Homeland Security – HLS.Today https://hls.today Homeland Security, Public Safety, Cyber and Intelligence News and Information Wed, 02 Apr 2025 03:31:22 +0000 en hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9 https://hls.today/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/cropped-hlt.today-favicon--32x32.png Homeland Security – HLS.Today https://hls.today 32 32 DHS: Advanced Technologies to Fight Fentanyl Proliferation https://hls.today/news/dhs-advanced-technologies-to-fight-fentanyl-proliferation/ Thu, 27 Feb 2025 15:51:03 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=5365 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is intensifying its efforts to combat the proliferation of synthetic drugs, particularly fentanyl, by developing and deploying advanced technologies aimed at enhancing detection and interdiction capabilities.

HLS.Today DHS.GOV

Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII): To bolster security at the southwest border, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is significantly expanding its Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology. NII employs large-scale X-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems to scan vehicles and cargo for contraband without physically opening them, thereby facilitating efficient inspections with minimal disruption to legitimate trade and travel. Historically, NII systems scanned less than 2% of passenger vehicles and 15% of commercial vehicles at the southwest border. With the planned installation of 123 new large-scale scanners at various ports of entry, CBP aims to increase inspection coverage to 40% for passenger vehicles and 70% for cargo vehicles. This expansion is expected to enhance the detection of illicit drugs, currency, firearms, ammunition, unauthorized merchandise, and human smuggling activities.

Chapter 1: X-Ray and Gamma-Ray Imaging Systems

X-ray and gamma-ray imaging are at the core of Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology, enabling CBP officers to detect contraband without the need for time-consuming manual searches.

1.1 How X-Ray Imaging Works

X-ray imaging technology uses high-energy electromagnetic waves to penetrate vehicles and cargo, creating detailed images of their contents. These images reveal hidden compartments, inconsistencies in packaging, and suspicious objects that may indicate the presence of illicit materials.

  • High-Energy X-Ray Scanners: Used primarily for cargo inspections, these scanners generate detailed cross-sectional images of large containers, allowing inspectors to detect irregularities.
  • Low-Energy X-Ray Scanners: Deployed for passenger vehicles and smaller items, these systems provide rapid screening with minimal radiation exposure.

1.2 Gamma-Ray Scanning Technology

Gamma-ray systems function similarly to X-rays but use gamma radiation sources instead of traditional X-ray tubes. These systems offer deeper penetration capabilities, making them effective for scanning dense cargo loads.

  • Passive Gamma-Ray Detection: Detects naturally occurring radiation from illicit nuclear materials.
  • Active Gamma-Ray Scanning: Uses a controlled gamma-ray source to inspect cargo for hidden threats.

1.3 Advantages and Implementation

  • Faster screening times compared to manual searches.
  • High-resolution imaging aids in the rapid identification of contraband.
  • Minimal disruption to trade and travel at ports of entry.

 

Chapter 2: Advanced Radiation and Chemical Detection

Beyond imaging systems, CBP integrates radiation and chemical detection technologies to enhance its interdiction efforts.

2.1 Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs)

These passive detection systems scan vehicles and cargo for illicit radioactive materials, helping to prevent nuclear and radiological threats from entering the U.S.

  • Strategic Placement: Deployed at key border crossings, ports, and checkpoints.
  • Real-Time Alerts: Triggers alarms when abnormal radiation levels are detected.

2.2 Trace Detection for Narcotics and Explosives

CBP uses advanced chemical sensors to identify traces of illicit substances, including fentanyl, methamphetamine, and explosive materials.

  • Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS): Detects microscopic traces of narcotics and explosives in cargo or vehicle compartments.
  • Mass Spectrometry (MS): Provides highly accurate chemical analysis for substance identification.

2.3 Integration with AI for Enhanced Detection

Artificial Intelligence (AI) enhances detection capabilities by analyzing sensor data and identifying anomalies that may indicate smuggling attempts. Machine learning algorithms help refine detection accuracy over time.

Chapter 3: Automated Threat Recognition and Artificial Intelligence

CBP is increasingly relying on artificial intelligence and automation to improve the efficiency and accuracy of Non-Intrusive Inspection systems.

3.1 AI-Driven Image Analysis

  • Machine learning models analyze X-ray and gamma-ray images to detect concealed compartments, unusual cargo densities, and potential threats.
  • AI-powered software can automatically flag suspicious areas for further inspection.

3.2 Automated Cargo Screening Systems

  • Automated scanning technology prioritizes high-risk shipments based on data analytics.
  • Smart algorithms assess shipping manifests, travel patterns, and cargo origins to identify suspicious activity.

3.3 Real-Time Data Sharing and Predictive Analytics

  • AI systems compile data from multiple NII technologies to create real-time risk assessments.
  • Law enforcement agencies use predictive analytics to anticipate smuggling tactics and deploy resources effectively.

 

Forward Operating Laboratories: To expedite the identification of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, CBP has established 16 Forward Operating Laboratories. These onsite facilities enable rapid testing of suspected substances, reducing analysis time from weeks to mere seconds. This swift turnaround accelerates law enforcement responses, supports timely prosecutions, and enhances intelligence gathering efforts. The implementation of these laboratories underscores DHS’s commitment to providing frontline personnel with the tools necessary for effective and immediate action against the synthetic drug threat.

Chapter 1: Rapid Drug Identification Technologies

The primary function of Forward Operating Laboratories is to identify fentanyl and other synthetic opioids quickly and accurately. To achieve this, CBP employs state-of-the-art chemical analysis technologies.

1.1 Portable Mass Spectrometry (MS)

Mass spectrometry is one of the most effective tools for identifying unknown substances. In Forward Operating Laboratories, portable MS devices allow frontline personnel to analyze drug samples in real time.

  • How It Works: MS breaks down substances into their molecular components, providing a chemical “fingerprint” that identifies fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine, and other narcotics.
  • Advantages:
    • Highly accurate identification of synthetic opioids and their precursors.
    • Capable of detecting minute traces of substances, even in complex mixtures.
    • Reduces reliance on external lab testing, allowing immediate field action.

1.2 Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR)

FTIR is a non-destructive analysis technique that uses infrared light to determine the chemical composition of a sample.

  • Uses in Drug Detection:
    • Identifies fentanyl analogs and cutting agents (such as xylazine and benzodiazepines).
    • Works on solid and liquid samples without requiring chemical reagents.
  • Speed and Efficiency:
    • Produces results in seconds.
    • Helps law enforcement distinguish between controlled substances and legal pharmaceuticals.

1.3 Handheld Raman Spectroscopy

  • Uses laser-based technology to scan and identify chemical compounds without opening packaging.
  • Enables officers to test substances through plastic or glass containers, minimizing exposure risks.

 

Chapter 2: Enhancing Law Enforcement Response

The ability to rapidly test and confirm the presence of synthetic drugs drastically improves operational efficiency and safety for law enforcement.

2.1 Accelerated Decision-Making for Prosecutions

  • In traditional forensic labs, drug analysis could take weeks due to backlog and processing delays.
  • With Forward Operating Laboratories, CBP can provide conclusive test results within seconds, leading to immediate arrests and evidence submission.

2.2 Protecting First Responders from Fentanyl Exposure

  • Even a few milligrams of fentanyl can be lethal. Law enforcement officers risk exposure through inhalation or skin contact.
  • Forward Operating Labs allow for on-site substance verification, minimizing unnecessary handling and exposure.
  • Protective protocols include:
    • Using portable fume hoods to contain airborne particles.
    • Deploying Naloxone (Narcan) kits for overdose emergencies.

2.3 Cross-Agency Collaboration and Intelligence Sharing

  • Real-time reporting of drug seizures allows agencies to track trafficking patterns.
  • Data from Forward Operating Laboratories is shared with:
    • DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) for national drug trends.
    • HSI (Homeland Security Investigations) to dismantle smuggling networks.
    • State and local law enforcement for coordinated interdictions.

 

Chapter 3: The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Drug Detection

CBP is integrating Artificial Intelligence (AI) to enhance the speed and accuracy of synthetic drug detection.

3.1 AI-Enhanced Chemical Profiling

  • AI analyzes molecular structures of synthetic drugs and their precursors to identify new analogs that may not yet be classified as controlled substances.
  • Machine learning models are trained on vast databases of known fentanyl compounds, helping to predict and detect emerging drug variants.

3.2 Automated Substance Classification

  • AI-driven spectroscopy software automatically compares samples against extensive chemical libraries.
  • The system flags suspicious new formulations that may require additional forensic investigation.

3.3 Predictive Analytics for Drug Trafficking

  • AI analyzes historical seizure data to identify trafficking trends.
  • Helps law enforcement anticipate smuggling routes and distribution hubs.
  • Predictive models assist in strategic resource deployment to high-risk locations.

 

Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning at Ports of Entry: CBP is leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) technologies to enhance screening processes at ports of entry. In the current year alone, AI-driven models have been instrumental in identifying suspicious vehicles and passengers, leading to 240 seizures. These interdictions have resulted in the confiscation of thousands of pounds of illicit narcotics, including cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl. The integration of AI and ML into inspection protocols enables more precise targeting of high-risk entities, thereby improving operational efficiency and effectiveness.

Chapter 1: AI and Machine Learning in Border Security Screening

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is integrating Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) into its screening procedures to enhance detection and interdiction efforts at ports of entry. These technologies significantly improve CBP’s ability to identify high-risk vehicles, cargo, and passengers, reducing reliance on manual inspections while increasing overall effectiveness.

1.1 How AI Enhances Border Inspections

Traditional border security relies on trained officers analyzing documents, traveler behaviors, and cargo manifests. AI-driven solutions complement these efforts by:

  • Risk-Based Targeting: AI models assess vast amounts of data to identify passengers, shipments, and vehicles with suspicious characteristics.
  • Automated Image and X-ray Analysis: Machine learning processes X-ray and gamma-ray scans to detect anomalies in cargo and vehicle compartments.
  • Facial Recognition and Biometric Screening: AI compares traveler biometrics against watchlists of known criminals and traffickers.

1.2 Real-World Impact: AI-Led Seizures and Interdictions

The integration of AI at U.S. ports of entry has led to 240 seizures in the current year alone, preventing the smuggling of:

  • Cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl – AI-assisted interdictions have confiscated thousands of pounds of illicit drugs.
  • Illegal firearms and ammunition – AI flagging systems have detected smuggled weapons disguised as legitimate cargo.
  • Human trafficking cases – AI-powered analytics have identified high-risk individuals and trafficking patterns, preventing forced migration and exploitation.

1.3 AI’s Role in Passenger and Cargo Inspection Efficiency

  • AI-driven passenger screening allows CBP officers to quickly assess traveler risk factors while maintaining normal processing speeds.
  • Machine learning models have improved cargo screening accuracy, reducing false positives and ensuring legitimate trade flows efficiently.
  • AI-based fraud detection systems have identified hundreds of cases of document forgery and identity fraud at border checkpoints.

 

Chapter 2: Machine Learning Models for Suspicious Activity Detection

Machine learning plays a key role in automating threat detection, making ports of entry more secure and efficient.

2.1 How Machine Learning Identifies High-Risk Passengers and Cargo

CBP uses machine learning algorithms to analyze various data points from:

  • Travel history and patterns: Identifies passengers with unusual or high-risk movement behaviors.
  • Cargo shipping data: Flags shipments that do not match declared cargo descriptions or standard trade patterns.
  • License plate and vehicle recognition: Detects cars associated with prior smuggling incidents or registered to known traffickers.

2.2 AI-Powered X-ray and Gamma-Ray Cargo Screening

CBP utilizes non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology enhanced by AI to scan and analyze cargo shipments.

  • AI compares scan images against a database of known smuggling patterns, quickly identifying contraband hidden within commercial shipments.
  • Deep learning enhances object recognition, differentiating between legal and illicit cargo.
  • AI-assisted vehicle inspections reduce false alerts, allowing officers to focus on truly suspicious cases.

2.3 AI in Biometric and Facial Recognition Screening

At high-traffic land, air, and sea entry points, AI enhances biometric screening:

  • Facial recognition systems compare live images to databases of known criminals and traffickers.
  • Deepfake detection prevents identity fraud, ensuring passports and visas are legitimate.
  • AI-driven behavioral analysis flags travelers exhibiting suspicious body language or inconsistent travel histories.

2.4 Success Stories from AI-Driven Machine Learning Systems

  • In 2023, AI-powered screening identified a drug smuggling attempt hidden in fruit shipments, leading to a multi-million-dollar fentanyl seizure.
  • Machine learning-driven risk assessments flagged a human trafficking operation, leading to the rescue of multiple victims at a major airport.

 

Chapter 3: The Future of AI and Machine Learning at Ports of Entry

As CBP continues expanding its AI capabilities, future innovations will further strengthen border security.

3.1 Predictive Analytics for Smuggling Prevention

  • AI models forecast smuggling trends, allowing officers to proactively adjust screening protocols.
  • Geospatial intelligence maps high-risk border crossings and smuggling routes in real-time.
  • Enhanced AI-driven anomaly detection will improve early-stage identification of hidden compartments and concealed drugs.

3.2 Integrating AI with International Intelligence Networks

AI-driven systems will facilitate greater collaboration with global agencies, including:

  • INTERPOL and Europol for real-time data sharing on international drug and human trafficking suspects.
  • AI-enhanced financial tracking to trace drug cartel funds across global banking networks.
  • Automated cargo tracking systems that alert law enforcement to high-risk shipments before they reach U.S. borders.

3.3 Expanding AI Capabilities for Future Border Security Challenges

CBP is exploring next-generation AI technologies, such as:

  • Quantum computing to process massive intelligence datasets in seconds.
  • AI-assisted drones and autonomous surveillance to monitor remote border areas.
  • AI-driven deepfake detection to counter advanced identity fraud techniques used by traffickers.

HSI Strategic Network Dismantlement Project: Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is employing AI to map and dismantle fentanyl distribution networks operating domestically and internationally. Through the Strategic Network Dismantlement Project, data engineers and scientists collaborate with HSI investigators using the RAVEN platform. This initiative involves analyzing vast datasets to uncover previously unidentified networks, providing actionable insights that disrupt the global supply chain of synthetic opioids. By illuminating these clandestine operations, HSI enhances its capacity to combat the distribution of fentanyl and its precursors.

Chapter 1: Artificial Intelligence in Criminal Network Mapping

The HSI Strategic Network Dismantlement Project leverages Artificial Intelligence (AI) to identify, track, and dismantle fentanyl trafficking networks operating both in the U.S. and internationally.

1.1 How AI Maps Drug Networks

AI-driven models analyze massive datasets from various sources to establish connections between known and unknown drug traffickers.

  • Pattern Recognition: AI algorithms detect recurring transactions, shipping routes, and communication channels used by traffickers.
  • Social Network Analysis (SNA): Identifies key players within a criminal organization by analyzing relationships between suspects, suppliers, and distributors.
  • Anomaly Detection: Machine learning flags suspicious financial transactions, unusually large shipments, or encrypted communications linked to drug operations.

1.2 Data Sources for Network Dismantlement

HSI integrates AI with data from multiple sources to build a comprehensive picture of fentanyl distribution networks:

  • Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Seizure Data – Tracks patterns of fentanyl smuggling across U.S. borders.
  • Financial Transaction Records – AI scans banking transactions for money laundering linked to drug sales.
  • Dark Web and Encrypted Communications – Monitors illicit marketplaces where fentanyl and its precursors are traded.
  • Shipping and Logistics Data – Identifies shipments suspected of carrying synthetic opioids.

1.3 Case Study: AI-Driven Network Disruptions

  • In 2023, HSI-led AI investigations uncovered a major fentanyl ring operating through online pharmacies. AI analysis of financial transactions linked over $100 million in illicit drug proceeds to offshore accounts.
  • Following the AI findings, HSI executed multiple arrests and shut down distribution hubs in five states.

 

 

Chapter 2: The RAVEN Platform – AI-Powered Intelligence for Law Enforcement

At the heart of the Strategic Network Dismantlement Project is RAVEN, a cutting-edge AI platform developed by HSI to analyze and visualize complex criminal operations.

2.1 What is the RAVEN Platform?

RAVEN is an advanced data analytics system that helps investigators track and dismantle fentanyl distribution networks. It combines AI, machine learning, and big data processing to reveal hidden connections in drug trafficking operations.

  • Graph-Based Intelligence: Uses AI-driven mapping to connect individuals, companies, and transactions in a drug network.
  • Real-Time Data Correlation: Continuously updates connections between suspects, shipments, and financial records.
  • Predictive Threat Analysis: Forecasts future trafficking routes and smuggling tactics based on historical patterns.

2.2 Key Features of RAVEN

  • Automated Entity Matching: AI links drug seizures to known traffickers by analyzing shipping manifests, phone records, and financial transactions.
  • Cross-Border Intelligence Sharing: Connects data between domestic and international law enforcement agencies to trace fentanyl supply chains.
  • Deep Learning for Drug Trend Prediction: Identifies emerging synthetic opioid variations and new precursor sources.

2.3 Success Stories from the RAVEN Platform

  • In a recent operation, RAVEN’s analysis led to the dismantling of a fentanyl production ring linked to Mexican cartels. By connecting digital transactions to known cartel members, law enforcement seized over 1,500 pounds of fentanyl before distribution.
  • RAVEN’s financial crime analysis helped uncover a major cryptocurrency-based fentanyl laundering scheme, leading to multiple arrests and asset seizures exceeding $50 million.

 

Chapter 3: AI-Powered Disruption of the Global Fentanyl Supply Chain

By leveraging AI and data science, HSI is not just identifying drug networks—it is disrupting the global supply chain that fuels the fentanyl crisis.

3.1 Identifying Fentanyl Precursors at the Source

Fentanyl precursors—chemicals used to manufacture synthetic opioids—are often shipped from international sources before being processed into fentanyl. AI-driven investigations help:

  • Track precursor shipments from China, India, and Mexico to illicit labs in North America.
  • Use predictive analytics to flag suspicious chemical exports before they reach drug manufacturers.
  • Coordinate with foreign law enforcement agencies to disrupt production facilities.

3.2 Shutting Down Digital and Financial Operations

Traffickers use cryptocurrency, encrypted messaging, and dark web markets to evade detection. AI helps law enforcement:

  • Unmask dark web fentanyl vendors by tracing cryptocurrency transactions through blockchain analysis.
  • Detect patterns of online drug sales, helping authorities take down illicit marketplaces.
  • Monitor shell companies and front businesses used for laundering drug money.

