One of the smallest drones out there well at least publicly known is the Black Hornet. It has very impressive capabilities with optical and thermal cameras which can relay up to 1.2 miles.

The Hornet has your typical features including waypoint return home and manual control. The craft can also be upgraded to a vision-based system which will likely have some type of obstacle avoidance. However there is a limitation to these types of drones as you can only miniaturize motors and propellers to a certain point so in order to make a smaller drone we need to look at different types of architectures.

MIT has come up with a very creative type of drone and instead of using a fixed wing the team utilized a soft actuator made of thin rubber cylinders coated in carbon nanotubes. When voltage is applied they produce an electrostatic force that squeezes and elongates the rubber cylinder.

This allows the wing to flap nearly 500 times a second which is pretty phenomenal.

Zinc particles were also added to the wing and this allowed the robot to have light communication. This type of communication could be very beneficial for swarms and even maybe allow for a centralized control system. In turn this swarm capability could allow for additional awareness and adaptation to the environment.

Flapping robots also must control wind speed in order to rotate and the hartford team has developed a new model which analytically maps out forces and torques. Thus allowing the best combination for yaw control in real time, on top of this the RoboBee has highly efficient actuators and a solar array. Even though it’s untethered it is worth noting that a laser is used to power the array so winged robots will need an upgraded power source.

New inventions such as solid-state batteries or even graphing capacitors could be the answer to micro vehicles in the future so this type of technology could advance very quickly within the decade. It can be argued that the winged vehicle will be the prominent design for future micro drones. However there has been a recent development which has overshadowed these aerial vehicles and it’s called biohacking.

You probably have heard about the biohacked dragonfly which was pretty much a living organism converted to a drone. Nevertheless I do not see this kind of development stopping anytime soon and that brings us to the next position which is the Biohacked Fruit Fly.

These are one of the first genetically modified flies and they have a higher degree of sensitivity furthermore magnetic particles are injected into the insects brain and this allows users to manipulate the insect through magnetic fields in other words the fly is biohacked and submitted to human control fortunately this is not converted 100 percent and there is no automation or fly to home functions in the insect. One can only speculate where this will go but I have a prediction that this will happen in fairy flies which are one of the smallest flying insects.

If you can biohack something that is 0.1 millimeters then you have the ultimate surveillance system this also means that you would have to figure out wireless brain communication so it’s no surprise that DARPA is heavily researching this stuff and one of their lead projects is MOANA (Magnetic, Optical and Acoustic Neural Access) as of right now they have developed preliminary wireless headsets.

But the ultimate brain to brain communication is just not there yet and there’s a lot of questions on how many neurons can you interact and actually control. Obviously there are other drones which have been covered before these are very generic types of crafts and they have very little control.

One of them is the micro flier and it could be outfitted with an array of sensors including visual audio and even embedded memory chips, so obviously it’s still really kind of debatable whether or not these are drones and they’re more of an expendable surveillance type of equipment.

So we have covered several different types of drones the first one being a rotor or multi-rotor and there is a strong limitation to these types of drones because the propellers and motors can only get so small.

You also have a micro winged aerial vehicle which could be very efficient and they can flap their wings at several hundred times a second but they also have mechanisms and these are also limited in size.

There is also biohacking which might not be really a drone and it’s not even ethical and finally there is a certain type of craft with no moving parts. This could be potentially a nano vehicle because it utilizes electro hydrodynamic thrusters.

These drives use a high strength electric field to generate a plasma of ionized air. The ions are drawn towards a negatively charged grid thereby colliding with neutral air molecules and imparting momentum.

The smallest Ionocraft is at UC Berkeley and it can take off at 2000 volts at 0.35 milliamps but it is possible to create millimeter scale EHD thrusters at around 100 volts.

Obviously this type of drone is really hinged on the advancement of battery technology, maybe even solid state, or even some type of graphene supercapacitor. Ultimately the Ionocraft is probably one of the more potential designs out there because it is completely silent and it can be scaled. Will it become a nano drone? Well it’s hard to say.

