and covering infrastructure upgrades required by their data centers, with the aim of protecting households from those costs. The White House

This is a constructive policy objective. Its results should be assessed through actual utility agreements, delivered generation, grid reliability, and customer costs.

From a homeland security perspective, computing demand and electricity resilience must be planned together. New capacity should support the communities and essential services around it.

That connection belongs within the wider infrastructure security agenda covered by HLS.Today.

11. Space Data Centers Deserve Research—Today’s Missions Need Deliverable Capacity

Elon Musk’s SpaceX has advanced an ambitious orbital computing proposal.

An FCC public notice released on February 4, 2026 accepted for filing an application for a SpaceX Orbital Data Center system involving up to one million satellites. docs.fcc.gov

Acceptance for filing is a regulatory procedural step. It is not, by itself, an authorization, a deployment milestone, or evidence of available computing service. The official material reviewed does not establish a dependable delivery schedule for capacity that homeland security users could purchase and operate.

Orbital computing would also require careful assessment of launch logistics, communications, heat rejection, radiation exposure, maintenance, and disposal. These are engineering and operational considerations, not a prediction that the concept will fail.

For current planning, the appropriate distinction is between research options and capacity that can meet a specified mission deadline.

DHS, utilities, ports, and emergency services need tested services and recovery arrangements now. Their near-term plans should be based on demonstrably available terrestrial infrastructure, while future space-based options are evaluated on their merits.

12. Build Quickly, Then Prove the Security Benefit

The strongest case for the administration’s approach is the connection it draws between technology adoption, domestic infrastructure, energy, and national security. That is a practical foundation for improving American capacity.

Execution will determine the outcome.

For agencies and critical infrastructure operators, HLS.Today’s assessment is that progress should be judged against a short set of operational questions:

Does the system detect threats or support decisions more accurately?
Does it reduce response time without creating an unmanageable volume of false alerts?
Can essential services continue if a model, vendor, network, or site becomes unavailable?
Are sensitive data and administrative access protected?
Can authorized personnel review, correct, and stop consequential automated actions?
Do measured benefits justify the full cost of computing, power, integration, and maintenance?

These are proposed evaluation criteria, not a claim that every federal program already reports them.

13. The Opportunity: Make SI a Dependable National Capability

The emergence of Super Intelligence in federal policy gives DHS and its partners an opportunity to make intelligent tools more useful, secure, and operationally dependable.

CISA’s guidance offers practical foundations. DOE’s development initiatives address physical capacity. National security policy emphasizes continuity and control. Private industry supplies much of the technology and construction capability.

The next challenge is connecting those elements in ways that produce measurable benefits for the people protecting the country.

For homeland security, the most meaningful achievement will be a capability that works during a crisis: analysts who can identify an attack sooner, infrastructure operators who can maintain services, and agencies that retain control over the systems on which their missions depend.

America’s SI advantage will be built through reliable infrastructure, trusted technology, and people equipped to use both.

DHS FY2026: A Stronger Border Takes Shape

HLS.Today — Sun, 18 Oct 2026 03:42:22 +0000

DHS FY2026: A Stronger Border Takes Shape

Lower apprehensions, sustained enforcement and investment in border infrastructure mark a positive milestone for the Trump administration—and an opportunity to strengthen long-term security.

The United States has reached a significant border-enforcement milestone. In its October 16 announcement, the Department of Homeland Security reported sharply lower apprehensions and nationwide encounters in preliminary Fiscal Year 2026 data.

For President Donald Trump and Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin, the results provide a positive measure of progress. For homeland security professionals, they raise an equally important question: how can reduced pressure translate into lasting operational improvements?

The Figures Behind the Milestone

FY2026 covers October 1, 2025, through September 30, 2026. DHS reports:

98,708 southwest border apprehensions, approximately 95% below the more than 1.8 million annual level it cites for the Biden administration.
379,243 nationwide CBP encounters, described by DHS as the lowest annual total in the agency’s history.
Zero Border Patrol releases during the fiscal year, with September completing 17 consecutive months.

The 95% comparison is against the earlier administration’s annual level, not a year-on-year comparison with FY2025. The figures remain preliminary.

Understanding What the Numbers Measure

These categories answer different questions. Southwest apprehensions concern Border Patrol enforcement between ports of entry. Nationwide encounters cover a broader set of CBP enforcement activity, including at official entry points.

They should not be presented as interchangeable totals or as a complete count of undetected crossings. Similarly, a Border Patrol release figure does not establish what happened in every other agency’s custody or immigration proceeding.

Readers looking for historical context can revisit HLS.Today’s 2022 report on CBP migrant encounters, which explains the distinction between Border Patrol and Office of Field Operations statistics. That archived article includes year-to-date figures and should not be treated as a finalized FY2022 comparison.

Clear definitions make the current results more useful to readers and decision-makers.

A Trend Visible From the Start of the Fiscal Year

The year-end announcement follows earlier official reporting of reduced activity.

The House Homeland Security Committee’s October FY2026 border brief recorded 7,989 southwest Border Patrol apprehensions in October 2025, compared with 56,515 in October 2024—an 86% decrease.

It also reported 30,573 nationwide encounters for that opening month, versus 142,742 a year earlier.

These figures show that the fiscal year began at a substantially lower level. The committee brief provides useful chronological context, although its CBP-derived figures are not an independent audit of the latest annual announcement.

Connecting Policy With Operational Priorities

President Trump’s January 20, 2025 executive order, “Securing Our Borders,” established a clear set of priorities: physical barriers supported by personnel and technology, stronger detention and removal efforts within legal authority, cooperation with state and local agencies, and international coordination.

It also directed attention to investigations and prosecutions involving human smuggling and trafficking.

The constructive feature of this approach is its recognition that border security involves several connected capabilities. Personnel need infrastructure, detection systems and workable procedures; physical barriers need monitoring and an effective response.

The order documents policy direction. It does not, by itself, prove that every measure was fully implemented or quantify each measure’s contribution to the decline. The annual results are nevertheless consistent with the administration’s stated objective of reducing unlawful entry.

Technology and Infrastructure Must Work Together

CBP’s Smart Wall overview and frequently asked questions describe investment in infrastructure, technology and enforcement personnel. The agency identifies primary and secondary walls and waterborne barriers among the projects supported by its contracts.

For an operational audience, the significance lies in how those components work together. A barrier can influence movement; detection can alert personnel; trained teams must assess the situation and respond. The practical value depends on coverage, reliability, maintenance and deployment.

This is an important distinction for procurement teams: completed construction, awarded contracts and demonstrated operational performance are different measures of progress.

HLS.Today’s Border Security section follows the broader mix of enforcement, infrastructure and technology shaping this mission.

Lower Pressure Creates an Opportunity

From an operational perspective, fewer apprehensions can offer agencies more flexibility in how they deploy staff and equipment. Potential benefits include more time for patrols, intelligence work, training and coordination.

These are opportunities, not outcomes established by the annual totals alone. Demonstrating them requires evidence about staffing, response times and mission performance.

Border security also continues at official ports. HLS.Today’s report on narcotics intercepted in commercial shipments at Otay Mesa illustrates why cargo inspection remains essential even when migration figures fall.

CBP’s travel guidance likewise describes a parallel responsibility: screening arrivals while facilitating legitimate travel. Effective border management must protect both security and lawful movement.

Turning a Milestone Into Durable Progress

The administration has a positive result to report in the enforcement measures released by DHS. The next test is sustaining that progress while maintaining effective screening, humane treatment, lawful procedures and readiness for changing threats.

For readers following HLS.Today’s Homeland Security coverage, the larger lesson is practical: a quieter border creates room to strengthen the system. Making that advantage durable will depend on frontline capability, reliable infrastructure and transparent reporting.

Official Sources

DHS — FY2026 border announcement, October 16, 2026.
CBP — corresponding FY2026 announcement. This is the same agency announcement, not separate corroborating research.
House Homeland Security Committee — October FY2026 Border Brief.
White House — Securing Our Borders, January 20, 2025.
CBP — Smart Wall Frequently Asked Questions.
CBP — Travel.

U.S. Targets China-Linked Cyber Enablers to Protect Critical Infrastructure

HLS.Today — Thu, 15 Oct 2026 03:34:27 +0000

U.S. Targets China-Linked Cyber Enablers to Protect Critical Infrastructure

Federal agencies pair a multinational warning with action against hacking tools, demonstrating the value of disruption, intelligence sharing and sustained pressure under the Trump administration.

A warning about a China-based cybersecurity company has become a broader story about how the United States can defend essential services: identify the organizations enabling intrusions, give defenders usable intelligence, and disrupt the tools attackers depend on.

An October 8 advisory from CISA, the FBI, NSA and international partners describes how Integrity Technology Group helps Chinese government-linked actors target organizations worldwide. NSA identifies affected sectors including government, manufacturing, healthcare and information technology, alongside law enforcement, education and religious organizations. [1]

The significance for homeland security reaches beyond a single company. It concerns the services and information that communities, public institutions and businesses depend on every day.

The company behind the warning

According to NSA, Integrity Technology Group employs people who support malicious cyber activity and contribute to a wider ecosystem aimed at stealing sensitive information. Some observed techniques align with campaigns tracked as Flax Typhoon, Storm 919, Ethereal Panda and Red Juliett. These are industry tracking names; they should not be treated as proof that every associated operation is identical. [1]

Britain’s National Cyber Security Centre describes a company supporting multiple stages of cyber operations, including developing tools, hosting infrastructure and compromising networks. Its assessment helps explain why governments are focusing on commercial enablers as well as individual hackers. Removing a shared capability can potentially affect more than one intrusion campaign. [2]

How the attacks work

The joint advisory describes a combination of automated scanning and hands-on exploitation. In everyday terms, attackers search widely for weaknesses, then devote attention to selected targets.

A botnet is a collection of compromised devices that attackers control. Such networks can support malicious activity through equipment belonging to unsuspecting owners. The advisory also describes password attacks against Microsoft Exchange, persistence through VPN software, and theft of emails and credentials. [3]

For security managers, the lesson is practical: an apparently ordinary remote connection or legitimate application can still warrant investigation when its behavior is unexpected. Security depends on understanding how systems are being used, as well as which software is installed.

From public warning to operational disruption

On October 8, the Justice Department and FBI announced court-authorized seizures intended to deny access to two tools, Microscan and FishHub. Court documents allege that Integrity Tech personnel operated them and that the company has Chinese government contracts. [4]

Microscan supported searches for vulnerable networks. FishHub allegedly supported targeted phishing and subsequent malware delivery, enabling unauthorized access or file theft. DOJ distinguishes scanning targets from confirmed victims, an important safeguard against overstating the scale of successful compromise. [4]

This is a concrete positive action under the Trump administration. Targeting enabling infrastructure addresses an attacker’s capacity to operate, while the accompanying warning helps potential victims protect themselves.

The public record establishes a disruption operation. It does not establish that all stolen information was recovered, every affected network was cleared, or the organization can no longer rebuild.

Why the administration’s approach deserves recognition

The strongest case for credit rests on the combination of enforcement and prevention.

The White House’s March 2026 Cyber Strategy for America prioritizes imposing costs on adversaries, disrupting hostile networks, improving resilience and working with allies and industry. The October measures are consistent with those priorities, although the announcements do not establish that the strategy itself initiated this investigation. [5]

That alignment matters. A national strategy becomes useful when its objectives are reflected in specific actions that defenders and the public can understand.

There is also value in publishing information that organizations can act upon. Threat intelligence held only inside government has limited immediate usefulness to a hospital security team or local government administrator. Sharing relevant findings helps those organizations make better defensive decisions.

These are reasons to recognize the administration’s handling of this operation. They are not, by themselves, a measurement of its entire cybersecurity record.

Allied cooperation strengthens the response

The United Kingdom joined agencies from the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Spain in the advisory. NCSC also recalled the UK’s earlier sanctions against Integrity Tech. [2]

This international participation is a meaningful strength. Organizations in different countries can face related infrastructure and techniques, making shared findings useful across borders. A coordinated advisory gives defenders a common reference for investigation and mitigation.

The positive implication is that national protection benefits from cooperation: U.S. agencies can defend American interests while contributing to a response that helps partners protect their own networks.

Sustained pressure across administrations

The timeline deserves accurate attribution. Treasury sanctioned Integrity Technology Group on January 3, 2025, before President Trump returned to office. Its announcement also described a September 2024 multinational advisory about the company’s support for Flax Typhoon. Those earlier steps belong to the Biden administration’s record. [6]

The October 2026 response therefore represents continued pressure against a previously identified threat. Recognizing that continuity strengthens the case for the current action: persistent adversaries require sustained institutional attention beyond a single political term.

What organizations should do now

The advisory recommends disabling unused services and ports, applying patches promptly, protecting web applications against malicious input, and strengthening identity and access controls, including multifactor authentication where possible. Security teams should review its indicators and detection guidance for evidence of related activity. [3]

For organizational leaders, the next question is whether someone has been assigned to assess the advisory and report back on exposure, findings and remediation.

The constructive message from this operation is that government action and local responsibility reinforce each other. Federal agencies can disrupt hostile capabilities and share intelligence; infrastructure operators must turn that information into protection for the systems they run.

SOURCES

Original story supplied:

CISA — warning about Integrity Technology Group

https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/cisa-fbi-nsa-and-international-partners-warn-china-based-cybersecurity-company-enabling-threat

[1] NSA — October 8, 2026 announcement

https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/4622576/nsa-joins-fbi-and-others-to-provide-guidance-to-mitigate-chinese-government-lin/

[2] UK National Cyber Security Centre — October 8, 2026

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/china-linked-actors-called-out-by-uk-and-international-partners-for-targeting-sensitive-data

[3] Joint cybersecurity advisory AA26-281A — October 8, 2026

https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261008.pdf

[4] U.S. Justice Department — October 8, 2026 seizure announcement

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-fbi-seize-vulnerability-scanning-and-spear-phishing-tools-operate

[5] White House — President Trump’s Cyber Strategy for America, March 2026

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/President-Trumps-Cyber-Strategy-for-America.pdf

[6] U.S. Treasury — January 3, 2025 sanctions announcement

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2769

AUSA 2026: Modern Warfare Is Redefining Defense and Homeland Security

HLS.Today — Wed, 14 Oct 2026 07:50:41 +0000

AUSA 2026: Modern Warfare Is Redefining Defense and Homeland Security

Washington, D.C.

The Association of the United States Army’s AUSA Annual Meeting & Exposition 2026, taking place from October 12–14 at the Walter E. Washington Convention Center in Washington, D.C., arrives at an unusually consequential moment for the global defense and homeland security community.

Under this year’s theme, “America’s Army: The Foundation of the Joint Force,” more than 40,000 participants, over 750 exhibits and representatives from more than 100 countries are expected to take part in what has become North America’s leading land-power exhibition and one of the world’s most influential meetings between military leadership and the defense industry.

But AUSA 2026 is taking place against a very different strategic background from that of only a few years ago.

The war in Ukraine, this year’s major military operations involving Iran, rapidly changing security conditions in the Middle East, growing strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific and the proliferation of inexpensive drones, precision weapons and artificial intelligence have fundamentally changed the discussion surrounding military modernization.

The question facing the defense industry today is no longer simply what technology can be developed, but rather what can be produced quickly, affordably and in sufficient numbers to survive a prolonged, high-intensity conflict.

From Ukraine to Washington: Battlefield Lessons Arrive at AUSA

Walking through the AUSA exhibition halls this year, one of the most visible trends is the extraordinary presence of unmanned systems and counter-UAS technologies.

That is not accidental.

U.S. Army Under Secretary Michael Obadal described a “noticeable shift in warfare,” highlighting the extraordinary demand for both sophisticated munitions and inexpensive systems. Ukraine in particular has demonstrated how relatively low-cost drones can conduct reconnaissance, deliver precision effects, disrupt logistics and force much more expensive defensive systems to respond.