3.3 Strengthening Global Partnerships

  • AI-driven insights from the Strategic Network Dismantlement Project are shared with INTERPOL, Europol, and foreign task forces to combat transnational crime.
  • HSI collaborates with foreign financial institutions to flag suspicious transactions linked to fentanyl trafficking.
  • By combining AI with real-time intelligence sharing, law enforcement can prevent shipments before they reach U.S. soil.

 

HSI Innovation Lab: The HSI Innovation Lab serves as a hub for developing and deploying cutting-edge technologies, including machine learning and artificial intelligence, to combat the fentanyl crisis. This facility focuses on harnessing data analytics to identify patterns and trends associated with synthetic drug trafficking. By integrating advanced technological solutions, the Innovation Lab supports proactive measures to intercept and dismantle illicit operations before they reach U.S. borders. This proactive approach is vital in addressing the dynamic and evolving nature of synthetic drug threats.

Chapter 1: Machine Learning and AI in Drug Trafficking Analysis

The HSI Innovation Lab plays a crucial role in leveraging machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) to combat synthetic drug trafficking. By analyzing vast amounts of data, these technologies help law enforcement stay ahead of evolving fentanyl distribution tactics.

1.1 How Machine Learning Detects Drug Trafficking Patterns

Machine learning (ML) algorithms process extensive datasets to identify hidden trends and suspicious activities linked to fentanyl smuggling.

  • Predictive Modeling: ML predicts future smuggling methods by analyzing past interdictions, seizures, and law enforcement reports.
  • Anomaly Detection: Algorithms detect unusual financial transactions, shipping routes, and communications that may indicate illicit activity.
  • Natural Language Processing (NLP): AI scans encrypted messages, dark web forums, and social media for references to synthetic drug trade.

1.2 AI-Driven Risk Assessment for Interdiction Efforts

AI enhances CBP and HSI’s ability to prioritize high-risk shipments and individuals for further investigation.

  • Automated Cargo Screening: Machine learning models evaluate cargo manifests to flag suspicious shipments.
  • Passenger and Travel Pattern Analysis: AI analyzes visa applications, flight bookings, and border crossings to detect traffickers.
  • Cryptocurrency Transaction Monitoring: AI traces digital currency payments linked to fentanyl sales on dark web marketplaces.

1.3 Success Stories in AI-Based Drug Interdiction

  • In a recent HSI-led operation, machine learning identified a fentanyl trafficking network by analyzing over 3 million financial transactions. This led to the seizure of over 800,000 counterfeit fentanyl pills before distribution.
  • AI-powered image recognition software detected fentanyl concealed in food shipments, preventing large-scale drug smuggling attempts.

 

Chapter 2: Data Analytics and Real-Time Intelligence for Law Enforcement

The HSI Innovation Lab is a leader in data-driven investigations, using real-time intelligence to prevent fentanyl trafficking before it reaches U.S. communities.

2.1 Big Data Integration for Fentanyl Supply Chain Analysis

The lab consolidates multiple data streams to track fentanyl production and distribution, including:

  • Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Seizure Data: Tracks historical trafficking routes.
  • Pharmaceutical and Chemical Shipments: Monitors precursor chemical exports.
  • Financial Intelligence Reports: Identifies money laundering patterns linked to drug trade.

2.2 Dark Web and Encrypted Communication Monitoring

The dark web is a major marketplace for fentanyl distribution. HSI’s Innovation Lab uses advanced analytics to track and disrupt illicit online operations.

  • AI scrapes dark web forums and vendor listings to identify and target fentanyl sellers.
  • Blockchain forensics tools analyze cryptocurrency transactions, revealing hidden financial networks.
  • Deepfake and synthetic identity detection prevent traffickers from using AI-generated personas to evade law enforcement.

2.3 Enhancing Collaboration Through Real-Time Intelligence Sharing

  • The Innovation Lab provides instant intelligence updates to HSI field offices, DEA, FBI, and foreign partners.
  • AI-driven alerts help agencies respond in real time to fentanyl shipments or suspicious financial activities.
  • Automated forensic analysis allows faster prosecution of traffickers by providing law enforcement with concrete digital evidence.

 

Chapter 3: Proactive Measures and Future Innovations

The HSI Innovation Lab is not just reacting to drug trafficking trends—it is developing next-generation tools to proactively dismantle synthetic drug operations.

3.1 AI-Powered Forensics for Drug Identification

  • Automated Substance Profiling: AI analyzes fentanyl analogs, helping labs classify new drug variations.
  • Portable Spectroscopy Devices: Machine learning refines chemical signatures, enhancing on-the-spot drug testing.

3.2 Predictive Analytics for Global Drug Supply Chains

  • AI assesses international precursor chemical production trends, predicting future fentanyl sources.
  • Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT): Tracks fentanyl lab locations via satellite imaging and AI-driven terrain analysis.
  • Behavioral Analysis Models: Identifies suspicious chemical purchase orders and shipping manifests before drugs reach traffickers.

3.3 Future-Proofing Law Enforcement with Emerging Technologies

The Innovation Lab continuously explores new frontiers in technology to combat synthetic opioids:

  • Quantum Computing for Advanced Encryption Breaking: HSI is testing quantum-based decryption tools to counter cartel communications.
  • AI-Powered Deepfake Detection: Prevents traffickers from using synthetic identities for money laundering and border crossings.
  • Autonomous Surveillance Drones: AI-controlled UAVs patrol known smuggling corridors, enhancing border security.

In summary, DHS’s multifaceted strategy combines technological innovation, rapid response capabilities, and interagency collaboration to address the complex challenges posed by synthetic drugs. Through the deployment of advanced inspection systems, real-time substance analysis, and AI-driven intelligence operations, DHS aims to significantly reduce the influx of synthetic opioids into the United States, thereby safeguarding public health and national security.

]]> White House: Trump’s First Month Rolling Agenda “Big League” https://hls.today/news/white-house-trumps-first-month-rolling-agenda/ Tue, 25 Feb 2025 04:36:09 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=5344

“President Trump said from the start: criminal illegals have no place in our homeland. He is keeping his promise.” – Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem

HLS.Today – WASHINGTON – In a single month, President Trump and Secretary Noem have made massive strides to address the crisis at the southern border and remove violent criminal aliens from American communities. This is just the beginning of the golden age of America.

PROMISES MADE, PROMISES KEPT:   

  • On day one, President Trump declared a national emergency at the southern border and restarted construction of the border wall.
  • President Trump instantly reinstated “Remain in Mexico” and ended catch and release.
  • The Trump administration has empowered our brave men and women in ICE, Border Patrol, and Coast Guard to use common sense to do their jobs effectively.
  • DHS has repealed Biden Era rules that allowed criminal aliens to hide from law enforcement in places like schools and churches to avoid arrest.
  • DHS returned to using the term “illegal alien” to use statutory language and stop political correctness from hindering law enforcement.
  • ICE arrests of criminal aliens have doubled and arrests of fugitives at large has tripled.
  • Daily border encounters have plunged 93% since President Trump took office.
  • To fulfill President Trump’s promise to carry out mass deportations, the administration is detaining illegal aliens, including violent criminals, at Guantanamo Bay.
  • President Trump designated international cartels and other criminal gangs, such as MS-13 and Tren de Aragua, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
  • President Trump signed the Laken Riley Act which mandates the federal detention of illegal immigrants who are accused of theft, burglary, assaulting a law enforcement officer, and any crime that causes death or serious bodily injury.
  • President Trump stopped the broad abuse of humanitarian parole and returned the program to a case-by-case basis.
  • Secretary Noem ended the previous administration’s extension of Venezuelan Temporary Protected Status. 
  • DHS froze all grants to non-profit organizations that facilitate illegal immigration.
  • DHS deputized  the Texas National Guard, Drug Enforcement Administration, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Marshals, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, members of the State Department and the IRS to help with immigration operations.
  • Secretary Noem clawed back $80 million that FEMA deep state activists unilaterally gave to put illegal aliens up in luxury New York City hotels.

Bottom Line: Since President Trump was inaugurated, he’s made it clear there is a new sheriff in town. The President and Secretary Noem will continue fighting every day to secure our borders and keep American communities safe.

Source: dhs.gov

]]> Israel Hacks Beirut Airport Control Tower to Prevent Iranian Aircraft from Landing https://hls.today/news/israel-hacks-beirut-airport-control-tower-to-prevent-iranian-aircraft-from-landing/ Sun, 29 Sep 2024 04:21:38 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=5277 The Lebanese Transport Minister reported that he quickly intervened and prohibited the landing of that aircraft.

Israel has allegedly breached the communication network of the control tower at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport and warned an Iranian plane against landing, prompting the aircraft to turn around and return to Tehran, Israeli media reported on Saturday.

According to reports, Israel supposedly hacked into the communications system of the Beirut control tower, warning that it would not allow the landing of a cargo plane from “Qasem Air,” Flight No. QFZ9964, as it was approaching for landing.

 

Lebanon’s Transport Minister, Ali Hamieh, stated to the Lebanese newspaper “An-Nahar” that the IDF intercepted the radio frequency of the international airport’s control tower and warned that it would attack the airport if an Iranian civilian aircraft on its way to Lebanon landed there.

The minister reported that he quickly intervened and prohibited the landing of that aircraft.

IDF strikes Hezbollah leadership in Beirut

The tension concerning flights from Iran landing in Lebanon is in light of the IDF’s spokesperson’s official announcement that the IDF eliminated Hezbollah’s co-founder and leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, along with Ali Karaki, the commander of Hezbollah’s Southern Front, and additional commanders from Hezbollah.

Following the announcement in which the operation’s name was revealed as “New Order,” the IDF Chief of Staff stated, “This is not the end of our arsenal. The message is simple: for anyone who threatens the citizens of the State of Israel – we will know how to reach you.”

The IDF further reported that “IAF fighter jets, guided by precise intelligence from the Intelligence Division and the security system, targeted Hezbollah’s central headquarters, which is located underground beneath a residential building in the Dahieh area of Beirut. The strike occurred while Hezbollah’s senior leadership was at the headquarters, coordinating terrorist activities against the citizens of the State of Israel.”

 

Source: JPOST and HLS.Today

]]> DHS-China: More Companies on Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act https://hls.today/news/dhs-china-more-companies-on-uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act/ Wed, 14 Aug 2024 03:37:22 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=5232 DHS.GOV. HLS.Today – The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) establishes a rebuttable presumption that the importation of any goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China, or produced by certain entities, is prohibited by Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and that such goods, wares, articles, and merchandise are not entitled to entry to the United States.

The presumption applies unless the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) determines, through clear and convincing evidence, that the goods, wares, articles, or merchandise were not produced using forced labor or that UFLPA does not apply to the goods, wares, or merchandise seeking to be entered into the United States. The statistics provided below are shipments subjected to UFLPA reviews or enforcement actions.

Today, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the addition of five entities based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List, bringing the total entities listed to 73. These additions build on DHS’s commitment to eradicate forced labor and promote accountability for the PRC’s ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs and other religious and ethnic minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

Effective August 9, 2024, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) will apply a rebuttable presumption that goods produced by Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd., Kashgar, Construction Engineering (Group) Co.; Ltd., Rare Earth Magnesium Technology Group Holdings, Ltd.; Xinjiang Habahe Ashele Copper Co., Ltd., and Xinjiang Tengxiang Magnesium Products Co., Ltd. will be prohibited from entering the United States.

“As DHS identifies more entities across different sectors that use or facilitate forced labor, we act to keep their tainted goods out of our nation’s supply chains,” said Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas. “Today’s announcement strengthens our enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and helps responsible companies conduct due diligence so that, together, we can keep the products of forced labor out of our country.  We will continue to implement this law with full force in our efforts to fight the exploitation and abuse of the Uyghur people and other persecuted groups and protect a free and fair market.”

Including the five entities identified today, the FLETF – chaired by DHS and whose member agencies also include the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Justice, Labor, State, and the Treasury – has added 73 entities to the UFLPA Entity List since the UFLPA was signed into law in December 2021.

The UFLPA Entity List includes companies that are active in the apparel, agriculture, polysilicon, plastics, chemicals, batteries, household appliances, electronics, and food additives sectors, among others. Identifying these additional entities provides U.S. importers with more information to conduct due diligence and examine their supply chains for risks of forced labor to ensure compliance with the UFLPA.

“We have shown again through today’s enforcement actions that the United States is committed to keeping goods made with forced labor out of U.S. supply chains,” said DHS Under Secretary for Policy Robert Silvers, who serves as Chair of the FLETF. “Companies must conduct due diligence and know where their products are coming from. The Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force will continue to designate entities in a variety of sectors that meet the criteria for inclusion on the UFLPA Entity List, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection will continue its vigilant enforcement at our ports.”

The FLETF has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that two entities meet the criteria for inclusion under Section 2(d)(2)(B)(ii) of the UFLPA by working with the government of the XUAR to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor or receive forced labor of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of the XUAR;

two entities meet the criteria for inclusion under Section 2(d)2(B)(v) of the UFLPA, which identifies facilities and entities that source material from the XUAR or from persons working with the government of Xinjiang or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for purposes of the “poverty alleviation” program or the “pairing-assistance” program or any other government labor scheme that uses forced labor; and one entity meets both criteria under Sections 2(d)(2)(B)(ii) and (v) of the UFLPA.

Xinjiang Habahe Ashele Copper Co., Ltd. is a company located in the XUAR that mines nonferrous metals, including zinc, copper and silver. Xinjiang Habahe Ashele Copper Co., Ltd. is a subsidiary of one of the world’s largest mining company, and produces approximately 10% of that company’s copper and silver. The United States Government has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that Xinjiang Habahe Ashele Copper Co., Ltd. works with the government of the XUAR to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, or receive Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of the XUAR.

Information reviewed by the FLETF, including publicly available information, indicates that Xinjiang Habahe Ashele Copper Co., Ltd. works with the Habahe County government of the XUAR to recruit Kazakh workers through PRC labor programs to mine metals, such as zinc, copper, and silver in the XUAR . The FLETF therefore determined that the activities of Xinjiang Habahe Ashele Copper Co., Ltd. satisfy the criteria for addition to the UFLPA Entity List described in section 2(d)(2)(B)(ii).

Kashgar Construction Engineering (Group) Co., Ltd. is a company based in Kashgar, Xinjiang, China, that manufactures structural components and materials for construction, and is engaged in general construction, construction engineering and operations, and real estate development and operations. The United States Government has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that Kashgar Construction Engineering (Group) Co., Ltd. works with the government of the XUAR to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, or receive Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of the XUAR.

Information reviewed by the FLETF, including publicly available information, indicates that Kashgar Construction Engineering (Group) Co., Ltd. has repeatedly participated in the transfer and recruitment of ethnic minorities from Xinjiang, including Uyghurs, through Jiashi County Xinjiang government labor programs. The FLETF therefore determined that the activities of Kashgar Construction Engineering (Group) Co., Ltd. satisfy the criteria for addition to the UFLPA Entity List described in section 2(d)(2)(B)(ii).

Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd. is a company based in Hong Kong that manufactures magnesium fertilizer and magnesium alloys. The United States Government has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd. sources material, specifically magnesium, from the XUAR. Information reviewed by the FLETF, including publicly available information, indicates that Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd. has established its magnesium production base in the XUAR through its vertically-integrated subsidiaries, and sources magnesium from the XUAR.

The FLETF therefore determined that the activities of Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd. satisfy the criteria for addition to the UFLPA Entity List described in section 2(d)(2)(B)(v).

Rare Earth Magnesium Technology Group Holdings, Ltd. is a company based in Hong Kong that manufactures and sells magnesium alloy products. The United States Government has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that Rare Earth Magnesium Technology Group Holdings, Ltd. sources material, specifically magnesium, from the XUAR.

Information reviewed by the FLETF, including publicly available information, indicates that Rare Earth Magnesium Technology Group Holdings, Ltd., a principal subsidiary of Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd., operates Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd.’s magnesium product business, and sources magnesium from its magnesium production base located in the XUAR. The FLETF therefore determined that the activities of Rare Earth Magnesium Technology Group Holdings, Ltd. satisfy the criteria for addition to the UFLPA Entity List described in section 2(d)(2)(B)(v).

Xinjiang Tengxiang Magnesium Products Co., Ltd. is a company based in Hami, Xinjiang, China, that manufactures magnesium and magnesium alloy products. The United States Government has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that Xinjiang Tengxiang Magnesium Products Co., Ltd. works with the government of the XUAR to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, or receive Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of the XUAR.

Information reviewed by the FLETF, including publicly available information, indicates that Xinjiang Tengxiang Magnesium Products Co., Ltd. receives Uyghurs or members of other persecuted groups that the local Yizhou District government transfer from Xinjiang. The United States Government also has reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable information, that Xinjiang Tengxiang Magnesium Products Co., Ltd. sources material, specifically the raw materials required to produce magnesium, such as coal and dolomite, from the XUAR.

Information reviewed by the FLETF, including publicly available information, indicates that Xinjiang Tengxiang Magnesium Products Co., Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rare Earth Magnesium Technology Group Holdings, Ltd. and a principal subsidiary of Century Sunshine Group Holdings, Ltd., operates a magnesium production facility in the XUAR and sources raw materials from the XUAR, including coal and dolomite, to produce magnesium. The FLETF therefore determined that the activities of Xinjiang Tengxiang Magnesium Products Co., Ltd. satisfy the criteria for addition to the UFLPA Entity List described in sections 2(d)(2)(B)(ii) and 2(d)(2)(B)(v).

The bipartisan Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, signed into law by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., in December 2021, mandates that CBP apply a rebuttable presumption that goods mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in the XUAR or produced by entities identified on the UFLPA Entity List are prohibited from importation into the United States unless the Commissioner of CBP determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that the goods were not produced with forced labor.

CBP began enforcing the UFLPA in June 2022.  Since then, CBP has reviewed over 9,000 shipments valued at more than $3.4 billion under the UFLPA.  Additionally, Homeland Security Investigations, through the DHS Center for Countering Human Trafficking, conducts criminal investigations into those engaging in or otherwise knowingly benefitting from forced labor, and collaborates with international partners to seek justice for victims.

Today’s announcement supports President Biden’s Memorandum on Advancing Worker Empowerment, Rights, and High Labor Standards Globally.  The memorandum represents the first whole-of-government approach to advance workers’ rights by directing federal agencies engaged abroad to advance international recognized labor rights, which includes DHS’s work implementing the UFLPA.