Source:  YouTube   Tech Planet

Specifically, the establishment of the new Bureau would bring together the Office of International Health and Biodefense in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES/IHB) and the functions of the Coordinator for Global COVID-19 Response and Health Security (S/CRHS) with the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (S/GAC), which leads and coordinates the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and is home to the Office of Global Health Diplomacy. These teams, along with critical partners throughout the government, are already leading our international global health security efforts, and their indispensable functions will continue. This new structure would allow our health security experts and diplomats to work more effectively together to prevent, detect, and respond to existing and future health threats.

I look forward to working with Congress on our plans for establishing the Department’s Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy.

GHSA on Global Health Security

Image of Dr. Chris Daniel, senior advisor for Global Health Engagement Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, spoke at the 7th Global Health Security Agenda Ministerial Meeting 2022 in Seoul, South Korea.

Dr. Chris Daniel, senior advisor for Global Health Engagement Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense spoke at the 7th Global Health Security Agenda Ministerial Meeting 2022 in Seoul, South Korea, on Nov. 30. He stressed the importance of including the defense and security sector in global cooperation and engagement in responding to global health threats. Senior leaders from nations around the world met to discuss how to work together to respond to future global health threats at the GHSA meeting.

Partner Capacity and Interoperability

Ministers of health, foreign affairs, and finance and other senior leaders from nations around the world met in Seoul, South Korea, recently identified joint opportunities to respond to future global health threats.

The 7th Global Health Security Agenda Ministerial Meeting 2022 took place Nov. 28-30 and featured multisectoral delegations from over 38 countries and 11 multilateral organizations, as well as the private sector.

Dr. Chris Daniel, senior advisor for Global Health Engagement Office of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, stressed the importance of including the defense and security sector in global cooperation and engagement in responding to global health threats.

“The defense and security sector brings many unique capabilities to bear in the shared fight against infectious disease threats, regardless of source,” he said. “The civilian sector frequently calls upon the defense and security sector to support civilian response.”

The GHSA is a global effort to strengthen the world’s ability to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats. More than 70 countries have signed onto the GHSA framework, including the United States, which made a commitment to the initial 5-year period of GHSA and continues to support its strategic priorities. The GHSA was previously extended through 2024, and the “New Seoul Declaration” was endorsed at the conclusion of the Ministerial Meeting, which extended the GHSA for a third 5-year phase through Dec. 31, 2028. 

Daniel discussed how the GHSA provides a unique platform that allows the defense and security sector to “connect with relevant international frameworks such as the new World Health Organization national civil-military health collaboration framework for strengthening health emergency preparedness, and to demonstrate transparency, uphold international norms and standards, and support national sovereignty.”

Daniel noted that the sectors could also be of use in other areas rather than just in response mode.

“I want to use this opportunity to move beyond our role in response and move to our work in preparedness,” said Daniel. “The defense and security sector needs to be robustly engaged during the preparedness phase, and not only brought in during the response phase, after we are in full-blown crisis mode.”

“We also have unique expertise in planning and conducting multi-sectoral and multilateral exercises. This may be one of the key areas of best practices that we can share with GHSA moving forward. We as a sector have a wealth of experience in assessing capacities and capabilities, identifying gaps, developing plans to fill those gaps, and exercising those plans,” he said.

Daniel concluded by underscoring the importance of global partnerships.

“The very nature of our mission sets requires us to work with partners across borders and oceans–just as GHSA must work globally to realize impact locally.”

White House Prioritizes Global Health Security

Coinciding with the global meeting, the White House released the annual report about global health security, titled “Strengthening Health Security Across the Globe: Progress and Impact of the U.S. Government Investments in Global Health Security.”

“The Biden-Harris Administration continues to prioritize global health security as a critical component of national biodefense, according to a release from the White House. “Partnering with countries to stop infectious disease threats at their source, by strengthening equitable health systems in their own regions, is an effective way to protect the health of Americans and people across the world.”