The economics of warfare have consequently become part of the technology discussion.

A sophisticated interceptor costing millions of dollars cannot always be the answer to an unmanned aircraft costing a fraction of that amount. The requirement is increasingly for layered detection, electronic warfare, inexpensive interceptors, directed-energy systems and scalable kinetic solutions.

This shift is clearly reflected throughout AUSA.

General Dynamics Land Systems is displaying new counter-drone capabilities alongside its Wolf XM30 candidate for the U.S. Army’s Bradley replacement program. Among the systems being presented are PERCH 2.0, M-SHORAD Increment 4 and the F600 Leonidas, combining the traditional requirements of armored maneuver with the emerging requirement to survive in an environment saturated with drones.

Northrop Grumman is presenting developments associated with its DRAKE electronic-warfare counter-UAS system, which uses operational feedback to continually update its software and configuration as drone threats change.

Israel Aerospace Industries used AUSA to unveil three new air-defense capabilities addressing evolving unmanned threats, including the Point@Air aerostat radar, a counter-drone interceptor and the Fire Storm 250, developed with SIG Sauer and combining a drone platform with a machine-gun payload.

Twenty-Six Defense, formerly Elbit Systems of America, meanwhile introduced Primex, a soldier-worn digital system combining low-light sensing, thermal imagery, augmented-reality capabilities and real-time processing.

Across the exhibition floor, the common denominator is increasingly evident: sensors, software, AI, electronic warfare, autonomy and effectors are being brought together rather than treated as independent systems.

Ukraine Has Its Own Place at AUSA

Perhaps one of the strongest indications of how closely operational experience and defense innovation have become linked is the new Ukrainian Defense Tech Pavilion, part of AUSA’s outdoor exhibition area.

Seventeen Ukrainian defense technology companies are participating alongside military personnel with direct combat experience.

The program addresses subjects including the economics of mass military production, electronic warfare, integrated counter-drone ecosystems and emerging drone doctrine.

Participating organizations include Ukrspecsystems, Kvertus, Reactive Drones, Stellarion, Tencore, Phantom Defense, Osiris AI and the Third Army Corps of Ukraine, among others.

This is significant.

For decades, military exhibitions largely followed a model in which governments established long-term requirements, major defense companies developed solutions and armies eventually received the resulting equipment.

Ukraine has helped demonstrate another model: technology is deployed, tested against a real adversary, modified according to battlefield experience and returned to the field—sometimes within weeks rather than years.

Electronic warfare techniques change. Drone frequencies change. Navigation systems change. Countermeasures appear. Software is updated.

Modern warfare has therefore become an accelerating technological competition in which the ability to adapt can be almost as important as the initial performance of a system.

The U.S. Army Moves Toward Autonomy

That transformation is now becoming institutional.

During AUSA 2026, Acting Army Chief of Staff Gen. Christopher LaNeve announced the redesignation of the Army’s Futures and Concepts Command as the Army Futures and Autonomous Systems Command – FASCOM.

According to LaNeve, autonomous and unmanned capabilities are to be introduced across Army formations and warfighting functions, accompanied by new military specialties in UAS and robotics.

The development moves autonomy beyond experimentation.

Recent Army exercises have already tested combinations of autonomous vehicles, drone swarms, robotic breaching systems, mine detection and counter-UAS technologies, while maintaining human authorization for critical weapons decisions.

AI is following the same trajectory.

At AUSA, discussions on AI at the Edge are examining applications ranging from maintenance and battlefield management to autonomous systems and rapid distribution of targeting information.

The emphasis is increasingly on giving commanders and individual soldiers access to information and decision-support capabilities at the point where they are required—without depending entirely on centralized processing.

From the Battlefield to Homeland Security

These developments have implications reaching far beyond conventional land warfare.

The distinction between military defense and homeland security is becoming increasingly narrow.

Small drones can threaten military installations, airports, energy facilities, government buildings, borders, public events and critical infrastructure.

Cyberattacks can target both military networks and civilian infrastructure.

Commercial satellite communications, AI, robotics, autonomous navigation and inexpensive sensors can be used by armed forces, security agencies—or hostile non-state actors.

One of the AUSA discussions this year, appropriately titled “Stopping the Swarm,” focuses directly on this challenge. The premise is that large numbers of inexpensive autonomous drones could overwhelm conventional defenses designed to engage individual targets, making layered sensing, artificial intelligence and scalable countermeasures increasingly important for both military forces and homeland protection.

This convergence is also reflected in the U.S. 2026 National Defense Strategy, which places defense of the American homeland among the Department of War’s primary missions and specifically identifies counter-UAS capabilities, cyber defense and the Golden Dome for America missile-defense initiative as priorities.

Washington Sends a Message to the Defense Industry

AUSA 2026 also takes place during a significant change in the relationship between Washington and its defense industrial base.

The current administration’s “Peace Through Strength” policy increasingly links military deterrence with industrial capacity.

The message from Washington is straightforward: technological superiority is insufficient if equipment cannot be manufactured quickly enough or in sufficient quantities.

A January 2026 Executive Order on defense contracting stated that while the United States produces some of the world’s most advanced military equipment, it does not produce enough of it quickly enough to meet the requirements of U.S. forces and allies. The order calls for accelerated procurement and a revitalized American defense industrial base.

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s Acquisition Transformation System follows the same philosophy: reduce bureaucracy, increase competition, bring commercial and non-traditional companies into the defense ecosystem and shorten the time between identifying an operational need and delivering capability to the warfighter.

In July, the Department of War suspended Phase II implementation of the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification while reviewing the program, explicitly citing the need to maintain cybersecurity while reducing barriers that could prevent smaller and non-traditional companies from entering the defense supply chain.

The administration describes the objective as rebuilding America’s “Arsenal of Freedom.”

That expression is particularly relevant at AUSA.

Modern military power increasingly depends not only on a handful of large prime contractors, but upon a broad ecosystem involving software developers, AI companies, robotics startups, electronics manufacturers, communications specialists, sensor companies and advanced manufacturing businesses.

A New Definition of Military Readiness

The implications are significant for defense manufacturers worldwide.

The priorities now visible at AUSA include:

drones and autonomous systems;
counter-UAS and layered air defense;
artificial intelligence and battlefield software;
electronic warfare and resilient communications;
sensors and multi-domain situational awareness;
robotic ground systems;
precision and loitering munitions;
rapid manufacturing and scalable production;
open architectures allowing systems to evolve rapidly;
resilient logistics, energy and infrastructure.

Even established platforms such as armored vehicles are increasingly being judged according to their ability to connect with drones, sensors, digital command networks and autonomous systems.

The platform itself is becoming part of a larger system of systems.

AUSA 2026 Reflects a World That Has Already Changed

AUSA has traditionally provided an indication of where the U.S. Army intends to go next.

AUSA 2026 is somewhat different.

Many of the technologies receiving the greatest attention—drones, electronic warfare, inexpensive precision weapons, AI, autonomous systems and counter-UAS—are not predictions about a distant battlefield.

They are responses to capabilities already being used.

The Army and the defense industry are therefore being asked to move at a pace much closer to that of the commercial technology sector while simultaneously preparing for wars in which industrial capacity, supply-chain resilience and the ability to replace equipment rapidly may again determine strategic outcomes.

For homeland security agencies, the same transformation has important consequences. Technologies developed to protect soldiers and military installations from drones, cyberattacks and autonomous threats will increasingly become relevant to borders, airports, ports, energy infrastructure and major population centers.

And for the global defense industry, Washington’s message appears equally clear.

The next competitive advantage will not necessarily belong only to the company offering the most sophisticated system.

It may belong to the company capable of learning faster, integrating faster and producing at scale.

That is perhaps the most important message emerging from AUSA 2026.

The future battlefield is no longer waiting to arrive. Much of it is already here.

Wearable Counter-Drone Systems: What the U.S. Army Trials Reveals

HLS.Today — Wed, 07 Oct 2026 14:41:30 +0000

Wearable Counter-Drone Systems: What U.S. Army Trials Reveal About Soldier Protection.

U.S. Army exercises are bringing drone detection and disruption closer to the individual soldier. Official reporting shows how wearable equipment fits into a broader effort to protect troops—and why warning alone is only the beginning.

How much protection against a drone can a soldier carry on a tactical vest?

Army records document wearable counter-drone equipment in exercises in Germany in 2025 and further assessments in Mississippi in 2026. Together, these activities offer a useful view of how personal warning devices are being evaluated alongside other defenses. www.dvidshub.net

1. Bringing Drone Warning to the Soldier

On June 7, 2025, soldiers from 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment mounted Wingman and Pitbull devices on their tactical vests during Project Flytrap at Hohenfels, Germany.

The official U.S. Army photo record on DVIDS describes Wingman as a detector that alerts the wearer to nearby unmanned aircraft threats. The soldier can then activate the Pitbull radio-frequency jammer when a drone is within range. www.dvidshub.net

The distinction between these functions is central to understanding the technology. Detection provides warning. Disruption attempts to interfere with the drone. Receiving an alert does not establish that the threat has been neutralized.

From a protection perspective, the practical question is whether that warning gives the wearer useful information in time to respond.

2. From Detection to a Decision

Further evaluation took place during Operation Sentinel Justice 26 at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

In its June 17, 2026 account of the exercise, the Army identifies Wingman as a MyDefence wearable RF detector and Pitbull as an RF disruption tool. Emerging technologies were placed into training scenarios so soldiers could use them and provide feedback.

The Army organized its assessment around three functions: detect, decide and defeat. Its report also describes AirScout, Dronebuster 4 and SMASH among the systems evaluated. www.army.mil

For the individual soldier, the implication is straightforward: a device must fit into a usable response process. An alert needs to be understood, the situation assessed and an appropriate action selected. Equipment design and training therefore belong in the same discussion.

3. Why Wearable Systems Need a Wider Defense

Project Flytrap expanded beyond individual equipment. The Army’s May 18, 2026 report on Flytrap 5.0 describes counter-drone integration at squadron level in Lithuania.

U.S. and British participants tested more than 50 industry-provided technologies, including radars, RF defeat systems and kinetic interceptors. Systems were networked across a combined tactical data architecture and tested against a live opposing force. www.army.mil

This suggests that evaluating a wearable device in isolation provides only part of the picture. The surrounding formation also needs to share information and coordinate its response.

For readers exploring the wider technology landscape, HLS.today’s industry profiles of Vorpal and D-Fend Solutions offer related reading. These profiles are background resources, rather than evidence of participation in the Army exercises discussed here.

4. What the Trials Tell Procurement Teams

The official accounts establish that soldiers used and evaluated the equipment. They do not provide a comprehensive public dataset showing the wearable systems’ detection probability, false-alarm rates or defeat success across different threats. www.dvidshub.net

That leaves practical questions for anyone assessing a purchase:

How reliably does the system detect the threats relevant to the mission?
Can operators interpret alerts while carrying out other duties?
How do battery endurance and equipment weight affect sustained use?
How well does the device work with the unit’s other protective systems?

These are evaluation priorities, not failures demonstrated by the reports. Their purpose is to connect technical specifications with the conditions in which people actually depend on the equipment.

5. The Connection to Homeland Security

The emphasis on usability also appears in HLS.today’s coverage of DHS counter-drone testing for state and local law enforcement.

That assessment examined practical demands such as transporting, setting up and operating equipment during realistic scenarios. Although policing and military missions differ, the shared procurement question is clear: can the intended users put the capability to work when needed? hls.today

For soldiers, wearable counter-drone systems offer a way to carry warning and response tools with them. The Army’s exercises show why those tools must be assessed alongside training, decision-making and wider defenses. Their ultimate value rests on how consistently they help turn an alert into effective protection.

Official Sources

U.S. Army / DVIDS: Wearable counter-drone testing during Project Flytrap, June 7, 2025.
U.S. Army: Reserve Soldiers evaluate C-sUAS during Operation Sentinel Justice 26, June 17, 2026.
U.S. Army: Project Flytrap accelerates NATO’s counter-drone lethality, May 18, 2026.

DHS Tests Counter-Drone Systems for State and Local Law Enforcement

HLS.Today — Mon, 05 Oct 2026 13:50:29 +0000

DHS Tests Counter-Drone Systems for State and Local Law Enforcement

DHS field assessments examine whether counter-drone systems can meet the practical demands of state and local policing, from rapid deployment to protecting large public gatherings.

A counter-drone system may offer impressive capabilities, but can officers transport it, set it up and use it effectively when a public event faces an aerial threat?

That question is central to a recent assessment led by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). In an October 1, 2026 feature article, DHS describes five days of testing in August that brought federal specialists and law enforcement personnel together to evaluate commercially available counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) technologies.

The central message is practical: equipment must suit the people using it and the situations they face. Technical performance is only one part of that assessment.

What counter-drone systems actually do

C-UAS is an umbrella term for technologies that help security teams address unauthorized drone activity. Understanding their different functions makes the purpose of the DHS tests clearer.

Detection alerts operators to a possible drone presence. Tracking follows its movement. Identification helps establish what has been detected. Mitigation involves action to counter the drone’s activity, where legally authorized.

These functions are related, but they are not interchangeable. Detecting a drone does not itself stop it, and possession of equipment does not establish authority to use every capability it offers.

DHS says this assessment focused specifically on mitigation while also placing detection and tracking within operational scenarios. Its account describes radio frequency equipment and real-time radar tracking, but does not publish a detailed comparison of individual systems.

Testing begins before a drone arrives

The assessment was led by S&T’s National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL), working with the directorate’s C-UAS research, development, testing and evaluation team.

One scenario began with a credible threat to a public gathering. Responders had to carry equipment to a designated location, move cases up stairs, assemble tripods, mount components and power up the systems.

These tasks may seem basic. For a responding police unit, however, they determine whether a capability can be brought into service in a useful and realistic way.

The exercise examined a question procurement documents can easily understate: how demanding is deployment for the officers who will actually perform it? Weight, portability and setup complexity all affect whether equipment fits an agency’s operations.

The operational lesson is that readiness begins with getting a system into position and working.

Simulating threats to a major event

A second scenario tested the systems during a simulated Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) 1 event. With equipment already operating, drones approached as simulated threats, and law enforcement participants used the systems to detect, track and mitigate them.

This moved the evaluation from physical deployment to operational use. It gave participants hands-on experience with the equipment while assessing how its capabilities might support their missions.

Representatives quoted by DHS included personnel from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and police departments in Atlanta and Houston. Their comments reflected shared concerns about preparing for large gatherings, understanding available equipment and making informed purchasing decisions.

Houston’s representative specifically highlighted advanced detection as a capability likely to assist the department’s mission. That observation underlines an important operational relationship: an effective response depends on first establishing what is happening in the airspace.

Helping agencies make informed purchases

The testing forms part of S&T’s System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) program, which provides independent evaluations of commercially available equipment.

For agencies with limited budgets and technical staff, the value is straightforward. Evaluating a crowded technology market takes time, expertise and resources that many departments cannot dedicate to their own trials.

SAVER is intended to help fill that gap through assessment results and explanations of the methods used. DHS emphasizes that the program does not endorse particular products or vendors.

For procurement teams, the useful question is therefore which system fits a defined mission. A department supporting temporary events may place different demands on portability and deployment than an organization protecting a fixed site. That is a practical implication of the assessment’s emphasis on operational suitability, rather than a published finding about a particular product.

Source: DHS.GOV

Trump Slashing Spending: Musk Claims $4B Saved Daily

HLS.Today — Wed, 02 Apr 2025 03:30:50 +0000

Elon Musk, the billionaire entrepreneur and head of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), has adopted a bold approach to reducing federal spending, drawing inspiration from Argentine President Javier Milei. On February 20, 2025, during the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), Musk brandished a chainsaw—a gift from Milei—symbolizing their shared commitment to cutting government expenditures.