This expansion of the UFLPA Entity List reflects DHS’s prioritization of efforts to combat the introduction of forced labor into U.S. supply chains. This commitment is outlined in the Department’s recent Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which added combating crimes of exploitation, including labor exploitation, as the newest and sixth DHS mission. Last month, DHS published updates to the UFLPA strategy, which outlines how the FLETF has significantly advanced our objectives through several initiatives including strong enforcement by CBP; expansion of the UFLPA Entity List; designating new high priority sectors for enforcement; and greater collaboration with stakeholders.

HLS.Today

]]> Amid Gaza Evacuation US President Biden Travels to Israel https://hls.today/news/hls-today-amid-gaza-evacuation-us-president-biden-travels-to-israel/ Tue, 17 Oct 2023 16:06:28 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=5030 HLS.Today – President joseph r. biden, jr. will travel to israel on wednesday, october 18, to demonstrate his steadfast support for israel in the face of hamas’s brutal terrorist attack and to consult on next steps.

president biden will then travel to amman, jordan, where he will meet with his majesty king abdullah, egyptian president sisi, and palestinian authority president mahmoud abbas. he will reiterate that hamas does not stand for the palestinian people’s right to dignity and self-determination and discuss the humanitarian needs of civilians in gaza.

 

from israel, thank you very much for starting off our coverage at this hour. thank you. >> and joining us now is ben rhodes, former deputy national security adviser for president obama. he is an msnbc political analyst. ben, it seems likely that israel will not launch a land invasion, or ground invasion of gaza before president biden leaves israel.
>> yes, lawrence. i can’t imagine that israel would do that, both because of the potential risk of escalation while president biden is there. and also, just because i think the purpose of this visit is to have a consultation, a full, robust, comprehensive consultation between president biden and the israeli government before they launch that invasion. so, i think that this indicates that the timeline for that ground invasion is likely moving a bit to the right here. >> in the less than three minutes, secretary blinken laid out the agenda for president biden when he comes to israel. he easily described the single most important meeting by a president of the united states in israel that has ever occurred.
>> yes, not even close, lawrence. i mean, this is absolutely unprecedented. obviously, what’s happened in israel’s unprecedented. the risk of regional escalation is unprecedented. and the idea of a president being in that kind of circumstance, where there is literal danger in terms of the rockets that are continue to come at tel aviv, but also, there whisks about not knowing where exactly this is going. what is clear is that secretary blinken was on that trip. he went to every major partner, partner in the region, after consulting with israel. and clearly, what he determined is there are a number of issues where it’s absolutely central to the u.s. and israel, they’re on the same page. how do we prevent regional escalation?
what is the messaging that has to be done to iran, and groups like hezbollah, to prevent escalation? how can we ensure a sufficient humanitarian component to end the israeli operation in gaza that does not set the region on fire? and i’m sure that’s the message that secretary blinken was getting from those air partners, that we have to take every step possible to both have an israeli operation, and also mitigates the arm to palestinian civilians. clearly, secretary blinken took all those messages from arab leaders back to israel, compared notes, and saw whether or not the time was right for president biden to step in like this. and the fact that he was meeting with seven hours with prime minister netanyahu indicate this is real substance, right? this wasn’t window dressing, the secretary meeting with a foreign leader to the presidents visit. they were really negotiating the agenda, the deliverables, the announcements that will come from president biden as well during that visit.
>> yeah, at the washington post is reporting, u.s. officials waited to announce president biden’s traveled to israel until they received commitments from israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu on a humanitarian package monday night, according to two u.s. officials familiar with the discussions. and then, that’s all about that seven-hour meeting that secretary blinken was in.
>> that’s right. and you heard even in his remarks, tony’s remarks, i think they clearly indicated what the back and forth and the points of tension are on this. on the one hand, there is an overwhelming imperative to address the humanitarian crisis in gaza, and that is growing more acute. and then, again, it really was the concern that tony blinken heard from all the different arab leaders, and obviously from leaders around the world. on the other hand, you heard in his messaging what the israelis are concerned about, which is that we provide a humanitarian corridor into gaza. we start shipping eight into gaza. if we create safe zones in gaza, then hamas we manipulate that, that they will dispute disrupt the aid, try to get their hands on things that might be used for military purposes as well. so, i think you heard, even though you heard those remarks from tony blinken, we heard exactly what was discussed in that meeting with prime minister netanyahu, which is that u.s. wanting to make sure that there was a commitment to humanitarian effort to alleviate the situation in gaza. but israel wanting to hear from the united states that we understand that there is a risk that hamas could try to take advantage of that. and that clearly was a big part of the discussion in that meeting that tony blinken had in israel.
>> there is a lesson, i would say, in the last 24 hours for people watching this coverage across television networks, with the president last night on 60 minutes, he was asked, pressed about humanitarian aid in gaza. and he was minimally forthcoming. he certainly said that it is necessary, we have to figure out something. the team is working on something. and of course, much more was going on than what was indicated in his answers 24 hours ago. 24 hours later, you see a hint of how much more. and of course, that means whatever we know tonight, there is even more going on underneath that.
>> that’s exactly right, lawrence. i have been in situations like this. this one is perhaps more acute. but what has been going on is constant communication between the secretary of defense, the pentagon, and the idf, between i’m sure, the nsc, national security adviser, tony sullivan and his counterparts. tony blinken did a shuttle of diplomacy around the region. and really, the position of united states has meant — president biden has put himself in. he saw the trauma that this attack imposed on israel, they were thick nature of it. and their imperative to respond. he wrapped his arms around israel, quite literally, with his initial messaging. but then, obviously, they’re also looking to see there’s risk here. there is risk that this military operation goes forward in haste, that it could prompt a regional escalation. as we’ve talked about, hezbollah coming in, the west bank exploding, air public opinion exploding. there is risk, obviously, to the civilians in gaza. clearly, what the united states has been trying to do, saying to israel, let’s take just a moment here, and think through how can we manage this operation? we know you are going to undertake that in ways that mitigate that risk. but they’re more likely to prevent regional escalation. we, the united states, we’ll show you our commitment to our security, not just through our messaging, but by two aircraft carrier groups that are being sent to this mission to send a message to iran to stay out of this. at the same time, though, we need to see something from israel that indicates that they understand that the world is watching the humans are in crisis in gaza as well. it is incredibly complicated, but clearly, the administration once that messaging done in private, when it comes to the nature of the content crisis and how to alleviate that. the only tip of the hand, president biden does not want to see a full reoccupation of gaza. but underneath that, in order for his visit to happen, because it is incredibly consequential and a risky step, lawrence. they are leaning into this thing. there was this, you have ownership of whatever happens next. but the reward is you can impact and you can prevent that regional escalation. and you might be able to alleviate the humanitarian crisis. and clearly, joe biden is determined that it’s better to lean in and try to have a new patio and dick summers about where this thing might go, then to step back.
>> president biden, he always seems to have his eye on the risk, and of course the possible reward but then also. and perhaps more than others have in the past in israel, what he sees as his duty.
>> yes. you know, it’s both something people into would’ve too. and i don’t know how many times i was in a room with president biden when he would tell the story about going there in the 70s for the first time and meeting with prime minister gould mayer of israel, and telling him that the reason that we’re gonna be here is that we don’t have anywhere else to go. it’s something he feels intuitively. the other thing that i think is really important, lawrence, psychologically, i think, he understands that israelis feel vulnerable right now. they feel isolated. it is always the case. there are few places on earth where people are more appreciative of visits, of people stepping feet on the ground than israel. i can’t even imagine what the impact of this visit will be on the psychology of israel, given how vulnerable people are feeling right now. they are seeing — the united states government literally is charging plants, planes to get americans out. and yet, there is the president of the red states flying in. that is an incredibly powerful thing. i don’t think we even can grasp how much this will even mean. but there’s a lot to be done. this is substantive meeting as well.

HLS.Today DHS.GOV

 

]]> POTUS Situation Room status of Israel War on Hamas in Gaza https://hls.today/news/hls-today-potus-situation-room-status-of-israel-war-on-hamas-in-gaza/ Sun, 15 Oct 2023 07:37:30 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=5026 HLS.Today – This morning, we sat down with our national security teams to receive a situation update on the terrorist attack in Israel and to give direction on next steps.

We connected with Prime Minister Netanyahu to discuss our ongoing coordination to support Israel, deter other hostile actors, and protect innocent people.

A photograph of President Joe Biden in the White House Situation Room has generated online speculation that the 80-year-old leader may be experiencing cognitive decline.

Posted on President Biden’s official account on Tuesday, the photo captures several administration officials engaged in a meeting concerning the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine. However, a specific detail within the image has drawn the attention of certain online users: the name placards displayed on the Situation Room table.

On various social media platforms, individuals have pointed out the perceived unusualness of all the placards facing President Biden instead of their respective owners.

“Take a look at their nameplates,” one user commented. “They seem to be turned toward President Biden, presumably to help him identify who they are. It’s quite a peculiar scene.”

Blinken Holds Meeting with Saudi Crown Prince

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken convened with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh as the Biden administration strives to avert the escalation of the Israel-Hamas conflict into a broader regional crisis.

Blinken and the crown prince engaged in a conversation on Sunday, lasting slightly less than an hour, at his private estate just outside the capital, according to U.S. officials. When asked about the meeting’s outcome, Blinken responded with “very productive,” but no further immediate details were disclosed. The meeting, originally anticipated for late Saturday night but postponed, remained closed to the media.

These discussions occurred mere hours after the Israeli military issued a warning about an imminent full-scale offensive on Hamas positions in the Gaza Strip, amidst increasingly dire concerns regarding the potentially devastating consequences for Palestinian civilians as a ground invasion loomed.

Prince Mohammed marked the sixth Arab leader that Blinken met with in person since his arrival in the Middle East on Thursday. His journey began in Israel, where he reaffirmed the Biden administration’s commitment to supporting and standing with Israel. Blinken subsequently visited leaders in Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. He also has plans to visit Egypt later on Sunday.

HLS.Today DHS.GOV

]]> Secretary Blinken Enroute to Israel and Jordan https://hls.today/news/hls-today-secretary-blinken-enroute-to-israel-and-jordan/ Wed, 11 Oct 2023 06:06:10 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=5019 HLS.Today – Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken will travel to Israel and Jordan October 11-13, 2023, where he will meet with senior officials. The Secretary will reiterate his condolences for the victims of the terrorist attacks against Israel and condemn those attacks in the strongest terms.  The Secretary will also reaffirm the United States’ solidarity with the government and people of Israel.  He will also discuss measures to bolster Israel’s security and underscore the United States’ unwavering support for Israel’s right to defend itself.

 

Resources and Information for Faith and Community Leaders Regarding the Situation in Israel

 

DHS is closely monitoring unfolding events in Israel and Gaza and will share relevant information with our partners and communities to ensure they are prepared for any impacts to public safety. On October 7, DHS and the FBI jointly issued a public safety notice indicating that no specific and credible threats have been identified at this time.

 

DHS encourages communities to be alert, vigilant and prepared. Below are a variety of DHS resources that may be helpful to organizations:

 

Resources for Community Organizations and Service Providers

Training and course offerings, services, and funding resources for community organizations to address targeted violence.

Security and Resilience Resources for At-Risk Communities

Provides a range of physical security and community resources, including PSAs, Faith-Based/Houses of Worship, School Safety, and broader counterterrorism/targeted violence programs related to at-risk communities and soft targets/publicly accessible locations.

Protecting Houses of Worship Landing Page

This webpage is a first stop shop for guidance and resources to inform Faith-based organizations and places of worship on security-based decisions. Included on this page are numerous resources, which provide building blocks for effective safety and security programs. The resources include a self-assessment tool, trainings, exercises, and other materials focused on a wide range of man-made threats (e.g., bombing, active shooter, vehicle ramming, etc.) that could be used against communities.

Protecting Places of Worship: Six Steps to Enhance Security Against Targeted Violence 

This document outlines actions that faith-based organizations and community leaders can take to increase security. These six steps can help protect places of worship against potential threats of targeted violence in a cost-effective manner that maintains an open and welcoming environment.

Protecting Places of Worship: Perimeter Security Considerations

This infographic outlines low-to-no cost solutions to help implement these suggested practices and highlights ways to identify funding for security improvements.

Immigration Relief in Emergencies or Unforeseen Circumstances | USCIS

Unforeseen circumstances, such as natural catastrophes (hurricanes, wildfires, severe weather, etc.), national emergencies (public health emergencies), or severe illness (including COVID), can sometimes affect the processing of your USCIS application, petition, or immigration request.

Allied Against Hate: A Toolkit for Faith Communities

This toolkit describes practical steps faith communities can take to prevent acts of hate, discrimination, and bias, and to demonstrate solidarity with targeted communities if such acts tragically do occur.

 

HLS.Today DHS.GOV

]]> DHS: Mayorkas concedes Texas Requires a Border Wall https://hls.today/news/hls-today-dhs-mayorkas-concedes-texas-border-requires-a-border-wall/ Thu, 05 Oct 2023 14:00:10 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=5005 HLS.Today – Secretary Mayorkas Delivers Remarks at U.S. Department of Justice Press Conference. Secretary Mayorkas delivered the following remarks at a press conference announcing several fentanyl-related indictments in the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, DC.

Early in 2022, undercover agents from Homeland Security Investigations, or HSI, infiltrated several Chinese chemical companies that were selling precursor chemicals and Schedule 1 narcotics on the internet. The Chinese companies were making their sales in the United States, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, Italy, the Netherlands, and Russia.

The means of shipment varied; one company, for example, shipped the precursor chemicals and Schedule 1 narcotics via air cargo and UPS. Through their investigation, HSI agents learned that one company had shipped more than 500 kilograms of fentanyl precursors to Tucson, Arizona and Brownsville, Texas. By monitoring telephone numbers associated with the shipments and other investigative techniques, agents were able to identify the bitcoin wallets associated with the Chinese companies.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, working with our DEA partners, used advanced targeting data as part of Operation Artemis, a multi-agency surge effort, to interdict more than half a ton of precursor chemicals in warehouses in Los Angeles and Brownsville before the chemicals could be transported to the drug manufacturers in Mexico, and Arizona, California, and Texas. The precursor chemicals were found in mislabeled and otherwise disguised containers.

The indictments unsealed today communicate at least several important messages:

First and foremost, the incredible work of our federal law enforcement agents and officers. They work tirelessly at great personal risk, to save lives and to hold ruthless criminals accountable. 

Second, the law enforcement work that is required to address the scourge of fentanyl requires an all-of-government response, across multiple agencies, and that is precisely what the Biden-Harris Administration is bringing to bear. All of our presence here today makes that powerfully clear.

Third, the scourge of fentanyl is of an international dimension. It certainly is not limited to the United States and Mexico. It spans the globe. Our law enforcement capabilities do as well.

Fourth, we are attacking every instrumentality and every aspect of the criminal organizations and individuals who deal in the death and destruction of fentanyl and other opioids. In addition to indictments against companies and individuals, we are seizing the drugs, money, and properties they use and seek to obtain.

Fifth, we are unrelenting in our pursuit of the transnational criminal organizations – the cartels – that are at the root of it all – most notably, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación. And, we will reach across the globe to the Chinese companies and their employees who make up part of the cartels’ illegal trafficking operations – and anywhere else where the criminal enterprises reside.

 

Sixth, the scourge of fentanyl is not abating. Basically, year-over-year it has grown in this country for more than five years, with over 47,000 fentanyl overdose deaths in 2017 and more than 82,000 in 2022.

Lastly, our work is unabating. In fiscal year 2022, CBP seized more than 14,000 pounds of fentanyl. In fiscal year 2023, CBP seized more than 27,000 pounds.

Thanks again to the incredibly heroic work of the law enforcement agents and officers, including the prosecutors on the front line. We, all of us here, all whom we represent, will not pause our work until we have held all perpetrators accountable.

 

Mayorkas’ announcement comes as migrant numbers in September broke new records. Woman dies after falling from U.S.-Mexico border wall near California port of entry. A woman was found dead Friday in a fall from the U.S.-Mexico border wall, authorities told FOX 5 San Diego.

DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas is citing an “acute and immediate need” to waive dozens of federal laws to build a border wall in south Texas where illegal migration has surged. 

 

It’s a sharp contrast to dismissals of the use of such barriers in the early days of the administration.

 

The agency posted an announcement on the U.S. Federal Register that outlines construction in Starr County in the Rio Grande Valley Sector, where the administration says there is “high illegal entry.” The agency says there have been over 245,000 migrant encounters in the sector this fiscal year.

 

Mayorkas says he is using his authority provided by Congress to waive 26 federal laws, including the Clean Air Act, Safe Drinking Water Act and Endangered Species Act.

 

“There is presently an acute and immediate need to construct physical barriers and roads in the vicinity of the border of the United States in order to prevent unlawful entries into the United States in the project areas pursuant to sections 102(a) and 102(b) of [the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996],” Mayorkas said.

 

The administration had put a halt to new border wall construction in early 2021, after Biden had promised as a presidential candidate that there would “not be another foot of wall constructed on my administration.” The administration said wall construction under the Trump administration was “just one example of the prior administration’s misplaced priorities and failure to manage migration in a safe, orderly and humane way.”

 

However, the construction is funded by the fiscal year 2019 DHS appropriations bill, which specifically funded wall projects in the RGV Sector and which DHS is required to use for its appropriated purpose.

 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) announced plans for up to 20 miles of wall in the RGV Sector in June. The administration previously made moves to close gaps and replace gates and says such projects prioritize the completion of activities and projects to address life, safety and operational risks – including the safety of individuals, Border Patrol agents and migrants. 

 

A CBP spokesperson confirmed to Fox News Digital the waiver is for barrier projects announced in June, and it will cover approximately 17 miles in Starr County. The spokesperson said the project is consistent with DHS’ plan to fulfill President Biden’s Jan. 20, 2021, proclamation that “ended the diversion of funds for the border wall from military projects or other sources while calling for the expenditure of any funds Congress appropriated for barrier construction consistent with their appropriated purpose.”

 

“CBP remains committed to protecting the nation’s cultural and natural resources and will implement sound environmental practices as part of the project covered by this waiver,” the spokesperson said.

The announcement comes as the Biden administration is facing a fresh surge in illegal immigration, leading to record-high numbers at the southern border and intense political criticism from both Republicans and Democrats. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) sources told Fox News last week there were more than 260,000 encounters in September, which would be the highest monthly total on record.

Republicans have blamed the historic numbers on the Biden administration’s policies, including its rollback of Trump-era policies and its halt to border wall construction. The administration has also drawn criticism from Republicans for selling off border wall materials and for suing Texas over a border barrier it built in the Rio Grande.