President Donald Trump, acknowledging the controversial nature of Musk’s methods, suggested that his Cabinet secretaries have gleaned sufficient insights from the Tesla CEO to enhance efficiency within their departments. Speaking to reporters on Monday, Trump stated, “There will be a point at which the secretaries will be able to do this work and do it, as we say, with a scalpel.”

This development indicates that the Department of Government Efficiency may conclude its operations after only 130 days, well ahead of its original schedule. Musk’s tenure at DOGE has faced increasing criticism from some of the president’s constituents, particularly regarding the depth and speed of the implemented cuts.

During his CPAC speech, Musk defended his aggressive strategies, emphasizing the urgency of addressing government inefficiencies. He asserted, “Our goal is to reduce the waste and fraud by $4 billion a day, every day, seven days a week—and so far we are succeeding.”

President Trump has had to balance defending DOGE’s cuts, which affect voters in certain Republican strongholds, while also advocating for significant tariff increases—proposals that have unsettled the stock market and fueled recession concerns. Despite the controversy, Trump has referred to DOGE as the “Manhattan Project of our time,” highlighting the administration’s dedication to radically downsizing the federal government.

Musk’s initiatives have led to the dismissal of over 6,000 federal employees, a move that has disrupted operations in key departments such as Agriculture, which has had to pause activities and cancel significant funding programs. Critics argue that these cuts may precipitate crises in sectors like agriculture and increase unemployment rates.

In a symbolic gesture at CPAC, Musk wielded the chainsaw gifted by Milei, underscoring their mutual commitment to reducing government size. Milei, who used a chainsaw during his 2023 presidential campaign to represent his plans to slash the bloated Argentine state, explained, “Our method is similar to that of our dear friend Elon Musk: to go office by office, keep in place what is working and get rid of the rest. That’s why I gave him a chainsaw.”

As Musk’s 130-day term as a Special Government Employee nears its end, discussions about the future of DOGE intensify. The potential early termination of the department raises questions about the sustainability and long-term impact of Musk’s aggressive cost-cutting measures on the federal government’s structure and efficiency.

DHS: Advanced Technologies to Fight Fentanyl Proliferation

HLS.Today — Thu, 27 Feb 2025 15:51:03 +0000

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is intensifying its efforts to combat the proliferation of synthetic drugs, particularly fentanyl, by developing and deploying advanced technologies aimed at enhancing detection and interdiction capabilities.

HLS.Today DHS.GOV

Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII): To bolster security at the southwest border, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is significantly expanding its Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology. NII employs large-scale X-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems to scan vehicles and cargo for contraband without physically opening them, thereby facilitating efficient inspections with minimal disruption to legitimate trade and travel. Historically, NII systems scanned less than 2% of passenger vehicles and 15% of commercial vehicles at the southwest border. With the planned installation of 123 new large-scale scanners at various ports of entry, CBP aims to increase inspection coverage to 40% for passenger vehicles and 70% for cargo vehicles. This expansion is expected to enhance the detection of illicit drugs, currency, firearms, ammunition, unauthorized merchandise, and human smuggling activities.

Chapter 1: X-Ray and Gamma-Ray Imaging Systems

X-ray and gamma-ray imaging are at the core of Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology, enabling CBP officers to detect contraband without the need for time-consuming manual searches.

1.1 How X-Ray Imaging Works

X-ray imaging technology uses high-energy electromagnetic waves to penetrate vehicles and cargo, creating detailed images of their contents. These images reveal hidden compartments, inconsistencies in packaging, and suspicious objects that may indicate the presence of illicit materials.

High-Energy X-Ray Scanners: Used primarily for cargo inspections, these scanners generate detailed cross-sectional images of large containers, allowing inspectors to detect irregularities.
Low-Energy X-Ray Scanners: Deployed for passenger vehicles and smaller items, these systems provide rapid screening with minimal radiation exposure.

1.2 Gamma-Ray Scanning Technology

Gamma-ray systems function similarly to X-rays but use gamma radiation sources instead of traditional X-ray tubes. These systems offer deeper penetration capabilities, making them effective for scanning dense cargo loads.

Passive Gamma-Ray Detection: Detects naturally occurring radiation from illicit nuclear materials.
Active Gamma-Ray Scanning: Uses a controlled gamma-ray source to inspect cargo for hidden threats.

1.3 Advantages and Implementation

Faster screening times compared to manual searches.
High-resolution imaging aids in the rapid identification of contraband.
Minimal disruption to trade and travel at ports of entry.

Chapter 2: Advanced Radiation and Chemical Detection

Beyond imaging systems, CBP integrates radiation and chemical detection technologies to enhance its interdiction efforts.

2.1 Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs)

These passive detection systems scan vehicles and cargo for illicit radioactive materials, helping to prevent nuclear and radiological threats from entering the U.S.

Strategic Placement: Deployed at key border crossings, ports, and checkpoints.
Real-Time Alerts: Triggers alarms when abnormal radiation levels are detected.

2.2 Trace Detection for Narcotics and Explosives

CBP uses advanced chemical sensors to identify traces of illicit substances, including fentanyl, methamphetamine, and explosive materials.

Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS): Detects microscopic traces of narcotics and explosives in cargo or vehicle compartments.
Mass Spectrometry (MS): Provides highly accurate chemical analysis for substance identification.

2.3 Integration with AI for Enhanced Detection

Artificial Intelligence (AI) enhances detection capabilities by analyzing sensor data and identifying anomalies that may indicate smuggling attempts. Machine learning algorithms help refine detection accuracy over time.

Chapter 3: Automated Threat Recognition and Artificial Intelligence

CBP is increasingly relying on artificial intelligence and automation to improve the efficiency and accuracy of Non-Intrusive Inspection systems.

3.1 AI-Driven Image Analysis

Machine learning models analyze X-ray and gamma-ray images to detect concealed compartments, unusual cargo densities, and potential threats.
AI-powered software can automatically flag suspicious areas for further inspection.

3.2 Automated Cargo Screening Systems

Automated scanning technology prioritizes high-risk shipments based on data analytics.
Smart algorithms assess shipping manifests, travel patterns, and cargo origins to identify suspicious activity.

3.3 Real-Time Data Sharing and Predictive Analytics

AI systems compile data from multiple NII technologies to create real-time risk assessments.
Law enforcement agencies use predictive analytics to anticipate smuggling tactics and deploy resources effectively.

Forward Operating Laboratories: To expedite the identification of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, CBP has established 16 Forward Operating Laboratories. These onsite facilities enable rapid testing of suspected substances, reducing analysis time from weeks to mere seconds. This swift turnaround accelerates law enforcement responses, supports timely prosecutions, and enhances intelligence gathering efforts. The implementation of these laboratories underscores DHS’s commitment to providing frontline personnel with the tools necessary for effective and immediate action against the synthetic drug threat.

Chapter 1: Rapid Drug Identification Technologies

The primary function of Forward Operating Laboratories is to identify fentanyl and other synthetic opioids quickly and accurately. To achieve this, CBP employs state-of-the-art chemical analysis technologies.

1.1 Portable Mass Spectrometry (MS)

Mass spectrometry is one of the most effective tools for identifying unknown substances. In Forward Operating Laboratories, portable MS devices allow frontline personnel to analyze drug samples in real time.

How It Works: MS breaks down substances into their molecular components, providing a chemical “fingerprint” that identifies fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine, and other narcotics.
Advantages:
- Highly accurate identification of synthetic opioids and their precursors.
- Capable of detecting minute traces of substances, even in complex mixtures.
- Reduces reliance on external lab testing, allowing immediate field action.

1.2 Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR)

FTIR is a non-destructive analysis technique that uses infrared light to determine the chemical composition of a sample.

Uses in Drug Detection:
- Identifies fentanyl analogs and cutting agents (such as xylazine and benzodiazepines).
- Works on solid and liquid samples without requiring chemical reagents.
Speed and Efficiency:
- Produces results in seconds.
- Helps law enforcement distinguish between controlled substances and legal pharmaceuticals.

1.3 Handheld Raman Spectroscopy

Uses laser-based technology to scan and identify chemical compounds without opening packaging.
Enables officers to test substances through plastic or glass containers, minimizing exposure risks.

Chapter 2: Enhancing Law Enforcement Response

The ability to rapidly test and confirm the presence of synthetic drugs drastically improves operational efficiency and safety for law enforcement.

2.1 Accelerated Decision-Making for Prosecutions

In traditional forensic labs, drug analysis could take weeks due to backlog and processing delays.
With Forward Operating Laboratories, CBP can provide conclusive test results within seconds, leading to immediate arrests and evidence submission.

2.2 Protecting First Responders from Fentanyl Exposure

Even a few milligrams of fentanyl can be lethal. Law enforcement officers risk exposure through inhalation or skin contact.
Forward Operating Labs allow for on-site substance verification, minimizing unnecessary handling and exposure.
Protective protocols include:
- Using portable fume hoods to contain airborne particles.
- Deploying Naloxone (Narcan) kits for overdose emergencies.

2.3 Cross-Agency Collaboration and Intelligence Sharing

Real-time reporting of drug seizures allows agencies to track trafficking patterns.
Data from Forward Operating Laboratories is shared with:
- DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) for national drug trends.
- HSI (Homeland Security Investigations) to dismantle smuggling networks.
- State and local law enforcement for coordinated interdictions.

Chapter 3: The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Drug Detection

CBP is integrating Artificial Intelligence (AI) to enhance the speed and accuracy of synthetic drug detection.

3.1 AI-Enhanced Chemical Profiling

AI analyzes molecular structures of synthetic drugs and their precursors to identify new analogs that may not yet be classified as controlled substances.
Machine learning models are trained on vast databases of known fentanyl compounds, helping to predict and detect emerging drug variants.

3.2 Automated Substance Classification

AI-driven spectroscopy software automatically compares samples against extensive chemical libraries.
The system flags suspicious new formulations that may require additional forensic investigation.

3.3 Predictive Analytics for Drug Trafficking

AI analyzes historical seizure data to identify trafficking trends.
Helps law enforcement anticipate smuggling routes and distribution hubs.
Predictive models assist in strategic resource deployment to high-risk locations.

Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning at Ports of Entry: CBP is leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) technologies to enhance screening processes at ports of entry. In the current year alone, AI-driven models have been instrumental in identifying suspicious vehicles and passengers, leading to 240 seizures. These interdictions have resulted in the confiscation of thousands of pounds of illicit narcotics, including cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl. The integration of AI and ML into inspection protocols enables more precise targeting of high-risk entities, thereby improving operational efficiency and effectiveness.

Chapter 1: AI and Machine Learning in Border Security Screening

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is integrating Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) into its screening procedures to enhance detection and interdiction efforts at ports of entry. These technologies significantly improve CBP’s ability to identify high-risk vehicles, cargo, and passengers, reducing reliance on manual inspections while increasing overall effectiveness.

1.1 How AI Enhances Border Inspections

Traditional border security relies on trained officers analyzing documents, traveler behaviors, and cargo manifests. AI-driven solutions complement these efforts by:

Risk-Based Targeting: AI models assess vast amounts of data to identify passengers, shipments, and vehicles with suspicious characteristics.
Automated Image and X-ray Analysis: Machine learning processes X-ray and gamma-ray scans to detect anomalies in cargo and vehicle compartments.
Facial Recognition and Biometric Screening: AI compares traveler biometrics against watchlists of known criminals and traffickers.

1.2 Real-World Impact: AI-Led Seizures and Interdictions

The integration of AI at U.S. ports of entry has led to 240 seizures in the current year alone, preventing the smuggling of:

Cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl – AI-assisted interdictions have confiscated thousands of pounds of illicit drugs.
Illegal firearms and ammunition – AI flagging systems have detected smuggled weapons disguised as legitimate cargo.
Human trafficking cases – AI-powered analytics have identified high-risk individuals and trafficking patterns, preventing forced migration and exploitation.

1.3 AI’s Role in Passenger and Cargo Inspection Efficiency

AI-driven passenger screening allows CBP officers to quickly assess traveler risk factors while maintaining normal processing speeds.
Machine learning models have improved cargo screening accuracy, reducing false positives and ensuring legitimate trade flows efficiently.
AI-based fraud detection systems have identified hundreds of cases of document forgery and identity fraud at border checkpoints.

Chapter 2: Machine Learning Models for Suspicious Activity Detection

Machine learning plays a key role in automating threat detection, making ports of entry more secure and efficient.

2.1 How Machine Learning Identifies High-Risk Passengers and Cargo

CBP uses machine learning algorithms to analyze various data points from:

Travel history and patterns: Identifies passengers with unusual or high-risk movement behaviors.
Cargo shipping data: Flags shipments that do not match declared cargo descriptions or standard trade patterns.
License plate and vehicle recognition: Detects cars associated with prior smuggling incidents or registered to known traffickers.

2.2 AI-Powered X-ray and Gamma-Ray Cargo Screening

CBP utilizes non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology enhanced by AI to scan and analyze cargo shipments.

AI compares scan images against a database of known smuggling patterns, quickly identifying contraband hidden within commercial shipments.
Deep learning enhances object recognition, differentiating between legal and illicit cargo.
AI-assisted vehicle inspections reduce false alerts, allowing officers to focus on truly suspicious cases.

2.3 AI in Biometric and Facial Recognition Screening

At high-traffic land, air, and sea entry points, AI enhances biometric screening:

Facial recognition systems compare live images to databases of known criminals and traffickers.
Deepfake detection prevents identity fraud, ensuring passports and visas are legitimate.
AI-driven behavioral analysis flags travelers exhibiting suspicious body language or inconsistent travel histories.

2.4 Success Stories from AI-Driven Machine Learning Systems

In 2023, AI-powered screening identified a drug smuggling attempt hidden in fruit shipments, leading to a multi-million-dollar fentanyl seizure.
Machine learning-driven risk assessments flagged a human trafficking operation, leading to the rescue of multiple victims at a major airport.

Chapter 3: The Future of AI and Machine Learning at Ports of Entry

As CBP continues expanding its AI capabilities, future innovations will further strengthen border security.

3.1 Predictive Analytics for Smuggling Prevention

AI models forecast smuggling trends, allowing officers to proactively adjust screening protocols.
Geospatial intelligence maps high-risk border crossings and smuggling routes in real-time.
Enhanced AI-driven anomaly detection will improve early-stage identification of hidden compartments and concealed drugs.

3.2 Integrating AI with International Intelligence Networks

AI-driven systems will facilitate greater collaboration with global agencies, including:

INTERPOL and Europol for real-time data sharing on international drug and human trafficking suspects.
AI-enhanced financial tracking to trace drug cartel funds across global banking networks.
Automated cargo tracking systems that alert law enforcement to high-risk shipments before they reach U.S. borders.

3.3 Expanding AI Capabilities for Future Border Security Challenges

CBP is exploring next-generation AI technologies, such as:

Quantum computing to process massive intelligence datasets in seconds.
AI-assisted drones and autonomous surveillance to monitor remote border areas.
AI-driven deepfake detection to counter advanced identity fraud techniques used by traffickers.

HSI Strategic Network Dismantlement Project: Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is employing AI to map and dismantle fentanyl distribution networks operating domestically and internationally. Through the Strategic Network Dismantlement Project, data engineers and scientists collaborate with HSI investigators using the RAVEN platform. This initiative involves analyzing vast datasets to uncover previously unidentified networks, providing actionable insights that disrupt the global supply chain of synthetic opioids. By illuminating these clandestine operations, HSI enhances its capacity to combat the distribution of fentanyl and its precursors.

Chapter 1: Artificial Intelligence in Criminal Network Mapping

The HSI Strategic Network Dismantlement Project leverages Artificial Intelligence (AI) to identify, track, and dismantle fentanyl trafficking networks operating both in the U.S. and internationally.

1.1 How AI Maps Drug Networks

AI-driven models analyze massive datasets from various sources to establish connections between known and unknown drug traffickers.

Pattern Recognition: AI algorithms detect recurring transactions, shipping routes, and communication channels used by traffickers.
Social Network Analysis (SNA): Identifies key players within a criminal organization by analyzing relationships between suspects, suppliers, and distributors.
Anomaly Detection: Machine learning flags suspicious financial transactions, unusually large shipments, or encrypted communications linked to drug operations.

1.2 Data Sources for Network Dismantlement

HSI integrates AI with data from multiple sources to build a comprehensive picture of fentanyl distribution networks:

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Seizure Data – Tracks patterns of fentanyl smuggling across U.S. borders.
Financial Transaction Records – AI scans banking transactions for money laundering linked to drug sales.
Dark Web and Encrypted Communications – Monitors illicit marketplaces where fentanyl and its precursors are traded.
Shipping and Logistics Data – Identifies shipments suspected of carrying synthetic opioids.

1.3 Case Study: AI-Driven Network Disruptions

In 2023, HSI-led AI investigations uncovered a major fentanyl ring operating through online pharmacies. AI analysis of financial transactions linked over $100 million in illicit drug proceeds to offshore accounts.
Following the AI findings, HSI executed multiple arrests and shut down distribution hubs in five states.

Chapter 2: The RAVEN Platform – AI-Powered Intelligence for Law Enforcement

At the heart of the Strategic Network Dismantlement Project is RAVEN, a cutting-edge AI platform developed by HSI to analyze and visualize complex criminal operations.

2.1 What is the RAVEN Platform?

RAVEN is an advanced data analytics system that helps investigators track and dismantle fentanyl distribution networks. It combines AI, machine learning, and big data processing to reveal hidden connections in drug trafficking operations.

Graph-Based Intelligence: Uses AI-driven mapping to connect individuals, companies, and transactions in a drug network.
Real-Time Data Correlation: Continuously updates connections between suspects, shipments, and financial records.
Predictive Threat Analysis: Forecasts future trafficking routes and smuggling tactics based on historical patterns.

2.2 Key Features of RAVEN

Automated Entity Matching: AI links drug seizures to known traffickers by analyzing shipping manifests, phone records, and financial transactions.
Cross-Border Intelligence Sharing: Connects data between domestic and international law enforcement agencies to trace fentanyl supply chains.
Deep Learning for Drug Trend Prediction: Identifies emerging synthetic opioid variations and new precursor sources.

2.3 Success Stories from the RAVEN Platform

In a recent operation, RAVEN’s analysis led to the dismantling of a fentanyl production ring linked to Mexican cartels. By connecting digital transactions to known cartel members, law enforcement seized over 1,500 pounds of fentanyl before distribution.
RAVEN’s financial crime analysis helped uncover a major cryptocurrency-based fentanyl laundering scheme, leading to multiple arrests and asset seizures exceeding $50 million.

Chapter 3: AI-Powered Disruption of the Global Fentanyl Supply Chain

By leveraging AI and data science, HSI is not just identifying drug networks—it is disrupting the global supply chain that fuels the fentanyl crisis.

3.1 Identifying Fentanyl Precursors at the Source

Fentanyl precursors—chemicals used to manufacture synthetic opioids—are often shipped from international sources before being processed into fentanyl. AI-driven investigations help:

Track precursor shipments from China, India, and Mexico to illicit labs in North America.
Use predictive analytics to flag suspicious chemical exports before they reach drug manufacturers.
Coordinate with foreign law enforcement agencies to disrupt production facilities.

3.2 Shutting Down Digital and Financial Operations

Traffickers use cryptocurrency, encrypted messaging, and dark web markets to evade detection. AI helps law enforcement:

Unmask dark web fentanyl vendors by tracing cryptocurrency transactions through blockchain analysis.
Detect patterns of online drug sales, helping authorities take down illicit marketplaces.
Monitor shell companies and front businesses used for laundering drug money.

3.3 Strengthening Global Partnerships

AI-driven insights from the Strategic Network Dismantlement Project are shared with INTERPOL, Europol, and foreign task forces to combat transnational crime.
HSI collaborates with foreign financial institutions to flag suspicious transactions linked to fentanyl trafficking.
By combining AI with real-time intelligence sharing, law enforcement can prevent shipments before they reach U.S. soil.

HSI Innovation Lab: The HSI Innovation Lab serves as a hub for developing and deploying cutting-edge technologies, including machine learning and artificial intelligence, to combat the fentanyl crisis. This facility focuses on harnessing data analytics to identify patterns and trends associated with synthetic drug trafficking. By integrating advanced technological solutions, the Innovation Lab supports proactive measures to intercept and dismantle illicit operations before they reach U.S. borders. This proactive approach is vital in addressing the dynamic and evolving nature of synthetic drug threats.

Chapter 1: Machine Learning and AI in Drug Trafficking Analysis

The HSI Innovation Lab plays a crucial role in leveraging machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) to combat synthetic drug trafficking. By analyzing vast amounts of data, these technologies help law enforcement stay ahead of evolving fentanyl distribution tactics.

1.1 How Machine Learning Detects Drug Trafficking Patterns

Machine learning (ML) algorithms process extensive datasets to identify hidden trends and suspicious activities linked to fentanyl smuggling.

Predictive Modeling: ML predicts future smuggling methods by analyzing past interdictions, seizures, and law enforcement reports.
Anomaly Detection: Algorithms detect unusual financial transactions, shipping routes, and communications that may indicate illicit activity.
Natural Language Processing (NLP): AI scans encrypted messages, dark web forums, and social media for references to synthetic drug trade.

1.2 AI-Driven Risk Assessment for Interdiction Efforts

AI enhances CBP and HSI’s ability to prioritize high-risk shipments and individuals for further investigation.

Automated Cargo Screening: Machine learning models evaluate cargo manifests to flag suspicious shipments.
Passenger and Travel Pattern Analysis: AI analyzes visa applications, flight bookings, and border crossings to detect traffickers.
Cryptocurrency Transaction Monitoring: AI traces digital currency payments linked to fentanyl sales on dark web marketplaces.

1.3 Success Stories in AI-Based Drug Interdiction

In a recent HSI-led operation, machine learning identified a fentanyl trafficking network by analyzing over 3 million financial transactions. This led to the seizure of over 800,000 counterfeit fentanyl pills before distribution.
AI-powered image recognition software detected fentanyl concealed in food shipments, preventing large-scale drug smuggling attempts.

Chapter 2: Data Analytics and Real-Time Intelligence for Law Enforcement

The HSI Innovation Lab is a leader in data-driven investigations, using real-time intelligence to prevent fentanyl trafficking before it reaches U.S. communities.

2.1 Big Data Integration for Fentanyl Supply Chain Analysis

The lab consolidates multiple data streams to track fentanyl production and distribution, including:

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Seizure Data: Tracks historical trafficking routes.
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Shipments: Monitors precursor chemical exports.
Financial Intelligence Reports: Identifies money laundering patterns linked to drug trade.

2.2 Dark Web and Encrypted Communication Monitoring

The dark web is a major marketplace for fentanyl distribution. HSI’s Innovation Lab uses advanced analytics to track and disrupt illicit online operations.

AI scrapes dark web forums and vendor listings to identify and target fentanyl sellers.
Blockchain forensics tools analyze cryptocurrency transactions, revealing hidden financial networks.
Deepfake and synthetic identity detection prevent traffickers from using AI-generated personas to evade law enforcement.

2.3 Enhancing Collaboration Through Real-Time Intelligence Sharing

The Innovation Lab provides instant intelligence updates to HSI field offices, DEA, FBI, and foreign partners.
AI-driven alerts help agencies respond in real time to fentanyl shipments or suspicious financial activities.
Automated forensic analysis allows faster prosecution of traffickers by providing law enforcement with concrete digital evidence.

Chapter 3: Proactive Measures and Future Innovations

The HSI Innovation Lab is not just reacting to drug trafficking trends—it is developing next-generation tools to proactively dismantle synthetic drug operations.

3.1 AI-Powered Forensics for Drug Identification

Automated Substance Profiling: AI analyzes fentanyl analogs, helping labs classify new drug variations.
Portable Spectroscopy Devices: Machine learning refines chemical signatures, enhancing on-the-spot drug testing.

3.2 Predictive Analytics for Global Drug Supply Chains

AI assesses international precursor chemical production trends, predicting future fentanyl sources.
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT): Tracks fentanyl lab locations via satellite imaging and AI-driven terrain analysis.
Behavioral Analysis Models: Identifies suspicious chemical purchase orders and shipping manifests before drugs reach traffickers.

3.3 Future-Proofing Law Enforcement with Emerging Technologies

The Innovation Lab continuously explores new frontiers in technology to combat synthetic opioids:

Quantum Computing for Advanced Encryption Breaking: HSI is testing quantum-based decryption tools to counter cartel communications.
AI-Powered Deepfake Detection: Prevents traffickers from using synthetic identities for money laundering and border crossings.
Autonomous Surveillance Drones: AI-controlled UAVs patrol known smuggling corridors, enhancing border security.

In summary, DHS’s multifaceted strategy combines technological innovation, rapid response capabilities, and interagency collaboration to address the complex challenges posed by synthetic drugs. Through the deployment of advanced inspection systems, real-time substance analysis, and AI-driven intelligence operations, DHS aims to significantly reduce the influx of synthetic opioids into the United States, thereby safeguarding public health and national security.

White House: Trump’s First Month Rolling Agenda “Big League”

HLS.Today — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 04:36:09 +0000

“President Trump said from the start: criminal illegals have no place in our homeland. He is keeping his promise.” – Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem

HLS.Today – WASHINGTON – In a single month, President Trump and Secretary Noem have made massive strides to address the crisis at the southern border and remove violent criminal aliens from American communities. This is just the beginning of the golden age of America.

PROMISES MADE, PROMISES KEPT:

On day one, President Trump declared a national emergency at the southern border and restarted construction of the border wall.
President Trump instantly reinstated “Remain in Mexico” and ended catch and release.
The Trump administration has empowered our brave men and women in ICE, Border Patrol, and Coast Guard to use common sense to do their jobs effectively.
DHS has repealed Biden Era rules that allowed criminal aliens to hide from law enforcement in places like schools and churches to avoid arrest.
DHS returned to using the term “illegal alien” to use statutory language and stop political correctness from hindering law enforcement.
ICE arrests of criminal aliens have doubled and arrests of fugitives at large has tripled.
Daily border encounters have plunged 93% since President Trump took office.
To fulfill President Trump’s promise to carry out mass deportations, the administration is detaining illegal aliens, including violent criminals, at Guantanamo Bay.
President Trump designated international cartels and other criminal gangs, such as MS-13 and Tren de Aragua, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
President Trump signed the Laken Riley Act which mandates the federal detention of illegal immigrants who are accused of theft, burglary, assaulting a law enforcement officer, and any crime that causes death or serious bodily injury.
President Trump stopped the broad abuse of humanitarian parole and returned the program to a case-by-case basis.
Secretary Noem ended the previous administration’s extension of Venezuelan Temporary Protected Status.
DHS froze all grants to non-profit organizations that facilitate illegal immigration.
DHS deputized the Texas National Guard, Drug Enforcement Administration, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Marshals, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, members of the State Department and the IRS to help with immigration operations.
Secretary Noem clawed back $80 million that FEMA deep state activists unilaterally gave to put illegal aliens up in luxury New York City hotels.

Bottom Line: Since President Trump was inaugurated, he’s made it clear there is a new sheriff in town. The President and Secretary Noem will continue fighting every day to secure our borders and keep American communities safe.

Source: dhs.gov

Israel Hacks Beirut Airport Control Tower to Prevent Iranian Aircraft from Landing

HLS.Today — Sun, 29 Sep 2024 04:21:38 +0000

The Lebanese Transport Minister reported that he quickly intervened and prohibited the landing of that aircraft.

Israel has allegedly breached the communication network of the control tower at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport and warned an Iranian plane against landing, prompting the aircraft to turn around and return to Tehran, Israeli media reported on Saturday.

According to reports, Israel supposedly hacked into the communications system of the Beirut control tower, warning that it would not allow the landing of a cargo plane from “Qasem Air,” Flight No. QFZ9964, as it was approaching for landing.

Lebanon’s Transport Minister, Ali Hamieh, stated to the Lebanese newspaper “An-Nahar” that the IDF intercepted the radio frequency of the international airport’s control tower and warned that it would attack the airport if an Iranian civilian aircraft on its way to Lebanon landed there.

The minister reported that he quickly intervened and prohibited the landing of that aircraft.

IDF strikes Hezbollah leadership in Beirut

The tension concerning flights from Iran landing in Lebanon is in light of the IDF’s spokesperson’s official announcement that the IDF eliminated Hezbollah’s co-founder and leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, along with Ali Karaki, the commander of Hezbollah’s Southern Front, and additional commanders from Hezbollah.

Following the announcement in which the operation’s name was revealed as “New Order,” the IDF Chief of Staff stated, “This is not the end of our arsenal. The message is simple: for anyone who threatens the citizens of the State of Israel – we will know how to reach you.”

The IDF further reported that “IAF fighter jets, guided by precise intelligence from the Intelligence Division and the security system, targeted Hezbollah’s central headquarters, which is located underground beneath a residential building in the Dahieh area of Beirut. The strike occurred while Hezbollah’s senior leadership was at the headquarters, coordinating terrorist activities against the citizens of the State of Israel.”

Source: JPOST and HLS.Today

DHS-China: More Companies on Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act

HLS.Today — Wed, 14 Aug 2024 03:37:22 +0000

DHS.GOV. HLS.Today – The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) establishes a rebuttable presumption that the importation of any goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China, or produced by certain entities, is prohibited by Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and that such goods, wares, articles, and merchandise are not entitled to entry to the United States.

The presumption applies unless the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) determines, through clear and convincing evidence, that the goods, wares, articles, or merchandise were not produced using forced labor or that UFLPA does not apply to the goods, wares, or merchandise seeking to be entered into the United States. The statistics provided below are shipments subjected to UFLPA reviews or enforcement actions.

Today, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the addition of five entities based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List, bringing the total entities listed to 73. These additions build on DHS’s commitment to eradicate forced labor and promote accountability for the PRC’s ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs and other religious and ethnic minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

Effective August 9, 2024, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) will apply a rebuttable presumption that goods produced by Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd., Kashgar, Construction Engineering (Group) Co.; Ltd., Rare Earth Magnesium Technology Group Holdings, Ltd.; Xinjiang Habahe Ashele Copper Co., Ltd., and Xinjiang Tengxiang Magnesium Products Co., Ltd. will be prohibited from entering the United States.

“As DHS identifies more entities across different sectors that use or facilitate forced labor, we act to keep their tainted goods out of our nation’s supply chains,” said Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas. “Today’s announcement strengthens our enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and helps responsible companies conduct due diligence so that, together, we can keep the products of forced labor out of our country.  We will continue to implement this law with full force in our efforts to fight the exploitation and abuse of the Uyghur people and other persecuted groups and protect a free and fair market.”

Including the five entities identified today, the FLETF – chaired by DHS and whose member agencies also include the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Justice, Labor, State, and the Treasury – has added 73 entities to the UFLPA Entity List since the UFLPA was signed into law in December 2021.

The UFLPA Entity List includes companies that are active in the apparel, agriculture, polysilicon, plastics, chemicals, batteries, household appliances, electronics, and food additives sectors, among others. Identifying these additional entities provides U.S. importers with more information to conduct due diligence and examine their supply chains for risks of forced labor to ensure compliance with the UFLPA.

“We have shown again through today’s enforcement actions that the United States is committed to keeping goods made with forced labor out of U.S. supply chains,” said DHS Under Secretary for Policy Robert Silvers, who serves as Chair of the FLETF. “Companies must conduct due diligence and know where their products are coming from. The Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force will continue to designate entities in a variety of sectors that meet the criteria for inclusion on the UFLPA Entity List, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection will continue its vigilant enforcement at our ports.”