NYC Mayor Adams visits border as city struggles with migrant crisisVideo

“President Trump is always right,” the Trump campaign said in a statement to Fox News Digital. “That’s why he built close to 500 miles of powerful new wall on the border, and it would have been finished by now. Instead, Crooked Joe Biden turned our country into one giant sanctuary for dangerous criminal aliens.”

The administration has said Congress needs to provide more funding and pass legislation to fix the “broken” system with which it says it is working.

Meanwhile, the administration is getting growing calls for more action from liberal states and cities that have been overwhelmed by the escalating numbers, including ways to limit illegal immigrants from entering.

HLS.Today sources DHS.gov Fox News

]]> Russia Ukraine War: Iran to Supply Armed Forces Hundreds of UAS https://hls.today/homeland-security/29072022-9/ Thu, 31 Aug 2023 00:00:00 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=245 With speculation that Russia will soon acquire “hundreds” of armed and unarmed drones from Iran, the inevitable question of how Moscow plans to use them in its grinding war in Ukraine arises. When the White House publicised the alleged sale in mid-July, Samuel Bendett, a research analyst with the Center for Naval Analyses, reasonably speculated that a number of these drones could be loitering munitions, also known as suicide drones.

 

“One of the biggest lessons Russians took from 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war was mass use of loitering munitions is key to military success,” he tweeted. “So if Iran is supplying ‘several hundred’ drones to Russia, its highly likely that loitering munitions are part of the transfer.”

 

In that fall 2020 war, Azerbaijan used Israeli-built Harop loitering munitions to destroy Armenian S-300 air defence missile systems, the same kind of mobile long-range Soviet-era systems Ukraine is effectively using against intruding Russian aircraft today.

 

Does Russia hope to replicate Azerbaijan’s success using Iranian-made drones? Does Tehran even have drones as sophisticated as the Harop to offer Moscow?

 

“Iran has been a great student of drone technology over the past 20 years, developing its own and reverse-engineering captured U.S. and Israeli technology when presented with an opportunity,” Bendett told me.

 

“Even if their loitering munitions would not exactly match the Harop’s specs, then (they) would be compatible, given that Iran has several classes of loitering munitions.”

 

James Rogers, the DIAS Associate Professor in War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark (SDU), pointed out that Iranian loitering munitions, such as the Ra’ad 85, “have less range and flight time when compared to the Israeli Harops Azerbaijan used in the 2020 war.”

 

“Nevertheless, Iran’s systems are reported to work in an electronic warfare environment and have the ability to strike larger fixed and mobile targets,” he told me. “Iran also has the battle-hardened Ababil III drone, which has been used in a loitering capacity, with proximity fuse air-burst munitions targeting high-profile military personnel.”

 

Rogers believes it will be difficult for Russia to “emulate the technical success” of Azerbaijani Harops against Armenian S-300s with Iranian drones.

 

“The Harops have an extended communication and loitering range, twice that of the Ra’ad 85 and Ababil III Iranian systems, and are in general perceived to be more reliable,” he said. “Nevertheless, when Iranian designed loitering drones have been deployed in conflict, they have been deployed in multiples, in a rudimentary swarm formation that saturate and overwhelm enemy defenses.”

 

“If used in this capacity, the Iranian systems may well have an increased impact on the battlefield.”

 

Bendett noted that the Russians aren’t just worried about Ukrainian S-300s but also the recently supplied U.S.-built long-range surface-to-surface HIMARS artillery rockets.

 

“At this point, practically all Ukrainian long-range strike capability would be targets for the Russian forces equipped with advanced technology like loitering drones (either their own or Iranian),” he said.

 

During the conflict in Yemen, the Houthis used Qasef-1/2K loitering munitions, essentially a clone of the Iranian Ababil-2 drone, against Saudi Arabia’s air defenses. Using open-source GPS coordinates of the positions of Saudi MIM-104 Patriot batteries, the Qasef drones would crash into their radars. The Houthis would then fire volleys of missiles at Saudi targets.

 

“Houthis struck stationary targets with Qasef drones, so any Ukrainian stationary military assets like an air defense battery or a warehouse would be a target,” Bendett said.

Rogers expects Russia to use Iranian drones it receives “in a similar way to how they were used by non-state actors across the Middle East.”

“Iranian loitering munitions have a track record of being used in a ‘swarming tactic’ formation,” he said. “This is when multiple drones are sent at a target all at once to overwhelm enemy air defenses.”

Such tactics mightn’t be a major departure from how Russia has used its airpower in this war so far.

 

“Russia has been known to do something similar with its air force, using its airpower capacity to saturate Ukrainian defenses,” Rogers said.

 

“When the two ways of thinking about air power are combined, it will likely see Russia using Iranian drones in saturation attacks against Ukrainian targets.”

Bendett anticipates Moscow using different tactics “to take out Ukrainian stationary and mobile targets, anything from soldiers, weapons, machinery and artillery on the move to port facilities, warehouses and command and control centers.”

 

“Russia took a very serious look at the Azerbaijani success in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, and one lesson it drew from that conflict is that loitering munitions and combat drones are key to modern warfare success,” he said.

 

“So once/if this technology is transferred, Russia gains a significant aerial asset that will be unleashed against Ukrainian forces,” he concluded.

Source: FORBES

]]> US DoD: Ukraine Assistance Includes UAS Scan Eagle and C-UAS Vampire Systems https://hls.today/news/25082022-2/ Tue, 22 Aug 2023 00:00:25 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=2177 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl held a Press Briefing on Security Assistance in Support of Ukraine.
AUG. 24, 2022  – Dr. Colin Kahl, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.

STAFF: Well, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for being here today. I’m Brigadier General Pat Ryder, the DOD press secretary. It’s my pleasure to introduce Undersecretary of Defense, Dr. Colin Kahl, who will provide an Update on U.S. security assistance to Ukraine. He’ll provide an opening statement and then take your questions. Dr. Kahl?

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY COLIN KAHL: Great. Well, good afternoon. It’s good to be back with all of you again. Sorry for the bit of the delay. Let me start by acknowledging that last night at President Biden’s direction, U.S. military forces conducted precision airstrikes in Deir ez-Zor, Syria, which is in eastern Syria. 

Our forces accomplished their mission of destroying several infrastructure facilities used by militia groups affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. The strike was necessary to protect and defend US personnel in Syria, which had been the targets of several recent attacks by Iran-backed militia groups, including the most recent ones on August 15. 

Our response was proportionate and precise. It was designed to minimize the risk of casualties, and it responded to the nature of the attacks by Iran-backed militia groups. That being said, we cannot accept further attacks on our personnel. 

This operation is a demonstration the United States will not hesitate to defend itself against Iranian and Iran-backed aggression when it occurs. 

Now, let me turn to the focus of today’s briefing. Let me join President Biden and Secretary Austin and underscore our continued support for the people of Ukraine as we mark their 34th — 31st year of independence. 

We are now six months into Russia’s brutal, premeditated invasion of Ukraine, an act of aggression meant to undermine that independence. Russia’s efforts have not succeeded and will not succeed. And as we have made clear at every level of this administration, we are committed to sustained security assistance as Ukraine defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

We are with Ukraine today, and alongside our Allies and partners, we will stick with Ukraine over the long haul. 

In light of this enduring commitment, the Department of Defense has decided to provide an additional $2.98 billion in security assistance to Ukraine under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, or USAI.

As you all are aware, this is the largest single security assistance package we have ever provided to support Ukraine. In previous briefings, we’ve discussed various Presidential Drawdown Authority packages, or PDA packages. 

It’s important to note that USAI is different from Presidential Drawdown because we will be procuring these systems under USAI from the private sector, rather than pulling them out of our own stocks, which is what we do with PDA. 

By its very nature, this USAI package underscores our commitment to supporting Ukraine for the long term, representing a multi-year investment in critical defense capabilities. 

This package is about building enduring strength for Ukraine as it continues to defend its sovereignty in the face of Russian aggression. Vladimir Putin seems to believe that Russia can win the long game—outlasting the Ukrainians in their will to fight, and the international community’s will to continue to support Ukraine. 

This USAI package is a tangible demonstration that this is yet another Russian miscalculation. 

The capabilities in this package are tailored to sustain Ukraine’s most critical capability needs in the medium- to long-term, and they include six additional National Advanced Surface to Air Missile Systems, or NASAMS, with additional Munitions for those NASAMS. Up to 245,000 rounds of 155-millimeter artillery ammunition, which is the ammunition used for the NATO-standard artillery systems that have been transferred to Ukraine. Up to 65,000 rounds of 120-millimeter mortar ammunition. Up to 24 counter-artillery radars. 

We’re also including in this package Puma unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, and support equipment for Scan Eagle UAS systems. We’re including Vampire counter-unmanned aerial systems, laser-guided rocket systems, and a substantial funding package for training, maintenance, and sustainment, so that Ukraine can keep the equipment they already have in the fight. 

Deliveries of this USAI package will begin in the next several months, and continue over the coming years. While many of these capabilities are not intended to directly contribute to today’s fight, they will form the backbone of a robust future Ukrainian force, capable of defending Ukraine for years to come. 

Stepping back for a moment, the United States has now committed more than $13.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including $12.9 billion in the last six months. This level of U.S. security assistance is historically unprecedented, and demonstrates our wavering support for a free and democratic Ukraine on its Independence Day. This may be our largest security assistance package to date—but let me be clear—it will not be our last. We will continue to closely consult with Ukraine on its near-, mid-, and long-term capability needs. 

We are far from alone in this effort. As I noted in my last briefing earlier this month, at least 50 countries have now provided billions of dollars worth of additional security assistance to Ukraine since Russia invaded and participated — invaded in February, and these Allies and partners have participated in the monthly Ukraine defense contact group meetings that have been hosted by Secretary Austin. 

Our continued unified efforts will help Ukraine continue to be successful today and build enduring strength to ensure the Ukrainian people are able to commemorate many more independence days for years to come. 

And with that, I think we’re going to take the first question from the AP. 

STAFF: Thank you, sir. Lita?

Q: Thank you. So, one, sort of, specific question and then a broader question. The Vampires, can you give us a sense of how far down the road that is? What kind of — what — little more detail what they are? And how far down the road that is? Because I think it’s a fairly new system. And then more broadly, can you tell us how much of the package is on — would fund training? And is the U.S. going to expand training? Give us a picture of U.S. training for Ukraine down the road into the future. 

  1. KAHL: Yeah, so the Vampire system itself is a counter UAS system. It is a kinetic system, it uses small missiles, essentially, to shoot UAVs out of the sky. And we’re happy to provide you more technical details from the right experts, at the right time. 

As it relates to training, you know, we continue to train Ukrainian forces on all the systems that we are providing and that our Allies and partners are providing, that they haven’t already been trained on. So, as they’ve made kind of a transition from many cases, Soviet-legacy equipment to NATO standard equipment that’s required more training. And this has been happening on a rolling basis. 

Now, as it relates to systems in this package, since, really, we’re talking about systems that will take months to get on contract, and you know, 1-2-3 years, in some instances to arrive in Ukraine. We think — we’re confident we have the time to train the Ukrainians on whatever systems they’re not already familiar with. 

Q: How much of the package is…

  1. KAHL: Oh, on the sustainment training? 

Q: On the…

  1. KAHL: Well, yeah, the sustainment package, sorry, I answered as it relates to training. The piece of it that’s about sustainment, I’ll get you the exact numbers on that afterwards. But sustainment is really about spare parts. The things that help them with maintenance.

Q: (OFF-MIKE)

  1. KAHL: I don’t have a number in front of me, I can get you that. 

STAFF: Yeah, let’s go to Adam

Q: (OFF-MIKE) Air Force magazine. Thank you so much. Can you tell us why still no aircraft or pilot training, if you’re thinking medium- and long-term? And also, why not include some systems like the ATACMS, the A-T-A-C-M-S, the Army Tactical Missile Systems, with ranges beyond 80 kilometers since Russia is now moving their logistics and command and control beyond the range of the current munitions that we’re sending? Thank you.

  1. KAHL: Yeah, thanks. So, as it relates to aircraft, our current priority as it relates to aircraft is making sure that Ukrainians can use the aircraft they currently have to generate effects in the current conflict. So, for example, the last time we had a briefing here, we broke some news and talked about the fact that we had provided them with some of these anti-radiation missiles, the HARM missiles, and we had adapted those missiles to be able to fire off MIG-29. So, they of course, were not designed to fly off Russian equipment — they were designed to fly off our aircraft and the Ukrainians in recent weeks have been using the HARM missiles to great effect to take out Russian radar systems. 

So, you know, as it relates to future aircrafts, fourth generation aircraft, for example, even if we were to provide those now, they wouldn’t arrive for years, so we’ve been focused on as it relates to their fighter aircraft on what they need for the to support the current efforts to hold in the east and perhaps going on a counter offensive. 

As it relates to the future of aircraft, let me tell you where we are in the process. So, Secretary Austin has tasked the office of Secretary of Defense to work with the Joint Staff and European Command, essentially on a future-forces picture of the Ukrainian force for the mid- to long-term. 

Obviously, this is done in close consultation with the Ukrainians It is, after all, their military, and we’re really trying to be very deliberate and disciplined about what type of Ukrainian force matters in the next 12, 24, 36 months. Under any range of scenarios. It could be a scenario in which the war continues, it could be a scenario in which the violence ebbs because there’s an agreement or because it just dies down a bit. But even in that instance, the Ukrainians are going to need to defend their territory and deter future aggression. 

So, we’re trying to be very deliberate about what systems we think makes the most sense for Ukraine to have in that context, and also matters very much—can they sustain it? Can they afford it? Because, of course, you know, billions of dollars of international assistance is not, you know, may not be something 10 years from now, or 20 years from now. So, these also have to be systems that Ukraine itself can sustain. But I can tell you that fighter aircraft remain on the table, just no final decisions have been made about that. 

Yeah, as it relates to ATACMS. So, I think as most of you are tracking, you know, we’ve been provided 16 HIMARS systems, which are precision rockets, multiple launch rocket systems, a number of other Allies have provided similar systems, the Brits and Germans in particular have provided M-270 systems. The HIMARS is a truck, it launches the rockets off the back, the M-270s, launches the same rockets, but essentially off the chassis of a Bradley fighting vehicle type of armored vehicle. 

We have provided them guided multiple launch rocket systems, or GMLRS, that have a range of, you know, around 70 or 80 kilometers, we have provided them with hundreds and hundreds of these precision guided systems, and the Ukrainians have been using them to extraordinary effect on the battlefield. 

It’s our assessment that the most relevant Munitions for the current fight are the GMLRS. And so, we have prioritized getting the Ukrainians, the GMLRS they need, not only to hold in the east, but may generate some momentum elsewhere in the country. 

It’s our assessment that they don’t currently require ATACMS to service targets that are directly relevant to the current fight. You know, we’ll obviously continue to have conversations with the Ukrainians about their needs, but it’s our judgment at the moment that we should be focusing on GMLRS, not ATACMS. 

STAFF: Thank you. (inaudible). Sorry, Abraham, we’re going to move on. We’ll go to AFP, and then we’ll go up to the phone line. Sylvie?

Q: Speaking about GMLRS, you — you mentioned, laser guided rocket system? I suppose it’s them? Can you say how many? And how long are they supposed to last? How long is it going to take for them to receive them? And for how long?

  1. KAHL: Yeah, I mean, so it’s going to take — so you’re asking about the rocket systems in particular, correct? Let me make sure I have all the information for you. So, the laser-guided rocket systems provided in this tranche of funding will basically complement the systems that Ukrainians already have been provided in previous security assistance packages. The specific rocket systems have a range of about eight kilometers. And they can be used basically to target Russian capabilities like armored personnel carriers and unmanned aerial systems. 

In terms of the delivery timeline, some of those systems and rounds will probably be provided to the Ukrainians within the next nine months, and additional systems and rounds could take a year or two.

Q: Let’s see. This package doesn’t — there are no GMLRS there? 

  1. KAHL: There are no GMLRS in this package, no. The way — well, because we’ve been focusing on providing GMLRS through the PDA packages. So, the most recent — so we’ve — in every — just about every PDA package, we have provided a steady stream of GMLRS—hundreds and hundreds at a time. It’s our assessment that the Ukrainian stocks of GMLRS are pretty good right now. And we’re going to continue to provide those but — but remember, the distinction I drew before about PDA is essentially something we can draw it out of our own stocks to make it not immediately available, but usually in the matter of days or weeks, whereas USAI is typically months or years. 

STAFF: OK, let’s go to the phone lines. Do we have Tom Squitieri from Red Snow News?

Q: Thanks. Good afternoon. Doctor, could you just give us a little more clarity, please on the timeline. There have been some delays in the past of contracting equipment for delivery to Ukraine. Could you just be a bit more specific on the timeline please? Thank you.

  1. KAHL: The timeline for a particular system you’re interested in? Because the timelines are all different for the various timelines.

Q: Well, let me rephrase. Let me rephrase the question then. Have — has the Pentagon experienced any difficulties in contracting in the past for these kinds of weapons? And if so, has that been factored into the timeline?

  1. KAHL: Well, I mean, the short answer is we’re eager to get the Ukrainians the systems as quickly as that process will allow. We—it sometimes takes months to get these systems on contract. That’s been the case with the NASAMS for example. So, in each case, we will endeavor to get the contracts filled out as quickly as possible and get stuff on the road. But I think we have to manage people’s expectations, this package is — the package of capabilities here are really aimed at getting Ukraine what they’re going to need in the medium- to long-term. 

So, it’s not relevant to the fight today, tomorrow, next week, it is relevant to the ability of Ukraine to defend itself and deter further aggression a year from now, two years from now, and this is actually extraordinarily important. 

Because as least as we can discern, Vladimir Putin has not given up on his overall strategic objectives of seizing most of Ukraine, toppling the regime, reclaiming Ukraine as part of a new Russian Empire. What he has done is lengthened his timeline in recognition that he’s off plan. 

And so, as a consequence, his theory of victory is that he can wait everybody out, he can wait the Ukrainians out because they will be exhausted and attrited, he can wait us out, because we’ll turn our attention elsewhere. He can wait for the Europeans out because of high energy prices, or whatever. 