The FLETF has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that two entities meet the criteria for inclusion under Section 2(d)(2)(B)(ii) of the UFLPA by working with the government of the XUAR to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor or receive forced labor of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of the XUAR;

two entities meet the criteria for inclusion under Section 2(d)2(B)(v) of the UFLPA, which identifies facilities and entities that source material from the XUAR or from persons working with the government of Xinjiang or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for purposes of the “poverty alleviation” program or the “pairing-assistance” program or any other government labor scheme that uses forced labor; and one entity meets both criteria under Sections 2(d)(2)(B)(ii) and (v) of the UFLPA.

Xinjiang Habahe Ashele Copper Co., Ltd. is a company located in the XUAR that mines nonferrous metals, including zinc, copper and silver. Xinjiang Habahe Ashele Copper Co., Ltd. is a subsidiary of one of the world’s largest mining company, and produces approximately 10% of that company’s copper and silver. The United States Government has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that Xinjiang Habahe Ashele Copper Co., Ltd. works with the government of the XUAR to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, or receive Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of the XUAR.

Information reviewed by the FLETF, including publicly available information, indicates that Xinjiang Habahe Ashele Copper Co., Ltd. works with the Habahe County government of the XUAR to recruit Kazakh workers through PRC labor programs to mine metals, such as zinc, copper, and silver in the XUAR . The FLETF therefore determined that the activities of Xinjiang Habahe Ashele Copper Co., Ltd. satisfy the criteria for addition to the UFLPA Entity List described in section 2(d)(2)(B)(ii).

Kashgar Construction Engineering (Group) Co., Ltd. is a company based in Kashgar, Xinjiang, China, that manufactures structural components and materials for construction, and is engaged in general construction, construction engineering and operations, and real estate development and operations. The United States Government has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that Kashgar Construction Engineering (Group) Co., Ltd. works with the government of the XUAR to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, or receive Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of the XUAR.

Information reviewed by the FLETF, including publicly available information, indicates that Kashgar Construction Engineering (Group) Co., Ltd. has repeatedly participated in the transfer and recruitment of ethnic minorities from Xinjiang, including Uyghurs, through Jiashi County Xinjiang government labor programs. The FLETF therefore determined that the activities of Kashgar Construction Engineering (Group) Co., Ltd. satisfy the criteria for addition to the UFLPA Entity List described in section 2(d)(2)(B)(ii).

Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd. is a company based in Hong Kong that manufactures magnesium fertilizer and magnesium alloys. The United States Government has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd. sources material, specifically magnesium, from the XUAR. Information reviewed by the FLETF, including publicly available information, indicates that Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd. has established its magnesium production base in the XUAR through its vertically-integrated subsidiaries, and sources magnesium from the XUAR.

The FLETF therefore determined that the activities of Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd. satisfy the criteria for addition to the UFLPA Entity List described in section 2(d)(2)(B)(v).

Rare Earth Magnesium Technology Group Holdings, Ltd. is a company based in Hong Kong that manufactures and sells magnesium alloy products. The United States Government has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that Rare Earth Magnesium Technology Group Holdings, Ltd. sources material, specifically magnesium, from the XUAR.

Information reviewed by the FLETF, including publicly available information, indicates that Rare Earth Magnesium Technology Group Holdings, Ltd., a principal subsidiary of Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd., operates Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd.’s magnesium product business, and sources magnesium from its magnesium production base located in the XUAR. The FLETF therefore determined that the activities of Rare Earth Magnesium Technology Group Holdings, Ltd. satisfy the criteria for addition to the UFLPA Entity List described in section 2(d)(2)(B)(v).

Xinjiang Tengxiang Magnesium Products Co., Ltd. is a company based in Hami, Xinjiang, China, that manufactures magnesium and magnesium alloy products. The United States Government has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that Xinjiang Tengxiang Magnesium Products Co., Ltd. works with the government of the XUAR to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, or receive Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of the XUAR.

Information reviewed by the FLETF, including publicly available information, indicates that Xinjiang Tengxiang Magnesium Products Co., Ltd. receives Uyghurs or members of other persecuted groups that the local Yizhou District government transfer from Xinjiang. The United States Government also has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that Xinjiang Tengxiang Magnesium Products Co., Ltd. sources material, specifically the raw materials required to produce magnesium, such as coal and dolomite, from the XUAR.

Information reviewed by the FLETF, including publicly available information, indicates that Xinjiang Tengxiang Magnesium Products Co., Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rare Earth Magnesium Technology Group Holdings, Ltd. and a principal subsidiary of Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd., operates a magnesium production facility in the XUAR and sources raw materials from the XUAR, including coal and dolomite, to produce magnesium. The FLETF therefore determined that the activities of Xinjiang Tengxiang Magnesium Products Co., Ltd. satisfy the criteria for addition to the UFLPA Entity List described in sections 2(d)(2)(B)(ii) and 2(d)(2)(B)(v).

The bipartisan Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, signed into law by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., in December 2021, mandates that CBP apply a rebuttable presumption that goods mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in the XUAR or produced by entities identified on the UFLPA Entity List are prohibited from importation into the United States unless the Commissioner of CBP determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that the goods were not produced with forced labor.

CBP began enforcing the UFLPA in June 2022.  Since then, CBP has reviewed over 9,000 shipments valued at more than $3.4 billion under the UFLPA.  Additionally, Homeland Security Investigations, through the DHS Center for Countering Human Trafficking, conducts criminal investigations into those engaging in or otherwise knowingly benefitting from forced labor, and collaborates with international partners to seek justice for victims.

Today’s announcement supports President Biden’s Memorandum on Advancing Worker Empowerment, Rights, and High Labor Standards Globally.  The memorandum represents the first whole-of-government approach to advance workers’ rights by directing federal agencies engaged abroad to advance international recognized labor rights, which includes DHS’s work implementing the UFLPA.

This expansion of the UFLPA Entity List reflects DHS’s prioritization of efforts to combat the introduction of forced labor into U.S. supply chains. This commitment is outlined in the Department’s recent Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which added combating crimes of exploitation, including labor exploitation, as the newest and sixth DHS mission. Last month, DHS published updates to the UFLPA strategy, which outlines how the FLETF has significantly advanced our objectives through several initiatives including strong enforcement by CBP; expansion of the UFLPA Entity List; designating new high priority sectors for enforcement; and greater collaboration with stakeholders.

HLS.Today

Amid Gaza Evacuation US President Biden Travels to Israel

HLS.Today — Tue, 17 Oct 2023 16:06:28 +0000

HLS.Today – President joseph r. biden, jr. will travel to israel on wednesday, october 18, to demonstrate his steadfast support for israel in the face of hamas’s brutal terrorist attack and to consult on next steps.

president biden will then travel to amman, jordan, where he will meet with his majesty king abdullah, egyptian president sisi, and palestinian authority president mahmoud abbas. he will reiterate that hamas does not stand for the palestinian people’s right to dignity and self-determination and discuss the humanitarian needs of civilians in gaza.

from israel, thank you very much for starting off our coverage at this hour. thank you. >> and joining us now is ben rhodes, former deputy national security adviser for president obama. he is an msnbc political analyst. ben, it seems likely that israel will not launch a land invasion, or ground invasion of gaza before president biden leaves israel.
>> yes, lawrence. i can’t imagine that israel would do that, both because of the potential risk of escalation while president biden is there. and also, just because i think the purpose of this visit is to have a consultation, a full, robust, comprehensive consultation between president biden and the israeli government before they launch that invasion. so, i think that this indicates that the timeline for that ground invasion is likely moving a bit to the right here. >> in the less than three minutes, secretary blinken laid out the agenda for president biden when he comes to israel. he easily described the single most important meeting by a president of the united states in israel that has ever occurred.
>> yes, not even close, lawrence. i mean, this is absolutely unprecedented. obviously, what’s happened in israel’s unprecedented. the risk of regional escalation is unprecedented. and the idea of a president being in that kind of circumstance, where there is literal danger in terms of the rockets that are continue to come at tel aviv, but also, there whisks about not knowing where exactly this is going. what is clear is that secretary blinken was on that trip. he went to every major partner, partner in the region, after consulting with israel. and clearly, what he determined is there are a number of issues where it’s absolutely central to the u.s. and israel, they’re on the same page. how do we prevent regional escalation?
what is the messaging that has to be done to iran, and groups like hezbollah, to prevent escalation? how can we ensure a sufficient humanitarian component to end the israeli operation in gaza that does not set the region on fire? and i’m sure that’s the message that secretary blinken was getting from those air partners, that we have to take every step possible to both have an israeli operation, and also mitigates the arm to palestinian civilians. clearly, secretary blinken took all those messages from arab leaders back to israel, compared notes, and saw whether or not the time was right for president biden to step in like this. and the fact that he was meeting with seven hours with prime minister netanyahu indicate this is real substance, right? this wasn’t window dressing, the secretary meeting with a foreign leader to the presidents visit. they were really negotiating the agenda, the deliverables, the announcements that will come from president biden as well during that visit.
>> yeah, at the washington post is reporting, u.s. officials waited to announce president biden’s traveled to israel until they received commitments from israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu on a humanitarian package monday night, according to two u.s. officials familiar with the discussions. and then, that’s all about that seven-hour meeting that secretary blinken was in.
>> that’s right. and you heard even in his remarks, tony’s remarks, i think they clearly indicated what the back and forth and the points of tension are on this. on the one hand, there is an overwhelming imperative to address the humanitarian crisis in gaza, and that is growing more acute. and then, again, it really was the concern that tony blinken heard from all the different arab leaders, and obviously from leaders around the world. on the other hand, you heard in his messaging what the israelis are concerned about, which is that we provide a humanitarian corridor into gaza. we start shipping eight into gaza. if we create safe zones in gaza, then hamas we manipulate that, that they will dispute disrupt the aid, try to get their hands on things that might be used for military purposes as well. so, i think you heard, even though you heard those remarks from tony blinken, we heard exactly what was discussed in that meeting with prime minister netanyahu, which is that u.s. wanting to make sure that there was a commitment to humanitarian effort to alleviate the situation in gaza. but israel wanting to hear from the united states that we understand that there is a risk that hamas could try to take advantage of that. and that clearly was a big part of the discussion in that meeting that tony blinken had in israel.
>> there is a lesson, i would say, in the last 24 hours for people watching this coverage across television networks, with the president last night on 60 minutes, he was asked, pressed about humanitarian aid in gaza. and he was minimally forthcoming. he certainly said that it is necessary, we have to figure out something. the team is working on something. and of course, much more was going on than what was indicated in his answers 24 hours ago. 24 hours later, you see a hint of how much more. and of course, that means whatever we know tonight, there is even more going on underneath that.
>> that’s exactly right, lawrence. i have been in situations like this. this one is perhaps more acute. but what has been going on is constant communication between the secretary of defense, the pentagon, and the idf, between i’m sure, the nsc, national security adviser, tony sullivan and his counterparts. tony blinken did a shuttle of diplomacy around the region. and really, the position of united states has meant — president biden has put himself in. he saw the trauma that this attack imposed on israel, they were thick nature of it. and their imperative to respond. he wrapped his arms around israel, quite literally, with his initial messaging. but then, obviously, they’re also looking to see there’s risk here. there is risk that this military operation goes forward in haste, that it could prompt a regional escalation. as we’ve talked about, hezbollah coming in, the west bank exploding, air public opinion exploding. there is risk, obviously, to the civilians in gaza. clearly, what the united states has been trying to do, saying to israel, let’s take just a moment here, and think through how can we manage this operation? we know you are going to undertake that in ways that mitigate that risk. but they’re more likely to prevent regional escalation. we, the united states, we’ll show you our commitment to our security, not just through our messaging, but by two aircraft carrier groups that are being sent to this mission to send a message to iran to stay out of this. at the same time, though, we need to see something from israel that indicates that they understand that the world is watching the humans are in crisis in gaza as well. it is incredibly complicated, but clearly, the administration once that messaging done in private, when it comes to the nature of the content crisis and how to alleviate that. the only tip of the hand, president biden does not want to see a full reoccupation of gaza. but underneath that, in order for his visit to happen, because it is incredibly consequential and a risky step, lawrence. they are leaning into this thing. there was this, you have ownership of whatever happens next. but the reward is you can impact and you can prevent that regional escalation. and you might be able to alleviate the humanitarian crisis. and clearly, joe biden is determined that it’s better to lean in and try to have a new patio and dick summers about where this thing might go, then to step back.
>> president biden, he always seems to have his eye on the risk, and of course the possible reward but then also. and perhaps more than others have in the past in israel, what he sees as his duty.
>> yes. you know, it’s both something people into would’ve too. and i don’t know how many times i was in a room with president biden when he would tell the story about going there in the 70s for the first time and meeting with prime minister gould mayer of israel, and telling him that the reason that we’re gonna be here is that we don’t have anywhere else to go. it’s something he feels intuitively. the other thing that i think is really important, lawrence, psychologically, i think, he understands that israelis feel vulnerable right now. they feel isolated. it is always the case. there are few places on earth where people are more appreciative of visits, of people stepping feet on the ground than israel. i can’t even imagine what the impact of this visit will be on the psychology of israel, given how vulnerable people are feeling right now. they are seeing — the united states government literally is charging plants, planes to get americans out. and yet, there is the president of the red states flying in. that is an incredibly powerful thing. i don’t think we even can grasp how much this will even mean. but there’s a lot to be done. this is substantive meeting as well.

HLS.Today DHS.GOV

POTUS Situation Room status of Israel War on Hamas in Gaza

HLS.Today — Sun, 15 Oct 2023 07:37:30 +0000

HLS.Today – This morning, we sat down with our national security teams to receive a situation update on the terrorist attack in Israel and to give direction on next steps.

We connected with Prime Minister Netanyahu to discuss our ongoing coordination to support Israel, deter other hostile actors, and protect innocent people.

A photograph of President Joe Biden in the White House Situation Room has generated online speculation that the 80-year-old leader may be experiencing cognitive decline.

Posted on President Biden’s official account on Tuesday, the photo captures several administration officials engaged in a meeting concerning the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine. However, a specific detail within the image has drawn the attention of certain online users: the name placards displayed on the Situation Room table.

On various social media platforms, individuals have pointed out the perceived unusualness of all the placards facing President Biden instead of their respective owners.

“Take a look at their nameplates,” one user commented. “They seem to be turned toward President Biden, presumably to help him identify who they are. It’s quite a peculiar scene.”

Blinken Holds Meeting with Saudi Crown Prince

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken convened with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh as the Biden administration strives to avert the escalation of the Israel-Hamas conflict into a broader regional crisis.

Blinken and the crown prince engaged in a conversation on Sunday, lasting slightly less than an hour, at his private estate just outside the capital, according to U.S. officials. When asked about the meeting’s outcome, Blinken responded with “very productive,” but no further immediate details were disclosed. The meeting, originally anticipated for late Saturday night but postponed, remained closed to the media.

These discussions occurred mere hours after the Israeli military issued a warning about an imminent full-scale offensive on Hamas positions in the Gaza Strip, amidst increasingly dire concerns regarding the potentially devastating consequences for Palestinian civilians as a ground invasion loomed.

Prince Mohammed marked the sixth Arab leader that Blinken met with in person since his arrival in the Middle East on Thursday. His journey began in Israel, where he reaffirmed the Biden administration’s commitment to supporting and standing with Israel. Blinken subsequently visited leaders in Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. He also has plans to visit Egypt later on Sunday.

HLS.Today DHS.GOV

Secretary Blinken Enroute to Israel and Jordan

HLS.Today — Wed, 11 Oct 2023 06:06:10 +0000

HLS.Today – Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken will travel to Israel and Jordan October 11-13, 2023, where he will meet with senior officials. The Secretary will reiterate his condolences for the victims of the terrorist attacks against Israel and condemn those attacks in the strongest terms.  The Secretary will also reaffirm the United States’ solidarity with the government and people of Israel.  He will also discuss measures to bolster Israel’s security and underscore the United States’ unwavering support for Israel’s right to defend itself.

Resources and Information for Faith and Community Leaders Regarding the Situation in Israel

DHS is closely monitoring unfolding events in Israel and Gaza and will share relevant information with our partners and communities to ensure they are prepared for any impacts to public safety. On October 7, DHS and the FBI jointly issued a public safety notice indicating that no specific and credible threats have been identified at this time.

DHS encourages communities to be alert, vigilant and prepared. Below are a variety of DHS resources that may be helpful to organizations:

Resources for Community Organizations and Service Providers

Training and course offerings, services, and funding resources for community organizations to address targeted violence.

Security and Resilience Resources for At-Risk Communities

Provides a range of physical security and community resources, including PSAs, Faith-Based/Houses of Worship, School Safety, and broader counterterrorism/targeted violence programs related to at-risk communities and soft targets/publicly accessible locations.

Protecting Houses of Worship Landing Page

This webpage is a first stop shop for guidance and resources to inform Faith-based organizations and places of worship on security-based decisions. Included on this page are numerous resources, which provide building blocks for effective safety and security programs. The resources include a self-assessment tool, trainings, exercises, and other materials focused on a wide range of man-made threats (e.g., bombing, active shooter, vehicle ramming, etc.) that could be used against communities.

Protecting Places of Worship: Six Steps to Enhance Security Against Targeted Violence

This document outlines actions that faith-based organizations and community leaders can take to increase security. These six steps can help protect places of worship against potential threats of targeted violence in a cost-effective manner that maintains an open and welcoming environment.

Protecting Places of Worship: Perimeter Security Considerations

This infographic outlines low-to-no cost solutions to help implement these suggested practices and highlights ways to identify funding for security improvements.

Immigration Relief in Emergencies or Unforeseen Circumstances | USCIS

Unforeseen circumstances, such as natural catastrophes (hurricanes, wildfires, severe weather, etc.), national emergencies (public health emergencies), or severe illness (including COVID), can sometimes affect the processing of your USCIS application, petition, or immigration request.

Allied Against Hate: A Toolkit for Faith Communities

This toolkit describes practical steps faith communities can take to prevent acts of hate, discrimination, and bias, and to demonstrate solidarity with targeted communities if such acts tragically do occur.

HLS.Today DHS.GOV

DHS: Mayorkas concedes Texas Requires a Border Wall

HLS.Today — Thu, 05 Oct 2023 14:00:10 +0000

HLS.Today – Secretary Mayorkas Delivers Remarks at U.S. Department of Justice Press Conference. Secretary Mayorkas delivered the following remarks at a press conference announcing several fentanyl-related indictments in the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, DC.

Early in 2022, undercover agents from Homeland Security Investigations, or HSI, infiltrated several Chinese chemical companies that were selling precursor chemicals and Schedule 1 narcotics on the internet. The Chinese companies were making their sales in the United States, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, Italy, the Netherlands, and Russia.

The means of shipment varied; one company, for example, shipped the precursor chemicals and Schedule 1 narcotics via air cargo and UPS. Through their investigation, HSI agents learned that one company had shipped more than 500 kilograms of fentanyl precursors to Tucson, Arizona and Brownsville, Texas. By monitoring telephone numbers associated with the shipments and other investigative techniques, agents were able to identify the bitcoin wallets associated with the Chinese companies.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, working with our DEA partners, used advanced targeting data as part of Operation Artemis, a multi-agency surge effort, to interdict more than half a ton of precursor chemicals in warehouses in Los Angeles and Brownsville before the chemicals could be transported to the drug manufacturers in Mexico, and Arizona, California, and Texas. The precursor chemicals were found in mislabeled and otherwise disguised containers.

The indictments unsealed today communicate at least several important messages:

First and foremost, the incredible work of our federal law enforcement agents and officers. They work tirelessly at great personal risk, to save lives and to hold ruthless criminals accountable.

Second, the law enforcement work that is required to address the scourge of fentanyl requires an all-of-government response, across multiple agencies, and that is precisely what the Biden-Harris Administration is bringing to bear. All of our presence here today makes that powerfully clear.

Third, the scourge of fentanyl is of an international dimension. It certainly is not limited to the United States and Mexico. It spans the globe. Our law enforcement capabilities do as well.

Fourth, we are attacking every instrumentality and every aspect of the criminal organizations and individuals who deal in the death and destruction of fentanyl and other opioids. In addition to indictments against companies and individuals, we are seizing the drugs, money, and properties they use and seek to obtain.

Fifth, we are unrelenting in our pursuit of the transnational criminal organizations – the cartels – that are at the root of it all – most notably, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación. And, we will reach across the globe to the Chinese companies and their employees who make up part of the cartels’ illegal trafficking operations – and anywhere else where the criminal enterprises reside.

Sixth, the scourge of fentanyl is not abating. Basically, year-over-year it has grown in this country for more than five years, with over 47,000 fentanyl overdose deaths in 2017 and more than 82,000 in 2022.

Lastly, our work is unabating. In fiscal year 2022, CBP seized more than 14,000 pounds of fentanyl. In fiscal year 2023, CBP seized more than 27,000 pounds.

Thanks again to the incredibly heroic work of the law enforcement agents and officers, including the prosecutors on the front line. We, all of us here, all whom we represent, will not pause our work until we have held all perpetrators accountable.

Mayorkas’ announcement comes as migrant numbers in September broke new records. Woman dies after falling from U.S.-Mexico border wall near California port of entry. A woman was found dead Friday in a fall from the U.S.-Mexico border wall, authorities told FOX 5 San Diego.

DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas is citing an “acute and immediate need” to waive dozens of federal laws to build a border wall in south Texas where illegal migration has surged.

It’s a sharp contrast to dismissals of the use of such barriers in the early days of the administration.

The agency posted an announcement on the U.S. Federal Register that outlines construction in Starr County in the Rio Grande Valley Sector, where the administration says there is “high illegal entry.” The agency says there have been over 245,000 migrant encounters in the sector this fiscal year.

Mayorkas says he is using his authority provided by Congress to waive 26 federal laws, including the Clean Air Act, Safe Drinking Water Act and Endangered Species Act.

“There is presently an acute and immediate need to construct physical barriers and roads in the vicinity of the border of the United States in order to prevent unlawful entries into the United States in the project areas pursuant to sections 102(a) and 102(b) of [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996],” Mayorkas said.

The administration had put a halt to new border wall construction in early 2021, after Biden had promised as a presidential candidate that there would “not be another foot of wall constructed on my administration.” The administration said wall construction under the Trump administration was “just one example of the prior administration’s misplaced priorities and failure to manage migration in a safe, orderly and humane way.”

However, the construction is funded by the fiscal year 2019 DHS appropriations bill, which specifically funded wall projects in the RGV Sector and which DHS is required to use for its appropriated purpose.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) announced plans for up to 20 miles of wall in the RGV Sector in June. The administration previously made moves to close gaps and replace gates and says such projects prioritize the completion of activities and projects to address life, safety and operational risks – including the safety of individuals, Border Patrol agents and migrants.

A CBP spokesperson confirmed to Fox News Digital the waiver is for barrier projects announced in June, and it will cover approximately 17 miles in Starr County. The spokesperson said the project is consistent with DHS’ plan to fulfill President Biden’s Jan. 20, 2021, proclamation that “ended the diversion of funds for the border wall from military projects or other sources while calling for the expenditure of any funds Congress appropriated for barrier construction consistent with their appropriated purpose.”

“CBP remains committed to protecting the nation’s cultural and natural resources and will implement sound environmental practices as part of the project covered by this waiver,” the spokesperson said.

The announcement comes as the Biden administration is facing a fresh surge in illegal immigration, leading to record-high numbers at the southern border and intense political criticism from both Republicans and Democrats. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) sources told Fox News last week there were more than 260,000 encounters in September, which would be the highest monthly total on record.

Republicans have blamed the historic numbers on the Biden administration’s policies, including its rollback of Trump-era policies and its halt to border wall construction. The administration has also drawn criticism from Republicans for selling off border wall materials and for suing Texas over a border barrier it built in the Rio Grande.

NYC Mayor Adams visits border as city struggles with migrant crisisVideo

“President Trump is always right,” the Trump campaign said in a statement to Fox News Digital. “That’s why he built close to 500 miles of powerful new wall on the border, and it would have been finished by now. Instead, Crooked Joe Biden turned our country into one giant sanctuary for dangerous criminal aliens.”

The administration has said Congress needs to provide more funding and pass legislation to fix the “broken” system with which it says it is working.

Meanwhile, the administration is getting growing calls for more action from liberal states and cities that have been overwhelmed by the escalating numbers, including ways to limit illegal immigrants from entering.

HLS.Today sources DHS.gov Fox News

Russia Ukraine War: Iran to Supply Armed Forces Hundreds of UAS

HLS.Today — Thu, 31 Aug 2023 00:00:00 +0000

With speculation that Russia will soon acquire “hundreds” of armed and unarmed drones from Iran, the inevitable question of how Moscow plans to use them in its grinding war in Ukraine arises. When the White House publicised the alleged sale in mid-July, Samuel Bendett, a research analyst with the Center for Naval Analyses, reasonably speculated that a number of these drones could be loitering munitions, also known as suicide drones.

“One of the biggest lessons Russians took from 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war was mass use of loitering munitions is key to military success,” he tweeted. “So if Iran is supplying ‘several hundred’ drones to Russia, its highly likely that loitering munitions are part of the transfer.”

In that fall 2020 war, Azerbaijan used Israeli-built Harop loitering munitions to destroy Armenian S-300 air defence missile systems, the same kind of mobile long-range Soviet-era systems Ukraine is effectively using against intruding Russian aircraft today.

Does Russia hope to replicate Azerbaijan’s success using Iranian-made drones? Does Tehran even have drones as sophisticated as the Harop to offer Moscow?

“Iran has been a great student of drone technology over the past 20 years, developing its own and reverse-engineering captured U.S. and Israeli technology when presented with an opportunity,” Bendett told me.

“Even if their loitering munitions would not exactly match the Harop’s specs, then (they) would be compatible, given that Iran has several classes of loitering munitions.”

James Rogers, the DIAS Associate Professor in War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark (SDU), pointed out that Iranian loitering munitions, such as the Ra’ad 85, “have less range and flight time when compared to the Israeli Harops Azerbaijan used in the 2020 war.”

“Nevertheless, Iran’s systems are reported to work in an electronic warfare environment and have the ability to strike larger fixed and mobile targets,” he told me. “Iran also has the battle-hardened Ababil III drone, which has been used in a loitering capacity, with proximity fuse air-burst munitions targeting high-profile military personnel.”

Rogers believes it will be difficult for Russia to “emulate the technical success” of Azerbaijani Harops against Armenian S-300s with Iranian drones.

“The Harops have an extended communication and loitering range, twice that of the Ra’ad 85 and Ababil III Iranian systems, and are in general perceived to be more reliable,” he said. “Nevertheless, when Iranian designed loitering drones have been deployed in conflict, they have been deployed in multiples, in a rudimentary swarm formation that saturate and overwhelm enemy defenses.”

“If used in this capacity, the Iranian systems may well have an increased impact on the battlefield.”

Bendett noted that the Russians aren’t just worried about Ukrainian S-300s but also the recently supplied U.S.-built long-range surface-to-surface HIMARS artillery rockets.

“At this point, practically all Ukrainian long-range strike capability would be targets for the Russian forces equipped with advanced technology like loitering drones (either their own or Iranian),” he said.

During the conflict in Yemen, the Houthis used Qasef-1/2K loitering munitions, essentially a clone of the Iranian Ababil-2 drone, against Saudi Arabia’s air defenses. Using open-source GPS coordinates of the positions of Saudi MIM-104 Patriot batteries, the Qasef drones would crash into their radars. The Houthis would then fire volleys of missiles at Saudi targets.

“Houthis struck stationary targets with Qasef drones, so any Ukrainian stationary military assets like an air defense battery or a warehouse would be a target,” Bendett said.

Rogers expects Russia to use Iranian drones it receives “in a similar way to how they were used by non-state actors across the Middle East.”

“Iranian loitering munitions have a track record of being used in a ‘swarming tactic’ formation,” he said. “This is when multiple drones are sent at a target all at once to overwhelm enemy air defenses.”

Such tactics mightn’t be a major departure from how Russia has used its airpower in this war so far.

“Russia has been known to do something similar with its air force, using its airpower capacity to saturate Ukrainian defenses,” Rogers said.

“When the two ways of thinking about air power are combined, it will likely see Russia using Iranian drones in saturation attacks against Ukrainian targets.”

Bendett anticipates Moscow using different tactics “to take out Ukrainian stationary and mobile targets, anything from soldiers, weapons, machinery and artillery on the move to port facilities, warehouses and command and control centers.”

“Russia took a very serious look at the Azerbaijani success in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, and one lesson it drew from that conflict is that loitering munitions and combat drones are key to modern warfare success,” he said.

“So once/if this technology is transferred, Russia gains a significant aerial asset that will be unleashed against Ukrainian forces,” he concluded.

Source: FORBES

US DoD: Ukraine Assistance Includes UAS Scan Eagle and C-UAS Vampire Systems

HLS.Today — Tue, 22 Aug 2023 00:00:25 +0000

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl held a Press Briefing on Security Assistance in Support of Ukraine.
AUG. 24, 2022 – Dr. Colin Kahl, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.

STAFF: Well, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for being here today. I’m Brigadier General Pat Ryder, the DOD press secretary. It’s my pleasure to introduce Undersecretary of Defense, Dr. Colin Kahl, who will provide an Update on U.S. security assistance to Ukraine. He’ll provide an opening statement and then take your questions. Dr. Kahl?

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY COLIN KAHL: Great. Well, good afternoon. It’s good to be back with all of you again. Sorry for the bit of the delay. Let me start by acknowledging that last night at President Biden’s direction, U.S. military forces conducted precision airstrikes in Deir ez-Zor, Syria, which is in eastern Syria.

Our forces accomplished their mission of destroying several infrastructure facilities used by militia groups affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. The strike was necessary to protect and defend US personnel in Syria, which had been the targets of several recent attacks by Iran-backed militia groups, including the most recent ones on August 15.

Our response was proportionate and precise. It was designed to minimize the risk of casualties, and it responded to the nature of the attacks by Iran-backed militia groups. That being said, we cannot accept further attacks on our personnel.

This operation is a demonstration the United States will not hesitate to defend itself against Iranian and Iran-backed aggression when it occurs.

Now, let me turn to the focus of today’s briefing. Let me join President Biden and Secretary Austin and underscore our continued support for the people of Ukraine as we mark their 34th — 31st year of independence.

We are now six months into Russia’s brutal, premeditated invasion of Ukraine, an act of aggression meant to undermine that independence. Russia’s efforts have not succeeded and will not succeed. And as we have made clear at every level of this administration, we are committed to sustained security assistance as Ukraine defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

We are with Ukraine today, and alongside our Allies and partners, we will stick with Ukraine over the long haul.

In light of this enduring commitment, the Department of Defense has decided to provide an additional $2.98 billion in security assistance to Ukraine under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, or USAI.

As you all are aware, this is the largest single security assistance package we have ever provided to support Ukraine. In previous briefings, we’ve discussed various Presidential Drawdown Authority packages, or PDA packages.

It’s important to note that USAI is different from Presidential Drawdown because we will be procuring these systems under USAI from the private sector, rather than pulling them out of our own stocks, which is what we do with PDA.

By its very nature, this USAI package underscores our commitment to supporting Ukraine for the long term, representing a multi-year investment in critical defense capabilities.

This package is about building enduring strength for Ukraine as it continues to defend its sovereignty in the face of Russian aggression. Vladimir Putin seems to believe that Russia can win the long game—outlasting the Ukrainians in their will to fight, and the international community’s will to continue to support Ukraine.

This USAI package is a tangible demonstration that this is yet another Russian miscalculation.