And so, packages like this are extraordinarily important, indirectly challenging Putin’s theory of the case, which is that we’re not in it for the long haul, that we aren’t supporting Ukraine for the long haul. So, the other value in using the USAI money is that, you know, there, when we take things out of our own stocks, we’re taking things out of our own stocks. And that puts certain constraints on what we can provide, on what timelines. When we do USAI, we are buying stuff on contract, and therefore the private sector can produce these things. 

Q: Thanks a lot. I appreciate it. 

STAFF: We’ll go to Tara and then to Nancy.

Q: (OFF-MIKE) Does the building’s assessment now that this war is winnable for Ukraine, and that’s why there’s this announcement of this multi-year, U.S. will continue to provide these arms in the long term? And then can you provide some context? Is this not only the biggest challenge to date for Ukraine, this is the biggest security assistance package provided in any conflict individually for Afghanistan, Iraq? I realize that might take some time to put in context.

  1. KAHL: Yeah, on the latter question, I think my sense is, it is historically unusual. Whether it’s historically unprecedented in its sheer size, I think we’re going to have to get back — back to you on it. It’s also a way it may not be an apples-to-apples comparison, in terms of the types of things. USAI is not equivalent to, you know, foreign military funding, for example. 

So, anyway, let’s get back to you on whether it’s the biggest of all time. I think the sheer amount of security assistance we’ve provided through a combination of PDA and USAI is historically unprecedented, as far as we can tell, because we’re now north of $13 billion with this and, you know, $12.9 billion, just since the invasion kicked off on February 24. 

In terms of the relevance in terms of essentially does the package represent some assessment about the end game? I think the shortest answer to that is no. It’s actually agnostic to what the, you know, the end game is. Obviously, it’s important for us that Ukraine survives and endures as a democratic, independent, sovereign country with its territorial integrity intact. It’s important to us that Russia pays a cost in excess of the benefits they gain from an aggression so that they don’t do it again, and so that other aggressors take that lesson. It’s also important to us that Vladimir Putin’s objective of weakening the West and fragmenting NATO actually is turned on its head—that NATO emerges stronger, the free world emerges stronger. 

I think we’re on track to achieve all three of those objectives. Are you independent, sovereign democratic Ukraine, that endures. A Russia that has paid more costs and benefits, and a West that is stronger than when this started. 

This type of package does not presume any particular outcome of a conflict in Ukraine. So, for example, if the war continues for years, this package is relevant. If there is a ceasefire or a peace settlement, this package is still relevant, because Ukraine needs the ability to defend itself and deter future aggression. So, kind of under any scenario or all the ones in between, we think that the package is irrelevant. 

STAFF: OK, we’ll go to Nancy, and then we’ll go to the phone lines.

Q: Well, thank you. I wanted to go over a couple of things you said earlier. So, you talked about the strikes and Syria. There have been reports of additional U.S. strikes in Syria. Can you give us any additional information about that? Also, we see—quite sorry, there are three. He also had questions about training. How much of this was dedicated training? You said you couldn’t give us a number? Can you give us a sense of how many people would be trained, and over what time period? And finally, you talked about this as an investment in Ukraine’s military in the medium- to long- term? I think you talked about three years. Is it your assessment, then in three years that Ukraine will be fully integrated into NATO into NATO weapon systems? Do you anticipate they will no longer need Soviet weapons systems at that point? Can you give us a picture of what you envision the Ukrainian military looking like at the end of this weapons package? Thank you.

  1. KAHL: Yeah. So, just on the Syria strikes, we’re tracking the same reports you are, that there’s been an exchange in Syria. I don’t have any details to provide you with — when we have more, we will give you more. I will say, as a general matter, we’re not going to hesitate to defend ourselves. And we’ve communicated this both in the actions that were taken last night, the nature of those actions, and also what we have communicated to the Iranians. We’re not going to tolerate attacks by Iran-backed forces on our forces anywhere in the world, including in Syria, and we won’t hesitate to protect ourselves and take additional measures as appropriate. 

Now, in this particular case, our response was, I think, extraordinarily carefully calibrated. It was meant to be proportional to the attacks that the Iran-backed groups carried out on August 15. It was very precise. We had essentially scoped out 11 bunker targets on this site; we ended up prosecuting nine of them because shortly before the strike, there was new evidence that there might be individuals near two of the other bunkers. So, we held off striking those out of an abundance of caution, because our goal was not to produce casualties in this instance. But we will continue to respond if our people are attacked. But as it relates to the additional reports will tell you more when we know more. 

As it relates to the training numbers, I don’t have the specific numbers in front of me, Nancy, we will get back to you with — with whatever details you need for your story on that. 

In three years, will we be done? You know, will the Ukrainians be done transitioning and NATO standard equipment? You know, my sense is they will still have some aspects, you know, for example, they have hundreds and hundreds of 152-millimeter artillery systems, they also have considerable industrial capacity. It is conceivable that years from now, they could still be using those systems produced by, you know, using munitions that they themselves produce. 

I will say though, I would anticipate that in the timeframe we’re talking about here that Ukraine will gradually transition to NATO-standard equipment. You’re already seeing that in the transition to the M-777 howitzers and other similar systems like the French Caesar system that use the 155-millimeter systems, there’s, you know, HIMARS is another example, some of the UAS systems. 

I think one of the things that will be, you know, important as we think through this, alongside Ukraine, in the coming years is, how can we, and Secretary Austin is very seized with this is, what does the future force of Ukraine look like that’s sustainable? 

And the reality is that, in the six months of this war, it’s been an all-hands-on-deck situation, right? Security assistance flowing in from more than 50 countries. But that also means dozens of systems. And ideally, the Ukrainian military of the future will not be rooted in dozens of different systems, but a much smaller number of systems that are, you know, easier to sustain and maintain and all that. 

So, you know, let’s see where the future holds. But just know that we’re very focused here and helping Ukraine try to plan out what is kind of a rational force of the future, and I would anticipate a lot of that will include NATO-standard equipment. 

STAFF: Let’s go to the phone line. Do we have Oskar Górzyński from the Polish Press Agency?

Q: Hi, thank you. Thank you for this. So, a couple of questions. I just want to clarify. So, just this is your reason for not providing ATACMS as a military reason, because you think they don’t need them- it’s not efficient- or it’s because- for example, Jake Sullivan said a couple weeks ago just providing Ukraine this weapon could lead to World War three. So, is that not a consideration, and also you were talking about the shift to long term, medium term. Can we administer the security of Ukraine, but also as it translates to the region- will you keep forces present there or (inaudible) at all? Thank you.

  1. KAHL: So, Oscar, we were having a little trouble hearing you here, there was some echo. So, hopefully I’ll answer the question. So, the question on ATACMS is essentially, you know, it’s a version of the question before — why have we decided not to provide the ATACMS as of yet? I will tell you our primary consideration is our judgment about what is most useful and efficient for what the Ukrainians need for their current purposes, which are to hold in the east and to generate momentum elsewhere in the country. And why do we say that? We consulted very closely with Ukrainians about the types of targets that they needed to be able to prosecute inside Ukrainian territory. 

The vast majority of those targets were rangeable by HIMARS using GMLRS, as opposed to the much longer range ATACMS. And so we have been emphasizing providing them GMLRS. And by the way, I should note, it’s had an extraordinary effect. 

I think, as all of your reporting, and other reporting has, has suggested, you know, this isn’t just an average rocket, this is the equivalent of a 200-pound precision guided airstrike launched off the back of a truck. And the Ukrainians have been using this for precision strikes against command-and-control facilities, logistical nodes, and other sustainment facilities, and it has had the effect, we believe, of frustrating Russia’s advances in the East. 

I think it’s really—the Russians have really slowed down in the east and have held Russian assets at risk elsewhere in the country that’s very much complicating Russia’s planning effort. So, it’s our assessment that the GMLRS are the most important thing to continue emphasizing, and there’s a steady flow of those going to Ukraine. 

As it relates to your question about, you know, obviously, part of this package is to signal a long-term commitment to Ukraine. What about the long-term commitment to the broader region? I would assume to include Poland, and other countries on the eastern flank? 

I think as you all saw, from the most recent Madrid setting, our posture is more robust than it was before this crisis. And, you know, before the crisis we had between 70,000 and 80,000 forces in the EUCOM AOR. We now have around 100,000 forces in the AOR, we had on any given day around three — you know, two Brigade Combat Teams, or three Brigade Combat Teams. Now we’re at five. We will be at a steady state of four. One of those will be headquartered in Poland, as it currently, as another one will be headquartered in Romania. But they’ll be available to do exercises and reinforce all up and down the eastern flank. So, whether that be, you know, Poland and the Baltic states or whether it be in places like Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, et cetera, we’ve also put a couple of additional DDGs are going to be flowing into Spain, those are naval assets, we’re going to be putting F 35s into the U.K., and there are other movements as well. 

And I think one of the things that we’ve demonstrated through this crisis is that a lot of the investments we made in improving our forward posture and our infrastructure after the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the violence in the Donbass, a lot of that work has paid off, because of what it allowed us to do early in the crisis is to nimbly move around EUCOM forces — forces that may have been further back, were able to flow forward very quickly, because the infrastructure was there, the prepositioned equipment was there. And so, I would say that it’s important as we even as we look at the eastern flank, to not only look at the capabilities that are resident every single day in those countries, but the ability of the United States and NATO to surge forces forward. And one of the things that we came out of the Madrid Summit with, was a commitment not just by the United States, but other countries like Germany, the U.K., Canada, et cetera, to put in place commitments and infrastructure to be able to rapidly surge forward into the eastern flank. So, I think that is signaling a long-term commitment, not just from the United States, but from the rest of NATO to security in the east. 

STAFF: OK, and we have time for just a couple more. Let’s go to Fadi, and then go back to Carla.

Q: Thank you. Thank you for doing this. I have just one quick question on Iran, then on Ukraine. On Iran, you just mentioned that the U.S. communicated to the Iranians that we will not tolerate any attacks on U.S. troops. Was that made directly–through direct channels to Iran? And then in Ukraine, the first thing on the funding for training–is this–since we’re talking about long-term here, is it only training on equipment, or does it involve other things like tactical fighting? And then you said, since this is a long-term commitment, you’re not presuming any outcome. However, most often time wars end with political settlements, and huge security assistance like this impact, at the end of the day, political calculus. So, why don’t you factor in the possibility of being able to have an impact on Russia’s willingness to be engaged in political dialogue to end this war?

  1. KAHL: Yeah. So, on that, actually, I think we’re in exactly the same place as your question suggested. As I made clear a bunch of times, a big part of the reason for this commitment is actually to challenge Putin’s theory of victory, right? His theory of victory is that he can outlast everybody. Packages like this, that signal we’re not just providing assistance to Ukraine right now but it’s going to be a steady stream of assistance that will stretch out over many months and years, is precisely challenging Putin’s miscalculation, we believe, that he can just grind it out and wait it out. So, it is supposed to impact his calculus. 

We’re also largely through our PDA packages, trying to affect the calculus in the nearer-term, obviously, by enabling the Ukrainians to defend the territory they have, push back where they can, so that when, and if, negotiations start, whenever that happens, they have the best hand at the negotiating table. So, we’re very mindful of that as well. 

The point I was making is that the USAI package matters, essentially, no matter what world we end up in. So, clearly, we hope that the USAI package helps to send a particular signal to Putin that he can’t just wait everybody out, and that, hopefully, incentivizes Russia to stop the fighting and to get down to negotiations. But if it doesn’t, and the fighting continues, then the assistance continues to be relevant. If it does incentivize him to strike a deal, the assistance is still relevant, because Ukraine will have to hedge against the possibility that Russia could do this again.

In Iran, I’m not going to go much further than I already said, we have passed messages. I’m not going to go through exactly what channels. We have lots of ways of communicating to them. And we’ve tapped all of those channels to make it clear to the Iranians that what they’re doing is unacceptable. And that we will defend ourselves where necessary. 

I should say, by the way, you know, the other piece of Iran’s business right now is the conversation about the JCPOA–the nuclear deal. And I should just make clear that what the strikes last night illustrated is that, you know, our commitment to push back against Iran’s support for terrorism, militancy, and the threats that they engage in against our people in the region or elsewhere, are not linked to wherever we end up on the nuclear deal. 

So, there’s the nuclear diplomacy lane. You know, the President is very — pretty clear, the administration has been pretty clear that in the event that Iran moves back into compliance with the JCPOA, that’s in our interest, because it pushes Iran further away from a nuclear weapons capability. But whether the JCPOA is reborn or not, it actually has nothing to do with our willingness and resolve to defend ourselves. And I think the strike last night was a pretty clear communication to the Iranians, that these things are on different tracks. 

Lastly, just on training on equipment and tactics, I will say that, you know, for the most part, we’ve been prioritizing training Ukrainian troops on the systems that they need to be able to very rapidly employ in the field. Obviously, with these systems we’ll have a longer time period. Those interactions do have the ability to, you know, pass on not just the technical details, but also tactics, techniques and procedures. You know, how to use these in combination with other capabilities. So, we’ll do our best to make sure that we’re kind of synergizing the training in that way.

STAFF: OK. We’ll go to the final question, VOA. 

Q: Thank you for doing this. I have one in Ukraine, and then I’d like to ask one in Taiwan, if I may. So, in Ukraine, the Pentagon suggested that 10 Switchblade 600s were going to be going into Ukraine. Have any of those arrived in the theater? And will this package include any Switchblade 600s?

  1. KAHL: Yeah, so this package doesn’t. It includes Puma UAS systems, and then also some additional parts for Scan Eagle. But it does not include Switchblade 600s. As it relates to the actual delivery of the Switchblades, I’ll have to get back to you. I don’t have that information in front of me. You had a question about Taiwan?

Q: We’ve seen them just this week as the PLA is still maintaining an aggressive tempo, flying close to Taiwan. Has the Pentagon seen any indications that this is going to slow down, and should we view this as the new normal over in Taiwan, at the Taiwan Strait?

  1. KAHL: Yeah, so our assessment I mean, I think we’ll have to see what settles out and what the new normal looks like. I’ll tell you what we’ve seen thus far. 

The tempo of their activities is less than it was in the immediate aftermath of Speaker Pelosi visit, but it is still higher than historical norms. And they have clearly used this particular incident to try to essentially de facto erase the norm of the centerline, for example, of crossing between this, you know, the median position between Mainland China and the island of Taiwan. 

They have been more active in the air, they have been more active at sea. So, I think we should anticipate that whatever the ultimate level ends up being, it will be higher than it was before. And that speaks to your question about the new normal. 

And we’ll continue to adjust our activities to make sure that wherever China ends up settling, that we made clear a couple of things: we remain committed to defending our allies and partners in the region; we remain committed to a stable, free, and open Indo Pacific, which is, I think, an interest that all our allies and partners in the region subscribe to; and that we will continue to operate in the air, at sea, wherever international law allows, and that will include freedom of navigation operations, Taiwan Strait transits, and other activities. 

So, look, our view of this is that, you know, China took the speaker’s visit as an excuse to manufacture a crisis and to set a new normal, and that what we need to do is to show that we and the rest of the international community will not be coerced, that what Beijing wants is for the international community to react to their new normal by taking a step back and saying, whoa, you know, we don’t want any piece of that. 

And our reaction is not to invite conflict or to generate unnecessary frictions, but to basically make clear that Beijing’s gambit isn’t going to pay off. That if their goal was to coerce us and the international community to back off, it’s not going to work.

Q: Dr. Kahl, can I ask you one about Iran, just quickly? Can you explain what, why, you know, there have been a number of attacks by these Iranian-backed groups against U.S. forces and facilities in Iraq and Syria in the last year or so, including a pretty egregious one against ATG last October, and there hasn’t been a U.S. kinetic response, like last night. Can you just explain why the U.S. decided to respond to these on August 15, when they’re — they don’t seem to have been so far out of the norm from the other ones we’ve seen?

  1. KAHL: Yeah, I’m going to be a little careful here due to classification issues, but I’ll say this. Part of it’s an accumulation–that we want — we don’t want Iran to draw the wrong conclusion that they can continue just doing this and get away with it. But part of it was also the nature of the attacks on the 15th. The fact that they were coordinated against two U.S. facilities at the same time, the fact that we believe we have Iran dead to rights on attribution, the UAV parts that we’ve collected, for example, traced directly back to Tehran. So, I think our concern was that this might be an indication that Iran intends to do more of this, and we wanted to disabuse them of any sense that that was a good idea. 

STAFF: Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. Appreciate it.

Source: Defense.Gov

]]> 1000 Black Hornet Nano Drones part of Norway’s $240M Military Aid Commitment to Ukraine https://hls.today/news/1000-black-hornet-nano-drones-part-of-norways-240m-military-aid-commitment-to-ukraine/ Sun, 30 Jul 2023 11:42:47 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=4977 HLS.Today – 1000 Black Hornet Nano Drones. Norway announced on Wednesday its commitment to provide military aid to Ukraine, detailing the contents of the aid package revealed earlier in the week. The country will be supplying ultra-light drones and components for air defense missile systems as part of this assistance.

In an effort to bolster its support to Ukraine, Norway has decided to increase its military aid budget by 2.5 billion kroner ($240 million) for this year. Consequently, the total allocation for military aid will now be 10 billion kroner, while 7.5 billion kroner will be dedicated to civilian support, deviating from the initial plan of equal amounts for each.

 

 

The Defense Minister, Bjorn Arild Gram, disclosed that the aid package will include 1,000 Black Hornet nano drones, designed to assist soldiers in reconnaissance operations. Additionally, Norway will provide components for NASAMS surface-to-air missile systems, complementing Lithuania’s plan to deliver similar systems to Ukraine. To further aid the Ukrainian people, tens of thousands of food rations will also be donated by Norway, with all the equipment being manufactured in the country.

Norway has established a 75-billion-kroner fund earmarked for civilian and military aid to Ukraine spanning from 2023 to 2027. Originally, the yearly aid was set at 15 billion kroner, but the decision was made, during the NATO summit in Vilnius, to increase it to 17.5 billion kroner for this year. Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store justified this move, emphasizing the urgent need for support.

With its status as Europe’s main supplier of natural gas and benefiting from increased oil and gas prices following the Ukrainian conflict, Norway is now extending a helping hand to Ukraine to strengthen its defense capabilities and provide essential assistance in these critical times.

flir-systems-inc black-hornetpdf

 

Global Strategic Impact of Norway’s Support in Assisting Ukraine Against Russia’s Declared War

Norway’s decision to provide substantial military aid to Ukraine in the face of Russia’s declared war carries significant global strategic implications. As tensions escalate in the region, Norway’s commitment not only strengthens Ukraine’s defense capabilities but also signals solidarity among international allies in countering aggression. This article explores the far-reaching effects of Norway’s support on regional and global geopolitics, security dynamics, and humanitarian aid efforts.