The capabilities in this package are tailored to sustain Ukraine’s most critical capability needs in the medium- to long-term, and they include six additional National Advanced Surface to Air Missile Systems, or NASAMS, with additional Munitions for those NASAMS. Up to 245,000 rounds of 155-millimeter artillery ammunition, which is the ammunition used for the NATO-standard artillery systems that have been transferred to Ukraine. Up to 65,000 rounds of 120-millimeter mortar ammunition. Up to 24 counter-artillery radars.

We’re also including in this package Puma unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, and support equipment for Scan Eagle UAS systems. We’re including Vampire counter-unmanned aerial systems, laser-guided rocket systems, and a substantial funding package for training, maintenance, and sustainment, so that Ukraine can keep the equipment they already have in the fight.

Deliveries of this USAI package will begin in the next several months, and continue over the coming years. While many of these capabilities are not intended to directly contribute to today’s fight, they will form the backbone of a robust future Ukrainian force, capable of defending Ukraine for years to come.

Stepping back for a moment, the United States has now committed more than $13.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including $12.9 billion in the last six months. This level of U.S. security assistance is historically unprecedented, and demonstrates our wavering support for a free and democratic Ukraine on its Independence Day. This may be our largest security assistance package to date—but let me be clear—it will not be our last. We will continue to closely consult with Ukraine on its near-, mid-, and long-term capability needs.

We are far from alone in this effort. As I noted in my last briefing earlier this month, at least 50 countries have now provided billions of dollars worth of additional security assistance to Ukraine since Russia invaded and participated — invaded in February, and these Allies and partners have participated in the monthly Ukraine defense contact group meetings that have been hosted by Secretary Austin.

Our continued unified efforts will help Ukraine continue to be successful today and build enduring strength to ensure the Ukrainian people are able to commemorate many more independence days for years to come.

And with that, I think we’re going to take the first question from the AP.

STAFF: Thank you, sir. Lita?

Q: Thank you. So, one, sort of, specific question and then a broader question. The Vampires, can you give us a sense of how far down the road that is? What kind of — what — little more detail what they are? And how far down the road that is? Because I think it’s a fairly new system. And then more broadly, can you tell us how much of the package is on — would fund training? And is the U.S. going to expand training? Give us a picture of U.S. training for Ukraine down the road into the future.

KAHL: Yeah, so the Vampire system itself is a counter UAS system. It is a kinetic system, it uses small missiles, essentially, to shoot UAVs out of the sky. And we’re happy to provide you more technical details from the right experts, at the right time.

As it relates to training, you know, we continue to train Ukrainian forces on all the systems that we are providing and that our Allies and partners are providing, that they haven’t already been trained on. So, as they’ve made kind of a transition from many cases, Soviet-legacy equipment to NATO standard equipment that’s required more training. And this has been happening on a rolling basis.

Now, as it relates to systems in this package, since, really, we’re talking about systems that will take months to get on contract, and you know, 1-2-3 years, in some instances to arrive in Ukraine. We think — we’re confident we have the time to train the Ukrainians on whatever systems they’re not already familiar with.

Q: How much of the package is…

KAHL: Oh, on the sustainment training?

Q: On the…

KAHL: Well, yeah, the sustainment package, sorry, I answered as it relates to training. The piece of it that’s about sustainment, I’ll get you the exact numbers on that afterwards. But sustainment is really about spare parts. The things that help them with maintenance.

Q: (OFF-MIKE)

KAHL: I don’t have a number in front of me, I can get you that.

STAFF: Yeah, let’s go to Adam

Q: (OFF-MIKE) Air Force magazine. Thank you so much. Can you tell us why still no aircraft or pilot training, if you’re thinking medium- and long-term? And also, why not include some systems like the ATACMS, the A-T-A-C-M-S, the Army Tactical Missile Systems, with ranges beyond 80 kilometers since Russia is now moving their logistics and command and control beyond the range of the current munitions that we’re sending? Thank you.

KAHL: Yeah, thanks. So, as it relates to aircraft, our current priority as it relates to aircraft is making sure that Ukrainians can use the aircraft they currently have to generate effects in the current conflict. So, for example, the last time we had a briefing here, we broke some news and talked about the fact that we had provided them with some of these anti-radiation missiles, the HARM missiles, and we had adapted those missiles to be able to fire off MIG-29. So, they of course, were not designed to fly off Russian equipment — they were designed to fly off our aircraft and the Ukrainians in recent weeks have been using the HARM missiles to great effect to take out Russian radar systems.

So, you know, as it relates to future aircrafts, fourth generation aircraft, for example, even if we were to provide those now, they wouldn’t arrive for years, so we’ve been focused on as it relates to their fighter aircraft on what they need for the to support the current efforts to hold in the east and perhaps going on a counter offensive.

As it relates to the future of aircraft, let me tell you where we are in the process. So, Secretary Austin has tasked the office of Secretary of Defense to work with the Joint Staff and European Command, essentially on a future-forces picture of the Ukrainian force for the mid- to long-term.

Obviously, this is done in close consultation with the Ukrainians It is, after all, their military, and we’re really trying to be very deliberate and disciplined about what type of Ukrainian force matters in the next 12, 24, 36 months. Under any range of scenarios. It could be a scenario in which the war continues, it could be a scenario in which the violence ebbs because there’s an agreement or because it just dies down a bit. But even in that instance, the Ukrainians are going to need to defend their territory and deter future aggression.

So, we’re trying to be very deliberate about what systems we think makes the most sense for Ukraine to have in that context, and also matters very much—can they sustain it? Can they afford it? Because, of course, you know, billions of dollars of international assistance is not, you know, may not be something 10 years from now, or 20 years from now. So, these also have to be systems that Ukraine itself can sustain. But I can tell you that fighter aircraft remain on the table, just no final decisions have been made about that.

Yeah, as it relates to ATACMS. So, I think as most of you are tracking, you know, we’ve been provided 16 HIMARS systems, which are precision rockets, multiple launch rocket systems, a number of other Allies have provided similar systems, the Brits and Germans in particular have provided M-270 systems. The HIMARS is a truck, it launches the rockets off the back, the M-270s, launches the same rockets, but essentially off the chassis of a Bradley fighting vehicle type of armored vehicle.

We have provided them guided multiple launch rocket systems, or GMLRS, that have a range of, you know, around 70 or 80 kilometers, we have provided them with hundreds and hundreds of these precision guided systems, and the Ukrainians have been using them to extraordinary effect on the battlefield.

It’s our assessment that the most relevant Munitions for the current fight are the GMLRS. And so, we have prioritized getting the Ukrainians, the GMLRS they need, not only to hold in the east, but may generate some momentum elsewhere in the country.

It’s our assessment that they don’t currently require ATACMS to service targets that are directly relevant to the current fight. You know, we’ll obviously continue to have conversations with the Ukrainians about their needs, but it’s our judgment at the moment that we should be focusing on GMLRS, not ATACMS.

STAFF: Thank you. (inaudible). Sorry, Abraham, we’re going to move on. We’ll go to AFP, and then we’ll go up to the phone line. Sylvie?

Q: Speaking about GMLRS, you — you mentioned, laser guided rocket system? I suppose it’s them? Can you say how many? And how long are they supposed to last? How long is it going to take for them to receive them? And for how long?

KAHL: Yeah, I mean, so it’s going to take — so you’re asking about the rocket systems in particular, correct? Let me make sure I have all the information for you. So, the laser-guided rocket systems provided in this tranche of funding will basically complement the systems that Ukrainians already have been provided in previous security assistance packages. The specific rocket systems have a range of about eight kilometers. And they can be used basically to target Russian capabilities like armored personnel carriers and unmanned aerial systems.

In terms of the delivery timeline, some of those systems and rounds will probably be provided to the Ukrainians within the next nine months, and additional systems and rounds could take a year or two.

Q: Let’s see. This package doesn’t — there are no GMLRS there?

KAHL: There are no GMLRS in this package, no. The way — well, because we’ve been focusing on providing GMLRS through the PDA packages. So, the most recent — so we’ve — in every — just about every PDA package, we have provided a steady stream of GMLRS—hundreds and hundreds at a time. It’s our assessment that the Ukrainian stocks of GMLRS are pretty good right now. And we’re going to continue to provide those but — but remember, the distinction I drew before about PDA is essentially something we can draw it out of our own stocks to make it not immediately available, but usually in the matter of days or weeks, whereas USAI is typically months or years.

STAFF: OK, let’s go to the phone lines. Do we have Tom Squitieri from Red Snow News?

Q: Thanks. Good afternoon. Doctor, could you just give us a little more clarity, please on the timeline. There have been some delays in the past of contracting equipment for delivery to Ukraine. Could you just be a bit more specific on the timeline please? Thank you.

KAHL: The timeline for a particular system you’re interested in? Because the timelines are all different for the various timelines.

Q: Well, let me rephrase. Let me rephrase the question then. Have — has the Pentagon experienced any difficulties in contracting in the past for these kinds of weapons? And if so, has that been factored into the timeline?

KAHL: Well, I mean, the short answer is we’re eager to get the Ukrainians the systems as quickly as that process will allow. We—it sometimes takes months to get these systems on contract. That’s been the case with the NASAMS for example. So, in each case, we will endeavor to get the contracts filled out as quickly as possible and get stuff on the road. But I think we have to manage people’s expectations, this package is — the package of capabilities here are really aimed at getting Ukraine what they’re going to need in the medium- to long-term.

So, it’s not relevant to the fight today, tomorrow, next week, it is relevant to the ability of Ukraine to defend itself and deter further aggression a year from now, two years from now, and this is actually extraordinarily important.

Because as least as we can discern, Vladimir Putin has not given up on his overall strategic objectives of seizing most of Ukraine, toppling the regime, reclaiming Ukraine as part of a new Russian Empire. What he has done is lengthened his timeline in recognition that he’s off plan.

And so, as a consequence, his theory of victory is that he can wait everybody out, he can wait the Ukrainians out because they will be exhausted and attrited, he can wait us out, because we’ll turn our attention elsewhere. He can wait for the Europeans out because of high energy prices, or whatever.

And so, packages like this are extraordinarily important, indirectly challenging Putin’s theory of the case, which is that we’re not in it for the long haul, that we aren’t supporting Ukraine for the long haul. So, the other value in using the USAI money is that, you know, there, when we take things out of our own stocks, we’re taking things out of our own stocks. And that puts certain constraints on what we can provide, on what timelines. When we do USAI, we are buying stuff on contract, and therefore the private sector can produce these things.

Q: Thanks a lot. I appreciate it.

STAFF: We’ll go to Tara and then to Nancy.

Q: (OFF-MIKE) Does the building’s assessment now that this war is winnable for Ukraine, and that’s why there’s this announcement of this multi-year, U.S. will continue to provide these arms in the long term? And then can you provide some context? Is this not only the biggest challenge to date for Ukraine, this is the biggest security assistance package provided in any conflict individually for Afghanistan, Iraq? I realize that might take some time to put in context.

KAHL: Yeah, on the latter question, I think my sense is, it is historically unusual. Whether it’s historically unprecedented in its sheer size, I think we’re going to have to get back — back to you on it. It’s also a way it may not be an apples-to-apples comparison, in terms of the types of things. USAI is not equivalent to, you know, foreign military funding, for example.

So, anyway, let’s get back to you on whether it’s the biggest of all time. I think the sheer amount of security assistance we’ve provided through a combination of PDA and USAI is historically unprecedented, as far as we can tell, because we’re now north of $13 billion with this and, you know, $12.9 billion, just since the invasion kicked off on February 24.

In terms of the relevance in terms of essentially does the package represent some assessment about the end game? I think the shortest answer to that is no. It’s actually agnostic to what the, you know, the end game is. Obviously, it’s important for us that Ukraine survives and endures as a democratic, independent, sovereign country with its territorial integrity intact. It’s important to us that Russia pays a cost in excess of the benefits they gain from an aggression so that they don’t do it again, and so that other aggressors take that lesson. It’s also important to us that Vladimir Putin’s objective of weakening the West and fragmenting NATO actually is turned on its head—that NATO emerges stronger, the free world emerges stronger.

I think we’re on track to achieve all three of those objectives. Are you independent, sovereign democratic Ukraine, that endures. A Russia that has paid more costs and benefits, and a West that is stronger than when this started.

This type of package does not presume any particular outcome of a conflict in Ukraine. So, for example, if the war continues for years, this package is relevant. If there is a ceasefire or a peace settlement, this package is still relevant, because Ukraine needs the ability to defend itself and deter future aggression. So, kind of under any scenario or all the ones in between, we think that the package is irrelevant.

STAFF: OK, we’ll go to Nancy, and then we’ll go to the phone lines.

Q: Well, thank you. I wanted to go over a couple of things you said earlier. So, you talked about the strikes and Syria. There have been reports of additional U.S. strikes in Syria. Can you give us any additional information about that? Also, we see—quite sorry, there are three. He also had questions about training. How much of this was dedicated training? You said you couldn’t give us a number? Can you give us a sense of how many people would be trained, and over what time period? And finally, you talked about this as an investment in Ukraine’s military in the medium- to long- term? I think you talked about three years. Is it your assessment, then in three years that Ukraine will be fully integrated into NATO into NATO weapon systems? Do you anticipate they will no longer need Soviet weapons systems at that point? Can you give us a picture of what you envision the Ukrainian military looking like at the end of this weapons package? Thank you.

KAHL: Yeah. So, just on the Syria strikes, we’re tracking the same reports you are, that there’s been an exchange in Syria. I don’t have any details to provide you with — when we have more, we will give you more. I will say, as a general matter, we’re not going to hesitate to defend ourselves. And we’ve communicated this both in the actions that were taken last night, the nature of those actions, and also what we have communicated to the Iranians. We’re not going to tolerate attacks by Iran-backed forces on our forces anywhere in the world, including in Syria, and we won’t hesitate to protect ourselves and take additional measures as appropriate.

Now, in this particular case, our response was, I think, extraordinarily carefully calibrated. It was meant to be proportional to the attacks that the Iran-backed groups carried out on August 15. It was very precise. We had essentially scoped out 11 bunker targets on this site; we ended up prosecuting nine of them because shortly before the strike, there was new evidence that there might be individuals near two of the other bunkers. So, we held off striking those out of an abundance of caution, because our goal was not to produce casualties in this instance. But we will continue to respond if our people are attacked. But as it relates to the additional reports will tell you more when we know more.

As it relates to the training numbers, I don’t have the specific numbers in front of me, Nancy, we will get back to you with — with whatever details you need for your story on that.

In three years, will we be done? You know, will the Ukrainians be done transitioning and NATO standard equipment? You know, my sense is they will still have some aspects, you know, for example, they have hundreds and hundreds of 152-millimeter artillery systems, they also have considerable industrial capacity. It is conceivable that years from now, they could still be using those systems produced by, you know, using munitions that they themselves produce.

I will say though, I would anticipate that in the timeframe we’re talking about here that Ukraine will gradually transition to NATO-standard equipment. You’re already seeing that in the transition to the M-777 howitzers and other similar systems like the French Caesar system that use the 155-millimeter systems, there’s, you know, HIMARS is another example, some of the UAS systems.

I think one of the things that will be, you know, important as we think through this, alongside Ukraine, in the coming years is, how can we, and Secretary Austin is very seized with this is, what does the future force of Ukraine look like that’s sustainable?

And the reality is that, in the six months of this war, it’s been an all-hands-on-deck situation, right? Security assistance flowing in from more than 50 countries. But that also means dozens of systems. And ideally, the Ukrainian military of the future will not be rooted in dozens of different systems, but a much smaller number of systems that are, you know, easier to sustain and maintain and all that.

So, you know, let’s see where the future holds. But just know that we’re very focused here and helping Ukraine try to plan out what is kind of a rational force of the future, and I would anticipate a lot of that will include NATO-standard equipment.

STAFF: Let’s go to the phone line. Do we have Oskar Górzyński from the Polish Press Agency?