Enhanced Defense Capabilities for Ukraine
Norway’s contribution of ultra-light drones and components for air defense missile systems equips Ukraine with advanced technology, enhancing its ability to monitor and safeguard its territory. The 1,000 Black Hornet nano drones provide valuable reconnaissance support, offering real-time intelligence for Ukrainian forces to respond effectively to Russian military movements. Moreover, the NASAMS missile system components bolster Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, serving as a deterrent against potential aerial threats from Russian forces. This improved defense posture not only strengthens Ukraine but also underscores the importance of collective security efforts against aggression.

Signaling Unity and Solidarity Among Allies
Norway’s increased military aid to Ukraine sends a powerful message of unity and solidarity among international allies in support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Russia continues its aggressive stance, the international community’s response is critical in deterring further escalation. Norway’s commitment sets a precedent for other nations to step up their support and reinforce the message that any aggression against a sovereign state will not go unanswered. Such collective action strengthens the norms of international law and maintains a stable global order.

Counteracting Russia’s Influence in the Region
Russia’s declared war on Ukraine has raised concerns about its broader ambitions in the region. By supporting Ukraine, Norway counters Russia’s influence and asserts its commitment to upholding a Europe that is free from external coercion and interference. This strategic move by Norway aligns with the principles of a Europe whole, free, and at peace, as envisioned by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It also serves as a deterrent against further Russian aggression in neighboring countries and reinforces the importance of respecting national sovereignty.

Shaping Geopolitical Balance and Alliances
Norway’s significant financial commitment to Ukraine reflects its role as a proactive player in shaping the geopolitical balance in Europe. As traditional geopolitical alignments shift, alliances are evolving to address emerging security challenges. Norway’s support for Ukraine strengthens the bond between Nordic countries and Eastern Europe, fostering a closer partnership to address common security concerns. Additionally, this gesture may inspire other European nations to take a more active role in shaping regional security dynamics, thereby diversifying and strengthening existing alliances.

Humanitarian Aid and Long-Term Stability
Beyond military assistance, Norway’s donation of tens of thousands of food rations highlights the crucial role of humanitarian aid in conflict zones. The ongoing war in Ukraine has resulted in significant humanitarian crises, with many civilians displaced and struggling to meet their basic needs. Norway’s contribution addresses the urgent humanitarian needs in the region, providing life-saving aid to vulnerable populations. This support not only alleviates immediate suffering but also contributes to long-term stability by fostering goodwill and trust between nations.

Economic and Energy Security Implications
Norway’s emergence as Europe’s main supplier of natural gas has granted it economic leverage in regional and global energy markets. As tensions rise in the aftermath of the conflict in Ukraine, energy security becomes a critical concern. Norway’s support to Ukraine underscores its commitment to regional stability and energy diversification. By assisting Ukraine, Norway indirectly supports efforts to reduce European dependency on Russian gas supplies, thereby mitigating potential energy-related vulnerabilities.

Conclusion

Norway’s robust military aid and humanitarian support to Ukraine carry profound global strategic implications. By bolstering Ukraine’s defense capabilities, signaling solidarity among international allies, and countering Russia’s influence in the region, Norway demonstrates its commitment to a secure and stable Europe. Furthermore, this support enhances humanitarian efforts and contributes to long-term stability, while also addressing energy security concerns. In the face of Russia’s declared war on Ukraine, Norway’s actions exemplify the importance of international cooperation and collective response to regional crises, ultimately shaping the future of global geopolitics and security dynamics.

Source: HLS.Today

]]> Dereliction of Secretary Mayorkas Committee Hearing https://hls.today/news/hls-today-dereliction-of-secretary-mayorkas-committee-hearing/ Sun, 16 Jul 2023 00:00:04 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=4933 WASHINGTON, D.C. — The House Committee on Homeland Security, led by Chairman Mark E. Green, MD (R-TN), will hold a Full Committee hearing to kick off an investigation into Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas’ dereliction of duty.

 

 

 

WHAT: A House Committee on Homeland Security hearing entitled, “Open Borders, Closed Case: Secretary Mayorkas’ Dereliction of Duty on the Border Crisis.”

 

DATE: Wednesday, June 14, 2023

 

TIME: 10:00 AM ET

 

LOCATION: 310 Cannon House Office Building

 

WITNESSES:

 

Chad Wolf

Former Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

 

Rodney Scott

Visiting Fellow, Texas Public Policy Foundation; former Border Patrol Chief, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

 

Joe Edlow

Managing Member, the Edlow Group; former Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Department of Homeland Security

 

Witness testimony can be found here. The hearing will be open to the public and press. Press must be congressionally credentialed and must RSVP by Tuesday, June 13 at 6pm ET.

 

MARGARET BRENNAN: We’re joined now by the Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas. It’s good to have you here in person, sir.

HOMELAND SECURITY SECRETARY ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS: Good morning, Margaret.

MARGARET BRENNAN: Before we get to migration, I want to ask, do you have any information about this latest mass shooting in Texas, which may have been with an AR-15 style weapon?

SECY. MAYORKAS: Margaret, another horrific tragedy in our country. I spoke with the governor last night as well as the mayor. The matter is still under investigation. So of course, I can’t comment any further.

MARGARET BRENNAN: No information about the shooter?

SECY. MAYORKAS: No, Margaret, I think it’s- it’s under investigation. The state and local authorities are leading that investigation.

MARGARET BRENNAN: Let’s get to the border. This is the greatest migration surge, you said, in the Western Hemisphere since World War II. And you’ve been preparing for more than a year and a half. How rough will the next few weeks be?

SECY. MAYORKAS: You know, Margaret, we’ve been preparing for this for more than a year and a half, you are correct. And it is indeed a regional challenge. And it requires a regional response, which is why we are working so closely with many countries to the south. With the Los Angeles declaration that we achieved at the Summit of the Americas as our foundational approach. I think we’re going to see larger numbers at first. It’s going to take our plan a while to really take hold for people to understand that they can access lawful, safe, orderly pathways before they reach the border. And quite frankly, if they come to the border, they will receive a consequence under our enforcement authorities.

MARGARET BRENNAN: So you are, as an administration, setting up processing centers in Colombia and Guatemala so migrants can start the asylum process before they make it to the border. But those aren’t set up yet. When will those be functional?

SECY. MAYORKAS: So, we are furthest along with Colombia. It should be a matter of weeks. But we also have additional lawful pathways that already have existed for people to access–

MARGARET BRENNAN: The phone apps.

SECY. MAYORKAS: Yes, the parole program for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans. We are expanding our family reunification programs. We have an obligation not only as a matter of security, but as a matter of humanitarian relief, to cut out the smuggling organizations, to reach the people so they don’t have to put their lives in the hands of those ruthless smugglers that impose such tragedy and trauma.

MARGARET BRENNAN: So you have announced 1500 troops that are going to El Paso, Texas. Why not other parts of the border? Is Texas the most porous area?

SECY. MAYORKAS: Well, they will be dispersed as operational needs require. Something’s very important- something very important to note, since 2006, every single year since 2006, we have relied on the Department of Defense to supplement our personnel and our resources at the border. We have never been resourced appropriately. And so the deployment of active duty troops is not to do enforcement work, not to interact with the migrants, but to provide other support so that our border patrol agents can be out in the field doing the work–

MARGARET BRENNAN: So you’re- you’re talking about office work. No active-duty military will interact with migrants period?

Source HLS.Today – GOV.DHS

]]> Air Force Deploy THOR to Tackle Drone Swarms Attacks https://hls.today/news/hls-today-22052023/ Mon, 12 Jun 2023 00:00:54 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=4917 HLS.Today GOV – The Air Force Research Laboratory, or AFRL, conducted a demonstration, April 5, 2023, of its high-power microwave counter drone weapon, the Tactical High-power Operational Responder, or THOR, as it engaged a swarm of multiple targets at the Chestnut Test Site, Kirtland Air Force Base.

“The THOR team flew numerous drones at the THOR system to simulate a real-world swarm attack,” said Adrian Lucero, THOR program manager at AFRL’s Directed Energy Directorate. “THOR has never been tested against these types of drones before, but this did not stop the system from dropping the targets out of the sky with its non-kinetic, speed-of-light High-Power Microwave, or HPM pulses,” he said.

Capt. Eric Plummer, a test engineer with AFRL’s Directed Energy Directorate, operated the THOR system and has been with the THOR program for nearly two years. He was responsible for aiming the THOR system at the swarm.

“THOR was exceptionally effective at disabling the swarm with its wide beam, high peak powers and fast-moving gimbal to track and disable the targets,” said Lucero.

The Tactical High-power Operational Responder, or THOR, a high-powered microwave counter drone weapon, stands ready to demonstrate its effectiveness against a swarm of multiple targets at the Air Force Research Laboratory, or AFRL, Chestnut Test Site, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M., April 5, 2023. AFRL completed a successful demonstration of THOR simulating a real-world swarm attack. This was the first test of this scale in AFRL history.

Tactical High-power Operational Responder

The Tactical High-power Operational Responder, or THOR, a high-powered microwave counter drone weapon, stands ready to demonstrate its effectiveness against a swarm of multiple targets at the Air Force Research Laboratory, or AFRL, Chestnut Test Site, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M., April 5, 2023. AFRL completed a successful demonstration of THOR simulating a real-world swarm attack. This was the first test of this scale in AFRL history.

As the dangers from drone swarms evolve, leaders from across the Department of Defense are working closely to ensure we are exploring different technologies like directed energy to support the needs of the warfighter in the future against such threats.

“THOR was extremely efficient with a near continuous firing of the system during the swarm engagement,” said Capt. Tylar Hanson, THOR deputy program manager. “It is an early demonstrator, and we are confident we can take this same technology and make it more effective to protect our personnel around the world.”

While AFRL celebrates the success of the demonstration, leaders at Kirtland are recognizing the hard work of their team who have decades of research in high-power electromagnetic technologies.

“We couldn’t have come this far without the perseverance and professionalism of the entire THOR team,” said Ken Miller, AFRL’s high power electromagnetics division chief. “Our scientists, Airmen and contractors worked early mornings and late nights to make this swarm demo…a great success. AFRL is committed to developing such advanced technologies to defend our service members on the front lines.

The Tactical High-power Operational Responder (THOR), a high-powered microwave counter drone weapon, stands ready to demonstrate its effectiveness against a swarm of multiple targets at the Air Force Research Laboratory, or AFRL, Chestnut Test Site, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M., April 5, 2023. AFRL completed a successful demonstration of THOR simulating a real-world swarm attack. This was the first test of this scale in AFRL history.

The Tactical High-power Operational Responder (THOR), a high-powered microwave counter drone weapon, stands ready to demonstrate its effectiveness against a swarm of multiple targets at the Air Force Research Laboratory, or AFRL, Chestnut Test Site, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M., April 5, 2023. AFRL completed a successful demonstration of THOR simulating a real-world swarm attack. This was the first test of this scale in AFRL history.

By the hammer of Thor! The Air Force has successfully employed its primary directed energy weapon to knock a swarm of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles out of the sky in the first test of its kind, the service announced this week.

The latest demonstration of the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Tactical High-power Operational Responder (THOR), a high-powered microwave emitter designed to take out incoming drones for short-range air base defense, took place at the Chestnut Test Site at Kirtland Air Force Base in April.

During the trial, the THOR team “flew numerous drones at the THOR system to simulate a real-world swarm attack,” said program manager Adrian Lucero in a statement. “THOR has never been tested against these types of drones before.”

THOR “was exceptionally effective at disabling the swarm with its wide beam, high peak powers, and fast-moving gimbal to track and disable the targets,” Lucero said. 

First delivered to the Air Force in April 2020 and field tested “in a real-world setting” in Africa later that year, THOR consists of a 20-foot transport container that easily fits inside a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and can be deployed for use by a pair of airmen within three hours, according to a September report from the Congressional Research Service.

The Air Force has requested $87.148 million for high-powered microwave research related to THOR in its fiscal year 2024 budget request, according to service budget documents, up from $57.623 million the previous year. The funding increase “reflects the development and delivery of a high-priority base defense mission with joint high power microwave defense system with the military services.”

While there is no publicly-released media of the THOR in action, the Air Force released a video animation in June 2021 depicting its vision for it as a quick-and-dirty counter-drone system able to disable targets with more efficiency than traditional air base defense systems or even the high-energy lasers currently in development for other service branches.

“There are several drone negating systems available; guns, nets, and laser systems,” according to the AFRL. “THOR looks to extend the range to effect and decrease the engagement time over these other deterrent devices.

U.S. military leaders have been harping on the threat posed by adversary’s unmanned aerial vehicles for years, with former U.S. Central Command chief Marine Gen. Kenneth McKenzie Jr. calling the rise of cheap and commercially-available drones in the Middle East “the most concerning tactical development since the rise of the improvised explosive device in Iraq.”

“These systems are inexpensive, easy to modify and weaponize, and easy to proliferate,” McKenzie said during a February 2021 speech at the Middle East Institute, echoing his past comments on the matter. “They provide adversaries the operational ability to surveil and target U.S. and partner facilities while affording plausible deniability and a disproportionate return on the investment, all in our adversaries’ favor.”

Drones have proven a thorn in the U.S. military’s side since 2017 when ISIS fighters began employing them to drop mortar rounds onto Iraqi security forces during the coalition campaign to retake the city of Mosul. A few years later, in 2019, the U.S. accused Iran of using a drone swarm to disable a massive oil processing facility in Saudi Arabia.

“Although an individual low-cost drone may be powerless against a high-tech system like the F-35 stealth fighter, a swarm of such drones could potentially overwhelm high-tech systems, generating significant cost-savings and potentially rendering some current platforms obsolete,” according to a 2020 CRS analysis of artificial intelligence and its relationship to U.S. national security.

Air force Tactical High Power Operational Responder (THOR)

The Air Force Research Laboratory’s Tactical High-power Operational Responder (THOR) developed for airbase defense.

Recent years have shown the potential applications of drones in conventional warfare. In the 2020 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, drones ”performed both reconnaissance missions to support artillery use and strike missions,” according to a Center for Strategic and International Studies analysis. “Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and loitering munition attacks were able to destroy heavy ground units, including T-72 tanks and advanced S-300 air defenses.”

Indeed, that trend had continued through the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has seen the Ukrainian military aggressively retrofit commercially-available small rotorcraft to drop explosives on Russian tanks and troop positions, part of a desperate bid to supplement its existing fleet of military-grade unmanned aerial vehicles, according to recent reporting from Reuters. 

It’s unclear when the Air Force might officially field the THOR for operational use in a combat zone, but based on the past comments from military leaders and the funding increase in the service’s fiscal year 2024 budget request. 

“THOR was extremely efficient with a near continuous firing of the system during the swarm engagement,” said Capt. Tylar Hanson, THOR deputy program manager, in a statement regarding the April test. “It is an early demonstrator, and we are confident we can take this same technology and make it more effective to protect our personnel around the world.”

 

HL.Today Source: MIL.GOV

]]> US and Saudi Arabia CENTCOM Joined Defense Exercises https://hls.today/news/hls-today-27032023/ Wed, 29 Mar 2023 00:00:08 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=4817 HLS.Today – The United States and Saudi Arabia have had a longstanding military relationship dating back to the 1940s. This relationship has only strengthened over time, with the two nations entering into various training agreements under the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) to enhance the capabilities of their armed forces.

CENTCOM

The CENTCOM is one of the nine unified combatant commands of the United States Department of Defense (DoD). It is responsible for the security of the Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of South Asia. Its area of responsibility includes countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. As such, it is not surprising that the United States and Saudi Arabia have entered into several training agreements under CENTCOM.

The purpose of these training agreements is to build stronger military-to-military relationships between the United States and Saudi Arabia. These agreements help in enhancing the skills of the Saudi Arabian armed forces and equip them with the latest technology and tactics. The training agreements also allow the United States to maintain a strong presence in the Middle East, which is essential for protecting American interests in the region.

Military Training Mission (MTM)

One of the most significant training agreements between the United States and Saudi Arabia is the Military Training Mission (MTM). The MTM was established in 1953 to provide military training to the Saudi Arabian armed forces. The MTM has played a vital role in the development of the Saudi Arabian military, and its success is evident in the Gulf War of 1990-1991, where Saudi Arabia played a significant role in the coalition forces that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

Under the MTM, Saudi Arabian military personnel receive training in various areas such as logistics, maintenance, intelligence, and counterterrorism. The MTM also provides English language training to Saudi Arabian military personnel, which is essential for communication with their American counterparts. The MTM has helped to build a strong relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, with many Saudi Arabian military personnel studying in American military schools and universities.

Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)

Another essential training agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia is the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). JCET is a training program designed to enhance the skills of the special forces of both countries. Under JCET, US and Saudi Arabian special forces conduct joint exercises and training programs to improve their abilities in counterterrorism, hostage rescue, and urban warfare.

The JCET program has been in place since 1981 and has played a crucial role in the development of the Saudi Arabian special forces. The JCET program also helps to build trust between the United States and Saudi Arabia and promotes cooperation between the two countries in the fight against terrorism.

The United States and Saudi Arabia have also conducted joint military exercises under CENTCOM. These exercises provide an opportunity for the armed forces of both countries to train together and learn from each other. The exercises also help to demonstrate the military capabilities of both countries and their commitment to the security of the region.

Eagle Resolve

One such joint exercise is the “Eagle Resolve” exercise. The Eagle Resolve exercise is an annual joint military exercise conducted between the United States and Saudi Arabia since 1999. The exercise aims to enhance the capabilities of both countries in counterterrorism, crisis management, and interoperability. The exercise involves a range of scenarios, including live-fire exercises, medical training, and intelligence gathering.

Another joint exercise is the “North Thunder” exercise, which was conducted in 2016. The North Thunder exercise involved military personnel from 20 countries, including the United States and Saudi Arabia. The exercise aimed to demonstrate the military capabilities of the participating countries and their readiness to respond to any threat in the region. The exercise involved a range of scenarios, including a mock invasion of a city and a live-fire exercise.

Bright Star

In addition to these joint exercises, the United States and Saudi Arabia have also conducted other joint exercises under CENTCOM, including the “Red Flag” exercise and the “Bright Star” exercise. The Red Flag exercise is a biannual training exercise that is conducted in the United States. The exercise involves various air forces from around the world, including Saudi Arabia. The exercise provides an opportunity for air forces to train together in a realistic combat environment.

The Bright Star exercise is a biennial military exercise that is conducted in Egypt. The exercise involves various countries, including the United States and Saudi Arabia. The exercise aims to enhance the interoperability and readiness of the participating countries in responding to regional security threats.

The training agreements and joint exercises between the United States and Saudi Arabia have been successful in building a strong relationship between the two countries. The training agreements have helped to enhance the skills of the Saudi Arabian armed forces and equip them with the latest technology and tactics. The joint exercises have provided an opportunity for the armed forces of both countries to train together and learn from each other.

However, the United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia has been controversial due to Saudi Arabia’s human rights record, particularly in its treatment of women and its involvement in the Yemeni Civil War. The United States has faced criticism for its support of Saudi Arabia, with some arguing that it should not continue to support a regime with such a poor human rights record.

In conclusion, the United States and Saudi Arabia have a longstanding military relationship that has been strengthened through various training agreements under CENTCOM. These agreements have helped to enhance the skills of the Saudi Arabian armed forces and equip them with the latest technology and tactics. The joint exercises have provided an opportunity for the armed forces of both countries to train together and learn from each other. While this relationship has faced criticism due to Saudi Arabia’s human rights record, it remains an important partnership for both countries in maintaining regional security.

IMCMEX

In addition to these joint exercises, the United States and Saudi Arabia have also conducted joint naval exercises. One such exercise is the International Mine Countermeasures Exercise (IMCMEX), which is a biennial exercise conducted by the United States and its allies in the Gulf region. The exercise aims to improve the ability of participating countries to respond to threats from naval mines. Saudi Arabia has participated in several IMCMEX exercises, which have helped to improve its mine countermeasures capabilities.

United States Air Force (USAF)

The United States and Saudi Arabia have also conducted joint air exercises, including the Red Flag exercise. Red Flag is a biennial air-to-air combat training exercise conducted by the United States Air Force (USAF) at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. Saudi Arabia has participated in several Red Flag exercises, which have helped to improve its air combat capabilities and interoperability with the USAF.

In recent years, the United States and Saudi Arabia have focused on strengthening their cybersecurity capabilities. In 2019, the two countries conducted a joint cybersecurity exercise, which aimed to improve the ability of both countries to respond to cyber threats. The exercise involved simulated cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and aimed to test the preparedness of both countries to respond to such attacks.

The training agreements between the United States and Saudi Arabia have not been without controversy. The Saudi Arabian military has been accused of human rights abuses, including the killing of civilians in Yemen, where it has been involved in a civil war since 2015. The United States has been criticized for providing military aid to Saudi Arabia, which has been used in the conflict. However, the United States has defended its relationship with Saudi Arabia, arguing that it is essential for regional stability and for protecting American interests in the Middle East.

C-UAS counter-unmanned aerial systems

CENTCOM has also conducted joint exercises with its partners in the region in the area of counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS). These exercises aim to improve the ability of participating countries to detect, track, and neutralize unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that pose a threat to security and stability in the region. Saudi Arabia has participated in several C-UAS exercises, including the Falcon Sentry exercise, which was conducted in 2018. This exercise involved the use of advanced UAS detection and neutralization technology, and aimed to enhance the interoperability between the Saudi Arabian armed forces and their counterparts in the United States. The United States and its partners in the region continue to conduct joint exercises to improve their C-UAS capabilities, and to address the growing threat posed by UAS to regional security.

Takeaways

In conclusion, the United States and Saudi Arabia have a long-standing military relationship, which has been strengthened through various training agreements under CENTCOM. These training agreements have helped to enhance the capabilities of the Saudi Arabian armed forces and equip them with the latest technology and tactics. The training agreements have also allowed the United States to maintain a strong presence in the Middle East, which is essential for protecting American interests in the region. Joint exercises, including the Eagle Resolve exercise and the International Mine Countermeasures Exercise, have played a crucial role in building trust between the United States and Saudi Arabia and promoting cooperation between the two countries in the fight against terrorism. While the training agreements have been controversial, with concerns raised over human rights abuses, the United States has defended its relationship with Saudi Arabia, arguing that it is essential for regional stability.

HLS.Today Source: CENTCOM.MIL

]]> June 2023 Deadline for BIRD HLS 2023 Israel-US Collaboration Program https://hls.today/news/hls-today-20032023/ Mon, 20 Mar 2023 06:49:44 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=4779 HLS.Today – The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) funds two programs managed by the Israel-U.S. Binational Industrial Research and Development (BIRD) Foundation: BIRD Homeland Security (HLS), a joint initiative established in 2016 with the Israel Ministry of National Security (IMNS); and BIRD Cyber, a new program launched in 2022 in partnership with the Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD). Both BIRD HLS and BIRD Cyber support collaborative U.S.-Israeli research and development to advance innovative homeland security technologies of mutual benefit to both countries.

The top 5 takeaways from the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate’s funding of two programs managed by the Israel-U.S. Binational Industrial Research and Development Foundation, also known as BIRD. Specifically, we will be focusing on the BIRD Homeland Security program, or HLS.

  • COLLABORATION:

The first key takeaway from the DHS Science and Technology Directorate’s funding of the BIRD HLS program is the importance of collaboration between the United States and Israel. This partnership allows for the sharing of knowledge and expertise between two countries that have extensive experience in homeland security.

  • INNOVATION:

Another takeaway from this program is the emphasis on innovation. The BIRD HLS program funds innovative projects that focus on developing new technologies and methods to enhance homeland security. This funding supports startups and small businesses to bring their ideas to life and make a significant impact in the field of homeland security.

  • TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:

The BIRD HLS program also promotes technology transfer between the United States and Israel. This transfer of technology allows for the sharing of cutting-edge developments and expertise, which can lead to the creation of new products and services that enhance homeland security.

  • PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS:

Another important takeaway from the BIRD HLS program is the value of public-private partnerships. This program brings together private industry, academia, and government agencies to work collaboratively on projects that address the most pressing homeland security challenges facing our nations.

  • IMPACT:

Finally, the BIRD HLS program has a significant impact on homeland security. Through the development of new technologies and the collaboration between the United States and Israel, this program has helped to strengthen our national security and enhance the safety of our citizens.

In conclusion, the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate’s funding of the BIRD HLS program is a prime example of the importance of collaboration, innovation, technology transfer, public-private partnerships, and impact. By investing in this program, we are supporting the development of cutting-edge technologies and methods that will enhance homeland security and protect our citizens.

BIRD HLS

BIRD HLS supports collaboration between U.S. and Israeli companies, academia, and other research institutions to develop advanced technologies for homeland security needs. The program provides conditional grants of up to $1 million for approved projects, funding up to 50 percent of the joint project budget, to advance solutions with commercial potential to improve public security.

Since 2016, DHS S&T and IMNS have partnered to fund technology collaboration between U.S. and Israeli R&D projects with significant commercial potential to address the homeland security needs of both countries. 

 

BIRD HLS 2023 Call for Proposals

BIRD HLS 2023 Call for Proposals – Executive Summaries due April 24, 2023 | S&T seal, BIRD Foundation logo, Israel Ministry of National Security logo

The BIRD HLS 2023 Call for Proposals is now open and accepting executive summaries through April 24, 2023. The program seeks collaborative projects between U.S. and Israeli entities to develop advanced solutions for mission-critical homeland security needs from one of the five topic areas below:

Technologies and methods to secure critical infrastructure and public facilities (“soft targets”)

Technologies focused on safe and secure cities

Border protection, including maritime security (such as: biometrics, screening systems, robotics, etc.)

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)

Advanced first responder technologies (such as: Command & Control, video analytics, communication, wearable sensors, standoff detection and identification of hazards, Personal Protective Equipment, etc.)

Proposals must include research and development cooperation between a U.S. and an Israeli entity to create innovative technologies leading to commercialization. Final proposals are due on June 27, 2023, with decisions being made by September 2023. Visit the BIRD Foundation website to submit a proposal or to learn more about the BIRD HLS program. 

BIRD HLS 2022 Awards

BIRD HLS awarded $875,000 to CyberBee (Rosh Ha’ayin, Israel) and EyeCloud.AI (San Jose, California) for a joint project to develop a personal mini AI autonomous UAV fit for HLS-wide deployment that will enable first responders to operate in indoor GPS-denied environments. The project will combine CyberBee’s vision-based spatial intelligence with EyeCloud’s improved edge-AI camera capabilities and real-time cloud processing solutions. This innovative technology solution was selected by DHS S&T and IMNS, and was approved by the BIRD Foundation’s Board of Governors.

More information about the BIRD HLS program can be found on the BIRD Foundation website.

BIRD Cyber

DHS S&T, in partnership with the Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD), established the Israel- U.S. Binational Industrial Research and Development (BIRD) Cyber program, managed by the BIRD Foundation, to enhance the cyber resilience of critical infrastructure in the United States and Israel.

BIRD Cyber launched in 2022 with the release of the program’s first Call for Proposals seeking collaborative projects between U.S. and Israeli entities to develop advanced cybersecurity applications for mission-critical homeland security needs. BIRD Cyber will provide grants of $1.5 million per project, funding up to 50 percent of the combined research and development budget. 

The BIRD Cyber 2022 Call for Proposals is now closed. Check back with us in Spring 2023 for the announcement on decisions.

Source HLS.Today: DHS.GOV

]]> Rand Paul Slams Senate Homeland Security Panel over Fire Grants and Safety Act Amendments https://hls.today/news/hls-today-160323/ Thu, 16 Mar 2023 11:39:51 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=4772 HLS.Today – The Hill – Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) the ranking member on the Senate Homeland Security panel, abruptly walked out of a committee markup Wednesday morning after clashing with the panel’s chairman, Sen. Gary Peters (D-Mich.), over amendments.  

Paul vented his frustration over Peters’s use of procedural tactics to effectively shield Democrats on the committee from voting on Republican amendments to the Fire Grants and Safety Act.  

Peters offered second-degree amendments to the Republican-sponsored amendments that completely gutted their content.   

At one point, Paul suggested that all the Republican members walk out of the committee meeting.  

“If this is the way you’re going to run the committee, I would suggest that Republicans leave. I don’t see why we should stick around if you’re going to make up the rules,” Paul said hotly.  

The atmosphere in the room got so tense that Sen. Kyrsten Sinema (Ariz.), who left the Democratic Party to become an Independent in December, suggested that “we all take a couple minutes, lower the temperature, just figure out the procedure.”  

“There’s no need for us to turn this committee hearing into a partisan, ugly place like we’ve seen in other committees,” she pleaded.  

Sens. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) and James Lankford (R-Okla.) stayed in the room to vote against the amendments modified by Democrats after Paul walked out.  

The acrimonious scene was a departure from how the Homeland Security Committee operated in 2021 and 2022, when Sen. Rob Portman (R-Ohio) served as the panel’s ranking member.  

In the recent past, Democrats on the committee have sometimes sat on the Republican side of the dais and vice versa to promote a sense bipartisan camaraderie. 

Paul took over as the top-ranking Republican on the panel after Portman retired in early January.

Paul said “this is the first time we’ve had a hearing since I’ve been here that I know of that we’ve gotten second-degree amendments on every one of our amendments.”  

Lankford later sympathized with Paul’s frustration.  

“Typically in that committee, we just have votes,” he said. “When we can’t work it out behind the scenes, we have a vote and not replace someone’s vote. 

“We got to actually take votes,” he said.  

The blow-up was triggered by Peters’s use of committee procedure to effectively block votes on the Republican amendments. 

Paul offered an amendment to make any fire department that terminated firefighters for refusing a COVID-19 vaccine or speaking out against the mandate ineligible for federal grants.  

Under Paul’s proposal, fire departments that fired employees for refusing vaccines could become eligible for federal money by offering those individuals reinstatement and backpay.  

Peters, however, gutted Paul’s amendment by substituting language requiring the comptroller general of the United States to conduct an audit and report on barriers that prevent fire departments from accessing funds.  

The modified amendment was adopted by a party-line vote with all Democrats present supporting the modified amendment and all Republicans voting no.  

 

Paul then offered another amendment to broadly block any National Institutes of Health funding from going to China to fund “gain of function” research on coronaviruses at labs in Wuhan and other facilities.  

The Kentucky senator has previously pointed to an Oct. 20, 2021, letter to members of Congress in which he says the National Institutes of Health admitted that research it supported was used to create more potent viruses in Wuhan. 

Peters quickly offered a second-degree amendment that changed the language to prohibit any money in the Fire Grants and Safety Act “from being provided to a Chinese fire department.” 

“That doesn’t make any sense,” Paul complained. “This is legislative legerdemain to obscure the fact that you’re trying to not vote directly on this.” 

Paul then offered an amendment sponsored by Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fla.) to cover the costs of the $15.7 billion authorized over seven years by the Fire Grants and Safety Act with unspent COVID-19 relief money.  

He tried to block Peters from modifying the amendment by offering his own second-degree amendment that would block federal grants to fire departments that terminated employees who refused vaccines.  

But Peters told Paul that he didn’t have jurisdiction to call up a second-degree amendment on the Republican amendment, sparking a heated spat over the panel’s rules.  

“I already called up the second-degree amendment,” Paul argued.  

“You can’t call it up, senator, only the chair,” Peters insisted. “You weren’t recognized to call it for a vote. Only the chairman can do that. 

“The chair can call up the amendments as the chair sees fit,” he said.  

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Peters said after the markup that he remains open to working cooperatively with Paul.  

“I look forward to working with Sen. Paul and hopefully we can find common ground to go forward. Some of the amendments he offered were not germane to the substance of the bill that we were dealing with,” he said.

 

Source HLS.Today: THE HILL

]]> Russian War on Ukraine First Year Anniversary and Counting https://hls.today/news/15022023-hls-today/ Wed, 15 Feb 2023 11:31:06 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=4728 HLS.Today Jens Stoltenberg is set to step down this year, and the jockeying to replace him has already begun. A year ago, Jens Stoltenberg was preparing to begin winding down his term as NATO’s secretary-general and return to Norway to become the governor of its central bank, occupying himself with setting interest rates and managing the energy-rich nation’s massive wealth. Early in February of last year, Norway’s finance minister declared that he was the “best” candidate for the position.

Just a few weeks later, Russia invaded Ukraine. Stoltenberg quickly got an extension in his current job and a legacy as the face of Europe’s coordinated response to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression.

That one-year extension, however, will lapse this fall, and Brussels is already abuzz with speculation over his replacement. In the 30-member alliance, there are nearly half as many names making the rounds.

A year on, support to Ukraine from nations around the world matters more than ever, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in Brussels today.

Stoltenberg spoke before the alliance Defense Ministerial which, he said, is happening “at a critical time for our security.”

Two men engage in conversation across a conference table as others at the table look on.

February 24 marks one year since Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his forces to invade neighboring Ukraine. The Russian leader believed he would have a cakewalk and take the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv, but his forces were stopped and driven off. The same occurred in Kharkiv and in Kherson.

Spotlight: Support for Ukraine

Still, “we see no signs that President Putin is preparing for peace,” he said. “What we see is the opposite, he is preparing for more war, for new offensives and new attacks. So, it makes it even more important that NATO allies and partners provide more support to Ukraine.” 

The NATO allies will protect every inch of NATO territory, but supporting Ukraine in its fight against naked aggression is crucial as well.  

The Russian attack on Ukraine is an affront to sovereignty not only in Europe, but around the world. “This is a war of aggression,” Stoltenberg said. “President Putin — Russia — has attacked a sovereign independent democratic free nation in Europe — Ukraine. Of course, Ukraine has the right to defend itself — the right of self-defense is enshrined in the [United Nations] Charter.” 

NATO and NATO nations “have the right to help Ukraine uphold the right for self-defense.”

He noted that the support Ukraine has received has changed as the war evolved. At first, the need was for anti-armor and anti-air weapons. Then, the need shifted to artillery, then air defense. “And now, over the last weeks and months, allies have agreed to further step up significantly when it comes to heavy weaponry: armor, infantry fighting vehicles, but also main battle tanks,” he said.  

The type of support has evolved and will continue to evolve, he said. “We need to ensure that Ukraine gets the weapons it needs to be able to retake territory, liberate the lands and win this war and prevail as a sovereign, independent nation,” he said.

HLS.Today Source: Defense.gov

]]> F-22 US Air Force Shoots Down Spy Balloon from China https://hls.today/news/06022023-hls-today/ Mon, 06 Feb 2023 06:26:50 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=4712 HLS.Today – Pentagon A U.S. Air Force fighter safely shot down a Chinese high-altitude surveillance balloon today, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said in a written statement.  

Key Takeaways

  1. A Chinese high-altitude surveillance balloon was shot down by the US Air Force F-22 Raptor fighter, as ordered by President Joe Biden.
  2. The action was taken to ensure the safety and security of the American people in response to China’s violation of US sovereignty.
  3. The US military had taken steps to protect against sensitive information being collected by the balloon before it was shot down.
  4. The shoot-down was conducted in coordination with the Canadian government.
  5. The mission will now focus on recovery, and the US Navy and Coast Guard have deployed ships to secure the area and search for debris.

 

An F-22 flies across a blue sky.

President Joe Biden ordered the action on Wednesday, but it was delayed until the balloon was over water off the coast of South Carolina to ensure no Americans on the ground were harmed. 

“The balloon, which was being used by the PRC in an attempt to surveil strategic sites in the continental United States, was brought down above U.S. territorial waters,” Austin said.  

The action was taken in coordination and support of the Canadian government. “We thank Canada for its contribution to tracking and analysis of the balloon through [North American Aerospace Defense Command] as it transited North America,” Austin said. “Today’s deliberate and lawful action demonstrates that President Biden and his national security team will always put the safety and security of the American people first while responding effectively to the PRC’s unacceptable violation of our sovereignty,” Austin said referring to the Peoples Republic of China. 

U.S. officials first detected the balloon and its payload on January 28 when it entered U.S. airspace near the Aleutian Islands. The balloon traversed Alaska, Canada and re-entered U.S. airspace over Idaho. “President Biden asked the military to present options and on Wednesday President Biden gave his authorization to take down the Chinese surveillance balloon as soon as the mission could be accomplished without undue risk to us civilians under the balloon’s path,” said a senior defense official speaking on background. “Military commanders determined that there was undue risk of debris causing harm to civilians while the balloon was overland.” 

An F-22 Raptor fighter from the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, fired one AIM-9X Sidewinder missile at the balloon.  

The balloon fell approximately six miles off the coast in about 47 feet of water. No one was hurt. 