Q: Hi, thank you. Thank you for this. So, a couple of questions. I just want to clarify. So, just this is your reason for not providing ATACMS as a military reason, because you think they don’t need them- it’s not efficient- or it’s because- for example, Jake Sullivan said a couple weeks ago just providing Ukraine this weapon could lead to World War three. So, is that not a consideration, and also you were talking about the shift to long term, medium term. Can we administer the security of Ukraine, but also as it translates to the region- will you keep forces present there or (inaudible) at all? Thank you.

KAHL: So, Oscar, we were having a little trouble hearing you here, there was some echo. So, hopefully I’ll answer the question. So, the question on ATACMS is essentially, you know, it’s a version of the question before — why have we decided not to provide the ATACMS as of yet? I will tell you our primary consideration is our judgment about what is most useful and efficient for what the Ukrainians need for their current purposes, which are to hold in the east and to generate momentum elsewhere in the country. And why do we say that? We consulted very closely with Ukrainians about the types of targets that they needed to be able to prosecute inside Ukrainian territory.

The vast majority of those targets were rangeable by HIMARS using GMLRS, as opposed to the much longer range ATACMS. And so we have been emphasizing providing them GMLRS. And by the way, I should note, it’s had an extraordinary effect.

I think, as all of your reporting, and other reporting has, has suggested, you know, this isn’t just an average rocket, this is the equivalent of a 200-pound precision guided airstrike launched off the back of a truck. And the Ukrainians have been using this for precision strikes against command-and-control facilities, logistical nodes, and other sustainment facilities, and it has had the effect, we believe, of frustrating Russia’s advances in the East.

I think it’s really—the Russians have really slowed down in the east and have held Russian assets at risk elsewhere in the country that’s very much complicating Russia’s planning effort. So, it’s our assessment that the GMLRS are the most important thing to continue emphasizing, and there’s a steady flow of those going to Ukraine.

As it relates to your question about, you know, obviously, part of this package is to signal a long-term commitment to Ukraine. What about the long-term commitment to the broader region? I would assume to include Poland, and other countries on the eastern flank?

I think as you all saw, from the most recent Madrid setting, our posture is more robust than it was before this crisis. And, you know, before the crisis we had between 70,000 and 80,000 forces in the EUCOM AOR. We now have around 100,000 forces in the AOR, we had on any given day around three — you know, two Brigade Combat Teams, or three Brigade Combat Teams. Now we’re at five. We will be at a steady state of four. One of those will be headquartered in Poland, as it currently, as another one will be headquartered in Romania. But they’ll be available to do exercises and reinforce all up and down the eastern flank. So, whether that be, you know, Poland and the Baltic states or whether it be in places like Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, et cetera, we’ve also put a couple of additional DDGs are going to be flowing into Spain, those are naval assets, we’re going to be putting F 35s into the U.K., and there are other movements as well.

And I think one of the things that we’ve demonstrated through this crisis is that a lot of the investments we made in improving our forward posture and our infrastructure after the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the violence in the Donbass, a lot of that work has paid off, because of what it allowed us to do early in the crisis is to nimbly move around EUCOM forces — forces that may have been further back, were able to flow forward very quickly, because the infrastructure was there, the prepositioned equipment was there. And so, I would say that it’s important as we even as we look at the eastern flank, to not only look at the capabilities that are resident every single day in those countries, but the ability of the United States and NATO to surge forces forward. And one of the things that we came out of the Madrid Summit with, was a commitment not just by the United States, but other countries like Germany, the U.K., Canada, et cetera, to put in place commitments and infrastructure to be able to rapidly surge forward into the eastern flank. So, I think that is signaling a long-term commitment, not just from the United States, but from the rest of NATO to security in the east.

STAFF: OK, and we have time for just a couple more. Let’s go to Fadi, and then go back to Carla.

Q: Thank you. Thank you for doing this. I have just one quick question on Iran, then on Ukraine. On Iran, you just mentioned that the U.S. communicated to the Iranians that we will not tolerate any attacks on U.S. troops. Was that made directly–through direct channels to Iran? And then in Ukraine, the first thing on the funding for training–is this–since we’re talking about long-term here, is it only training on equipment, or does it involve other things like tactical fighting? And then you said, since this is a long-term commitment, you’re not presuming any outcome. However, most often time wars end with political settlements, and huge security assistance like this impact, at the end of the day, political calculus. So, why don’t you factor in the possibility of being able to have an impact on Russia’s willingness to be engaged in political dialogue to end this war?

KAHL: Yeah. So, on that, actually, I think we’re in exactly the same place as your question suggested. As I made clear a bunch of times, a big part of the reason for this commitment is actually to challenge Putin’s theory of victory, right? His theory of victory is that he can outlast everybody. Packages like this, that signal we’re not just providing assistance to Ukraine right now but it’s going to be a steady stream of assistance that will stretch out over many months and years, is precisely challenging Putin’s miscalculation, we believe, that he can just grind it out and wait it out. So, it is supposed to impact his calculus.

We’re also largely through our PDA packages, trying to affect the calculus in the nearer-term, obviously, by enabling the Ukrainians to defend the territory they have, push back where they can, so that when, and if, negotiations start, whenever that happens, they have the best hand at the negotiating table. So, we’re very mindful of that as well.

The point I was making is that the USAI package matters, essentially, no matter what world we end up in. So, clearly, we hope that the USAI package helps to send a particular signal to Putin that he can’t just wait everybody out, and that, hopefully, incentivizes Russia to stop the fighting and to get down to negotiations. But if it doesn’t, and the fighting continues, then the assistance continues to be relevant. If it does incentivize him to strike a deal, the assistance is still relevant, because Ukraine will have to hedge against the possibility that Russia could do this again.

In Iran, I’m not going to go much further than I already said, we have passed messages. I’m not going to go through exactly what channels. We have lots of ways of communicating to them. And we’ve tapped all of those channels to make it clear to the Iranians that what they’re doing is unacceptable. And that we will defend ourselves where necessary.

I should say, by the way, you know, the other piece of Iran’s business right now is the conversation about the JCPOA–the nuclear deal. And I should just make clear that what the strikes last night illustrated is that, you know, our commitment to push back against Iran’s support for terrorism, militancy, and the threats that they engage in against our people in the region or elsewhere, are not linked to wherever we end up on the nuclear deal.

So, there’s the nuclear diplomacy lane. You know, the President is very — pretty clear, the administration has been pretty clear that in the event that Iran moves back into compliance with the JCPOA, that’s in our interest, because it pushes Iran further away from a nuclear weapons capability. But whether the JCPOA is reborn or not, it actually has nothing to do with our willingness and resolve to defend ourselves. And I think the strike last night was a pretty clear communication to the Iranians, that these things are on different tracks.

Lastly, just on training on equipment and tactics, I will say that, you know, for the most part, we’ve been prioritizing training Ukrainian troops on the systems that they need to be able to very rapidly employ in the field. Obviously, with these systems we’ll have a longer time period. Those interactions do have the ability to, you know, pass on not just the technical details, but also tactics, techniques and procedures. You know, how to use these in combination with other capabilities. So, we’ll do our best to make sure that we’re kind of synergizing the training in that way.

STAFF: OK. We’ll go to the final question, VOA.

Q: Thank you for doing this. I have one in Ukraine, and then I’d like to ask one in Taiwan, if I may. So, in Ukraine, the Pentagon suggested that 10 Switchblade 600s were going to be going into Ukraine. Have any of those arrived in the theater? And will this package include any Switchblade 600s?

KAHL: Yeah, so this package doesn’t. It includes Puma UAS systems, and then also some additional parts for Scan Eagle. But it does not include Switchblade 600s. As it relates to the actual delivery of the Switchblades, I’ll have to get back to you. I don’t have that information in front of me. You had a question about Taiwan?

Q: We’ve seen them just this week as the PLA is still maintaining an aggressive tempo, flying close to Taiwan. Has the Pentagon seen any indications that this is going to slow down, and should we view this as the new normal over in Taiwan, at the Taiwan Strait?

KAHL: Yeah, so our assessment I mean, I think we’ll have to see what settles out and what the new normal looks like. I’ll tell you what we’ve seen thus far.

The tempo of their activities is less than it was in the immediate aftermath of Speaker Pelosi visit, but it is still higher than historical norms. And they have clearly used this particular incident to try to essentially de facto erase the norm of the centerline, for example, of crossing between this, you know, the median position between Mainland China and the island of Taiwan.

They have been more active in the air, they have been more active at sea. So, I think we should anticipate that whatever the ultimate level ends up being, it will be higher than it was before. And that speaks to your question about the new normal.

And we’ll continue to adjust our activities to make sure that wherever China ends up settling, that we made clear a couple of things: we remain committed to defending our allies and partners in the region; we remain committed to a stable, free, and open Indo Pacific, which is, I think, an interest that all our allies and partners in the region subscribe to; and that we will continue to operate in the air, at sea, wherever international law allows, and that will include freedom of navigation operations, Taiwan Strait transits, and other activities.

So, look, our view of this is that, you know, China took the speaker’s visit as an excuse to manufacture a crisis and to set a new normal, and that what we need to do is to show that we and the rest of the international community will not be coerced, that what Beijing wants is for the international community to react to their new normal by taking a step back and saying, whoa, you know, we don’t want any piece of that.

And our reaction is not to invite conflict or to generate unnecessary frictions, but to basically make clear that Beijing’s gambit isn’t going to pay off. That if their goal was to coerce us and the international community to back off, it’s not going to work.

Q: Dr. Kahl, can I ask you one about Iran, just quickly? Can you explain what, why, you know, there have been a number of attacks by these Iranian-backed groups against U.S. forces and facilities in Iraq and Syria in the last year or so, including a pretty egregious one against ATG last October, and there hasn’t been a U.S. kinetic response, like last night. Can you just explain why the U.S. decided to respond to these on August 15, when they’re — they don’t seem to have been so far out of the norm from the other ones we’ve seen?

KAHL: Yeah, I’m going to be a little careful here due to classification issues, but I’ll say this. Part of it’s an accumulation–that we want — we don’t want Iran to draw the wrong conclusion that they can continue just doing this and get away with it. But part of it was also the nature of the attacks on the 15th. The fact that they were coordinated against two U.S. facilities at the same time, the fact that we believe we have Iran dead to rights on attribution, the UAV parts that we’ve collected, for example, traced directly back to Tehran. So, I think our concern was that this might be an indication that Iran intends to do more of this, and we wanted to disabuse them of any sense that that was a good idea.

STAFF: Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. Appreciate it.

Source: Defense.Gov

1000 Black Hornet Nano Drones part of Norway’s $240M Military Aid Commitment to Ukraine

HLS.Today — Sun, 30 Jul 2023 11:42:47 +0000

HLS.Today – 1000 Black Hornet Nano Drones. Norway announced on Wednesday its commitment to provide military aid to Ukraine, detailing the contents of the aid package revealed earlier in the week. The country will be supplying ultra-light drones and components for air defense missile systems as part of this assistance.

In an effort to bolster its support to Ukraine, Norway has decided to increase its military aid budget by 2.5 billion kroner ($240 million) for this year. Consequently, the total allocation for military aid will now be 10 billion kroner, while 7.5 billion kroner will be dedicated to civilian support, deviating from the initial plan of equal amounts for each.

The Defense Minister, Bjorn Arild Gram, disclosed that the aid package will include 1,000 Black Hornet nano drones, designed to assist soldiers in reconnaissance operations. Additionally, Norway will provide components for NASAMS surface-to-air missile systems, complementing Lithuania’s plan to deliver similar systems to Ukraine. To further aid the Ukrainian people, tens of thousands of food rations will also be donated by Norway, with all the equipment being manufactured in the country.

Norway has established a 75-billion-kroner fund earmarked for civilian and military aid to Ukraine spanning from 2023 to 2027. Originally, the yearly aid was set at 15 billion kroner, but the decision was made, during the NATO summit in Vilnius, to increase it to 17.5 billion kroner for this year. Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store justified this move, emphasizing the urgent need for support.

With its status as Europe’s main supplier of natural gas and benefiting from increased oil and gas prices following the Ukrainian conflict, Norway is now extending a helping hand to Ukraine to strengthen its defense capabilities and provide essential assistance in these critical times.

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Global Strategic Impact of Norway’s Support in Assisting Ukraine Against Russia’s Declared War

Norway’s decision to provide substantial military aid to Ukraine in the face of Russia’s declared war carries significant global strategic implications. As tensions escalate in the region, Norway’s commitment not only strengthens Ukraine’s defense capabilities but also signals solidarity among international allies in countering aggression. This article explores the far-reaching effects of Norway’s support on regional and global geopolitics, security dynamics, and humanitarian aid efforts.

Enhanced Defense Capabilities for Ukraine
Norway’s contribution of ultra-light drones and components for air defense missile systems equips Ukraine with advanced technology, enhancing its ability to monitor and safeguard its territory. The 1,000 Black Hornet nano drones provide valuable reconnaissance support, offering real-time intelligence for Ukrainian forces to respond effectively to Russian military movements. Moreover, the NASAMS missile system components bolster Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, serving as a deterrent against potential aerial threats from Russian forces. This improved defense posture not only strengthens Ukraine but also underscores the importance of collective security efforts against aggression.

Signaling Unity and Solidarity Among Allies
Norway’s increased military aid to Ukraine sends a powerful message of unity and solidarity among international allies in support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Russia continues its aggressive stance, the international community’s response is critical in deterring further escalation. Norway’s commitment sets a precedent for other nations to step up their support and reinforce the message that any aggression against a sovereign state will not go unanswered. Such collective action strengthens the norms of international law and maintains a stable global order.

Counteracting Russia’s Influence in the Region
Russia’s declared war on Ukraine has raised concerns about its broader ambitions in the region. By supporting Ukraine, Norway counters Russia’s influence and asserts its commitment to upholding a Europe that is free from external coercion and interference. This strategic move by Norway aligns with the principles of a Europe whole, free, and at peace, as envisioned by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It also serves as a deterrent against further Russian aggression in neighboring countries and reinforces the importance of respecting national sovereignty.

Shaping Geopolitical Balance and Alliances
Norway’s significant financial commitment to Ukraine reflects its role as a proactive player in shaping the geopolitical balance in Europe. As traditional geopolitical alignments shift, alliances are evolving to address emerging security challenges. Norway’s support for Ukraine strengthens the bond between Nordic countries and Eastern Europe, fostering a closer partnership to address common security concerns. Additionally, this gesture may inspire other European nations to take a more active role in shaping regional security dynamics, thereby diversifying and strengthening existing alliances.

Humanitarian Aid and Long-Term Stability
Beyond military assistance, Norway’s donation of tens of thousands of food rations highlights the crucial role of humanitarian aid in conflict zones. The ongoing war in Ukraine has resulted in significant humanitarian crises, with many civilians displaced and struggling to meet their basic needs. Norway’s contribution addresses the urgent humanitarian needs in the region, providing life-saving aid to vulnerable populations. This support not only alleviates immediate suffering but also contributes to long-term stability by fostering goodwill and trust between nations.

Economic and Energy Security Implications
Norway’s emergence as Europe’s main supplier of natural gas has granted it economic leverage in regional and global energy markets. As tensions rise in the aftermath of the conflict in Ukraine, energy security becomes a critical concern. Norway’s support to Ukraine underscores its commitment to regional stability and energy diversification. By assisting Ukraine, Norway indirectly supports efforts to reduce European dependency on Russian gas supplies, thereby mitigating potential energy-related vulnerabilities.

Conclusion

Norway’s robust military aid and humanitarian support to Ukraine carry profound global strategic implications. By bolstering Ukraine’s defense capabilities, signaling solidarity among international allies, and countering Russia’s influence in the region, Norway demonstrates its commitment to a secure and stable Europe. Furthermore, this support enhances humanitarian efforts and contributes to long-term stability, while also addressing energy security concerns. In the face of Russia’s declared war on Ukraine, Norway’s actions exemplify the importance of international cooperation and collective response to regional crises, ultimately shaping the future of global geopolitics and security dynamics.

Source: HLS.Today