Long before the shoot down, U.S. officials took steps to protect against the balloon’s collection of sensitive information, mitigating its intelligence value to the Chinese. The senior defense official said the recovery of the balloon will enable U.S. analysts to examine sensitive Chinese equipment. “I would also note that while we took all necessary steps to protect against the PRC surveillance balloon’s collection of sensitive information, the surveillance balloon’s overflight of U.S. territory was of intelligence value to us,” the official said. “I can’t go into more detail, but we were able to study and scrutinize the balloon and its equipment, which has been valuable.” 

The balloon did not pose a military or physical threat

The balloon did not pose a military or physical threat. Still its intrusion into American airspace over several days was an unacceptable violation of U.S. sovereignty. The official said Chinese balloons briefly transited the continental United States at least three times during the prior administration. 

While Chinese officials admitted that the balloon was theirs, they said it was a runaway weather balloon. “The PRC has claimed publicly that the high-altitude balloon operating above the United States is a weather balloon that was blown off course. This is false,” the official said. “This was a PRC surveillance balloon. This surveillance balloon purposely traversed the United States and Canada, and we are confident it was seeking to monitor sensitive military sites.” 

The mission now transitions to one of recovery. There are a number of U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels establishing a security perimeter around the area where the balloon came to Earth. They are searching for debris, said a senior military official also speaking on background.  

There is no estimate for how long the recovery mission will take, the military official said, but the fact that it came down in such a shallow area should make recovery “fairly easy”. 

The military official gave some detail of the engagement. The F-22 fired the Sidewinder at the balloon from an altitude of 58,000 feet. The balloon at the time was between 60,000 and 65,000 feet.  

F-15 Eagles flying from Barnes Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts, supported the F-22, as did tankers from multiple states including Oregon, Montana, South Carolina and North Carolina. Canadian forces also helped track the overflight of the balloon. 

The Navy has deployed the destroyer USS Oscar Austin, the cruiser USS Philippine Sea and the USS Carter Hall, an amphibious landing ship in support of the effort.

HLS.Today Source:  DEFENSE.GOV

]]> China Launch High-Altitude Spy Balloon Spotted in US Skies https://hls.today/news/03022023-hls-today/ Fri, 03 Feb 2023 15:04:33 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=4690 Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing on High-Altitude Surveillance Balloon

HLS.Today Pentagon Report

 BRIGADIER GENERAL PAT RYDER:  Good evening, everyone.  Brigadier General Pat Ryder here, the Pentagon press secretary.  So thank you very much for joining us a little bit later in the day.  I’m going to go over a couple of ground rules first.  I’ll provide you then with an on-the-record statement.  And then I’ll turn it over to our senior defense official.  

So first, I’m going to read you an on-the-record statement.  This is from Brigadier General Pat Ryder, Pentagon press secretary. 

“The United States government has detected and is tracking a high-altitude surveillance balloon that is over the continental United States right now.  The U.S. government, to include NORAD, continues to track and monitor it closely.  The balloon is currently traveling at an altitude well above commercial air traffic, and does not present a military or physical threat to people on the ground. Instances of this kind of balloon activity have been observed previously over the past several years.  Once the balloon was detected, the U.S. government acted immediately to protect against the collection of sensitive information.”

 

 

STAFF:  And with that, we’ll go ahead now and revert to on-background. And you can attribute this to a senior defense official.     

 

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Thanks, Pat. 

 

Hey, everybody.  Thanks for joining us late.  So a couple of things up top, and then happy to take a few questions.  I’ll let Pat moderate on that.  But so a few things.

 

First, we are confident that this high-altitude surveillance balloon belongs to the PRC.  As was said at the top, instances of this activity have been observed over the past several years, including prior to this administration.  In this instance, President Biden was briefed and asked for military options.  

 

Secretary Austin convened senior DoD leadership yesterday, even as he was on the road in the Philippines.  It was the strong recommendation by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Milley, and the commander of NORTHCOM, General VanHerck, not to take kinetic action due to the risk to safety and security of people on the ground from the possible debris field.  

hls.today China Launch High-Altitude Surveillance Balloon Spotted in US Skies

Currently we assess that this balloon has limited additive value from an intelligence collection perspective.  But we are taking steps, nevertheless, to protect against foreign intelligence collection of sensitive information.  

 

We are also tracking what abilities it could have in gaining insights, and continue to monitor the balloon as it is over the continental United States.  

 

And so with that, let me pause and I’ll take your questions.  

 

Pat, you want to run the show?

 

STAFF:  Yes, sir.  Thank you.  

 

All right, first we’ll go to Tara Copp, Associated Press.

 

Q:  Hey, thanks for doing this.  A couple of questions about the balloon itself.  Can you give us a sense of how big is it?  Is it as big as a car?  Big as a bus?  Did that factor into the decision not to shoot it down?  And, I guess, third on the balloon, when did you first start tracking it?  Was it before it crossed into the continental United States?  

 

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Yes, good questions.  So how big?  You know, I’m not going to go into the exact dimensions.  We did assess that it was large enough to cause damage from the debris field if we downed it over an area.  We had been looking at whether there was an option yesterday over some sparsely populated areas in Montana.  But we just couldn’t buy down the risk enough to feel comfortable recommending shooting it down yesterday.  

 

So, beyond that, though, I can’t really go into the dimensions.  But there have been reports of pilots seeing this thing, even though it’s pretty high up in the sky.  So, you know, it’s sizeable.  

 

In terms — and so whether it factored into the decision, it did in the sense that we had to assess what the possible debris field would look like falling from that height.  We wanted to, you know, take care that somebody didn’t get hurt or property wasn’t destroyed.  

 

And, I’m sorry, how long have we been tracking it.  I’m not going to go into all the details because I don’t want to reveal sensitive information.  But I will say we have been tracking it for some time.  And we have had custody of it the entire time it has been over U.S. airspace, entered the continental United States airspace a couple of days ago.  

 

Q:  And just one last, you know, Montana’s one of the three homes for our siloed nuclear weapons.  Was there any concern that the balloon was trying to collect intelligence on those silo fields?  

 

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Yes, so clearly the intent of this balloon is for surveillance.  And so the current flight path does carry it over a number of sensitive sites.  I’d just say a couple of things.  

 

First, our best assessment at the moment is that whatever the surveillance payload is on this balloon, it does not create significant value added over and above what the PRC is likely able to collect through things like satellites in Low Earth Orbit.  

 

But out of an abundance of caution, we have taken additional mitigation steps.  I’m not going to go into what those are.  But we know exactly where this balloon is, exactly what it is passing over.  And we are taking steps to be extra vigilant so that we can mitigate any foreign intelligence risk.  

 

STAFF:  Thank you.  

 

Let’s go to Jen Griffin, FOX.

 

Q:  Thank you very much. What do you think the target of this balloon was?  And has this ever happened before that you’ve seen either a Chinese surveillance balloon or another country’s surveillance balloon over the United States, or is this the first time?  

 

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Yes, so, I mean, it is a surveillance balloon.  And not to be — I’m not trying to be a wiseguy.  But the goal is surveillance.  And clearly they’re trying to fly this — this balloon over sensitive sites, one of which was just mentioned, to collect information.  As I said, we do not judge that it provides significant value added over and above what they can currently collect in other means.  But nevertheless, it’s something we’re watching closely.  

 

Is it the first time.  It is not the first time that you had a balloon of this nature cross over the continental United States.  It has happened a handful of other times over the past few years, to include before this administration.  

 

It is appearing to hang out for a long period of time this time around, more persistent than in previous instances. So that would be one distinguishing factor. Over.

 

STAFF:  Let’s go to Jeff Schogol, Task & Purpose.

 

Q:  All right, thank you. What makes you believe this is a Chinese spy balloon? And then just for arguments sake, why not blow it up and just take the risk that it hits something on the ground?

 

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Right. No, I’m not going to go into all the ways in which we know that it’s a PRC balloon. I will just say we have very high confidence that this is a PRC balloon. Very high confidence.

 

So we do not doubt that this is a PRC balloon. And that is an assessment shared across our intelligence and analytic community. Why not shoot it down? We have to do the risk-reward here. So the first question is does it pose a threat — physical kinetic threat to individuals in the United States or the U.S. Homeland. Our assessment is it does not.

 

Does it pose a threat to civilian aviation? Our assessment is it does not. Does it pose a significantly enhanced threat on the intelligence side? Our best assessment right now is that it does not. And so given that risk, that profile, we assess that the risk of downing it, even if the probability was low in a sparsely populated area of the debris falling and hurting somebody or damaging property that it wasn’t worth it and that was the recommendation of our military commanders.

 

That is what we recommended to the White House yesterday.

 

STAFF:  Let’s go to Idrees Ali, Reuters.

 

Q:  Hey, just two quick questions. Firstly, have you directly brought this up with Chinese officials and what has their response been? And in terms of altitude, is this over U.S. airspace or is it sort of in the stratosphere? What’s sort of the height of this right now?

 

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Yes, both good questions. Good to hear your voice, Idrees. We have engaged PRC officials with urgency through multiple channels. They’ve been engaged both through their embassy here in Washington and through our embassy in Beijing. 

 

We have communicated to them the seriousness with which we take this issue. But beyond that I’m not going to go into the content of the — of the message. But we have made clear we will do whatever is necessary to protect our people and our homeland. And so if the risk profile that I described earlier, if that changes we will have options to deal with this balloon.

 

In terms of the altitude, I’m not going to go into the exact altitude. What I will say is that it is significantly above where civilian air traffic is active, which is why we do not assess that it’s a threat to civilian aviation. It — but it is in the atmosphere and it is over U.S. airspace. It is not in outer space.

 

STAFF:  OK. Let’s go to Heather Mongilio, USNI.

 

Q:  Thank you so much. You mentioned this is not the first time. Can you say when the last time a similar situation happened?

 

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  I — I’m not going to go into the details of that. It’s happened a few times in recent years to include before this administration. But beyond that I’m not going to go into the details.

 

STAFF:  Got time for just a few more. We’ll go to Dan Lamothe, Washington Post.

 

Q:  Yes, thank you. And can you walk us through how you observed it? NBC News reported that system F-22s were sent up — I don’t if scrambled would be the right terminology there but at least sent up to get a closer look. Thank you.

 

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Yes, so we’ve been — we’ve been observing it through multiple means, including manned aircraft. You did see reports yesterday of a ground stop at billings airport and the mobilization of a number of assets including F-22s.

 

The context for that was it would put some things on station in the event that a decision was made to bring this down while it was over Montana. So we wanted to make sure we were coordinating with civil authorities to empty out the air space around that potential area. But even with those protective measures taken it was the judgment of our military commanders that we didn’t drive the risk down low enough, so we didn’t take the shot.

 

But that’s why you saw the reports that you saw, Dan.

 

STAFF:  And Nancy Youssef, Wall Street Journal.

 

Q:  Thank you. (Inaudible) you mentioned earlier that the balloon stayed for a longer period of time than in the past and that it wasn’t offering any significant intelligence relative to other means of ISR that the Chinese have. My question is, is there any reason to believe that the Chinese wanted this to be spotted. Is there — is that your conclusion?

 

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  You know, I can’t speculate. It’s probably a question better to direct to the Chinese embassy. I don’t know why they did what they did. I will say that the past number of times it did not loiter over the continental United States for an extended period of time. It’s different.

 

And precisely why they made the decision to make this different I think really is a question for them. 

 

STAFF:  And last question, Brandi Vincent, DefenseScoop.

 

Q:  Thank you so much for doing this. Does the balloon appear to have technology that is different or more advanced than any technology that the U.S. has? Does the U.S. have a policy for dealing with balloons like this? I can’t help but think of the 163 balloons that were made sense of in the UAP report. So is this something that you’re developing policy on or does policy exist about how to handle these sort of sightings?

 

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Yes, you know I’m not going to go into the exact nature of the technology. I don’t think that the — that the pay load on this is — I wouldn’t characterize it as revolutionary. I think the thing that is different is the altitude and of course the willingness to put it over the continental United States for an extended period of time.

 

I think that’s the — that’s the biggest difference here. As it relates to do we have a policy, the answer is yes, we do and most importantly we also have sufficient authority given to us to take action under Title 10 against unmanned aerial systems of which this balloon would be a part. So we think we have all the authorities we need to do anything that we need to do to protect the American people and we’ll continue to do that.

 

Q:  Thank you.

 

STAFF:  Thank you very much ladies and gentlemen, that’s all the time we have. Just as a reminder the comments are as a senior defense official on background. My comment at the top is on the record and we will post a transcript on defense.gov when it’s available. Thank you for joining us.

 

(CROSSTALK)

 

Q:  Can you hear me? Hello?

 

STAFF:  Louie ?

 

Q:  Yes. Some of us, you know, since we work in broadcast, recorded the top portion of your briefing since you were on the record. Can we use it for broadcast?

 

STAFF:  You can use that for broadcast.

 

Q:  Thank you.

 

STAFF:  Thank you.

 

Thank you very much, everybody

 

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Thanks, everybody.

 

HLS.Today Source: DEFENSE.GOV

]]> Report: US Struggles to Provide Ukraine with Counter-Drone Technology https://hls.today/news/11012023-hls-today/ Wed, 18 Jan 2023 00:00:42 +0000 https://hls.today/?p=4497 Western analysts and officials say the U.S. is struggling to quickly deploy sufficient equipment for Ukraine to effectively counter the threat posed by the Iran-built Shahed-136 drone that Russia has fielded to attack civilian infrastructure, The Wall Street Journal reported Monday.

The U.S. Department of Defense awarded a contract to L3Harris Technologies to supply 14 Vehicle Agnostic Modular Palletized ISR Rocket Equipment to help Ukraine ground forces fight hostile drones.

The portable VAMPIRE kit will allow Ukraine ground forces to target and shoot down enemy drones and defend against adversary ground threats. The systems ordered by DoD are tailored to provide critical defense assets to help Ukraine protect against attacks on civilian infrastructure.“We’ve invested in procurement, testing and certification since August so VAMPIRE production can begin without delay,” said Luke Savoie, President, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, L3Harris. “We’re committed to supporting a U.S. strategic partner with a robust capability, as the people of Ukraine continue to defend their country and protect their independence.”Under the DoD contract, L3Harris will install VAMPIRE kits on U.S. government-provided vehicles for agile combat support to the Ukrainian battlefield. The contract calls for L3Harris to deliver 14 VAMPIRE systems to DoD, with four delivered by mid-2023 and ten more delivered by the end of 2023.

 

According to the report, the first four VAMPIRE units are set to be delivered to Ukraine by mid-2023 and the rest will be ready by the end of the year, highlighting the challenge of supplying enough technologies to the Eastern European country.

 

Richard Ast, director of unmanned systems technology at DOD’s research and engineering directorate, said at a conference in December that his office was turning to industry to help develop platforms that could counter unmanned systems, particularly autonomous drones being fielded in large numbers.

 

Companies such as the Netherlands-based Robin Radar Systems and Utah-based Fortem Technologies are reportedly developing their capabilities so that they may counter Iran-made drones as the Russia-Ukraine war approaches its first anniversary.

Fortem Technologies develops solutions and strategies in C-UAS (counter-unmanned aerial systems), ISR (intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance), perimeter security, airspace safety, and several emerging airborne markets.

Best known for our TrueView® radars and autonomous DroneHunter® interceptors, we work with military, government, and commercial customers to solve drone-related security and defense challenges while simultaneously laying the groundwork for AAM (advanced air mobility).

With backing from Toshiba, Boeing, DCVC, Mubadala, Signia Venture Partners, and other strategic partnerships, Fortem Technologies continues to push the limits of critical thinking and technical innovation, earning a reputation as a leader in airspace security and defense.

 

Bill Haraka, vice president of defense and security at Robin Radar, said the company is working to improve the capability of its sensors to detect Shahed-136 and other larger drones.

The West is making efforts to transfer equipment and develop technology to help Ukraine strengthen its “patched” air defense system against the threat of Russian UAVs.

More than three months since Russia began massively using suicide drones (UAVs) to attack Ukraine’s strategic infrastructure, the US and its Western allies are racing to overcome many challenges to defeat the enemy. can help Kiev counter the threat posed by them.

The Pentagon announced in August last year that it would provide Ukraine with an anti-UAV system called Vampire, but it was not until mid-December that it approved a $ 40 million contract for this weapon. It is not until mid-2023 that the first 4 Vampire complexes can be delivered to Ukraine and 10 more by the end of the year.

The US Department of Defense did not say why it took so long to approve the agreement to transfer Vampires to Ukraine. Luke Savoie, director of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment business at L3Harris Technologies, the company that makes Vampire, said the problem lies in the paperwork and procedures.

The agreement to provide Vampire systems shows that Washington and its allies are working to help Kiev strengthen its air defense shield against the threat of Russian UAVs.

“I think Ukraine needs a lot of systems like Vampire to deploy to all fronts,” said Sam Bendett, a UAV expert at the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), USA. “They will need to place hundreds of systems around major cities, important military facilities, military bases, critical infrastructure and the like.”

Vampires use high-definition sensors to track airborne threats, including UAVs, and then intercept them with laser-guided munitions. According to L3Harris, this system is designed to be very compact, to fit even on the back of a pickup truck.

However, the slow process of Vampire transfer also shows that the West faces many difficulties and challenges in its efforts to help Ukraine possess an effective and fast air defense system.

Ukraine has had some success in its efforts to shoot down UAVs, but so far does not possess a system that offers comprehensive defense. Ukraine believes that Russia has used cheap Iranian-made Shahed-136 UAVs to massively attack military and civilian infrastructure targets since September last year.

 

Fortem CEO Jon Gruen also revealed that the company has made improvements to its DroneHunter system to help address the threat posed by Iranian drones.

Fortem CEO Jon Gruen and Security Today Editor-in-Chief Ralph C. Jensen Discuss Fortem’s Counter-UAS Advantages

In this episode of SecurPod, Ralph C. Jensen, editor-in-chief of Security Today magazine, talks with Jon Gruen, CEO of Fortem Technologies. Fortem Technologies is a well-known unmanned aerial surveillance manufacturer with experience on consumer and commercial applications, as well as on the battlefield for the past 10 months in Ukraine. Gruen highlights his experience and Fortem Technologies’ capabilities on a global platform, discussing the current state of the drone threatscape, both from a public and military standpoint. In addition, learn about what to expect from the C-UAS space in the future and the evolution of drone technology for years to come.

 

HLS.Today Source: ExecutiveGov

 

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