Along with the report, the White House announced “new actions to advance global health security that accelerate implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security Strategy.”

The strategy will use the following to achieve these goals by the White House:

• Expanding global health security partnerships.
• Spurring other donors and multilateral partners to act.
• Building preparedness at home and with our neighbors.
• Delivering results from United States investments.

More than 100 Countries to Improve Health Security

In 2018, all member countries committed to the next phase of the GHSA strategic framework, termed “GHSA 2024”. GHSA 2024 positions member countries to develop the leadership, technical knowledge, and collaborative foundation to sustain health security in the long term by:

• Developing sustainable financing mechanisms for global health security.
• Promoting multi-sector collaboration to improve GHSA capacities.
• Improving information sharing across member countries.
• Strengthening accountability to member country commitments.

GHSA 2024’s target is for countries to take greater ownership of global health security efforts, and for more than 100 countries to improve health security technical areas within five years.

HLS.Today Source: STATE.GOV  HEALTH.MIL  

In response to these challenges, many governments have developed plans and strategies to protect their populations from health-related attacks and terrorism. These efforts typically involve a range of measures, including surveillance and monitoring of potential threats, public health preparedness and response plans, and the development of vaccines and other medical countermeasures.

Early Detection

One key component of health security is the early detection and rapid response to potential threats. This involves the use of surveillance systems to monitor for the emergence of new or unusual health events, such as outbreaks of infectious diseases. In many countries, this surveillance is carried out by public health agencies, which use a combination of laboratory testing, epidemiological investigation, and other tools to identify potential threats and take action to prevent their spread.

In addition to surveillance and detection, governments also play a crucial role in promoting public health preparedness and response. This involves the development of plans and protocols to be used in the event of a health-related emergency, such as an outbreak of an infectious disease or a bioterrorism attack. These plans typically include measures to prevent the spread of the threat, such as quarantine and isolation, as well as steps to provide medical care to those affected.

Countermeasures

Another important aspect of health security is the development of medical countermeasures, such as vaccines and other treatments, to protect against potential threats. Governments often play a central role in supporting the research and development of these countermeasures, as well as in their procurement and distribution. This can involve funding for the development of new vaccines and treatments, as well as the stockpiling of existing medical countermeasures to be used in the event of an emergency.

In summary, health security is a critical concern for governments around the world, and many have developed plans and strategies to protect their populations from health-related threats. These efforts typically involve a combination of surveillance and detection, public health preparedness and response, and the development of medical countermeasures. By taking these steps, governments can help to reduce the risk of health-related attacks and terrorism, and protect the health and well-being of their populations.

The 20 steps nations protect themselves from health related terrorism

1. Developing a national strategy or plan for health security and emergency preparedness, which outlines the specific measures to be taken in the event of a health-related emergency.
2. Establishing a national surveillance system to monitor for the emergence of new or unusual health events, such as outbreaks of infectious diseases or bioterrorism incidents.
3. Developing and implementing protocols for public health preparedness and response, including measures to prevent the spread of health-related threats, as well as plans for providing medical care to those affected.
4. Supporting the research and development of medical countermeasures, such as vaccines and other treatments, to protect against potential health threats.
5. Stockpiling medical countermeasures and other essential supplies to be used in the event of an emergency.
6. Providing training and education to public health officials and other relevant personnel on the identification and management of health-related threats.
7. Establishing partnerships and collaborations with other countries, international organizations, and the private sector to share information, expertise, and resources related to health security.
8. Enhancing the resilience of health care systems, including by improving infrastructure, emergency management capabilities, and the availability of medical supplies.
9. Strengthening border control measures to prevent the introduction and spread of health-related threats into the country.
10. Enhancing the capacity of laboratories and other diagnostic facilities to detect and identify potential health threats.
11. Developing and implementing regulations and policies to ensure the safe handling and disposal of infectious materials and other hazardous substances.
12. Providing education and outreach to the public on the importance of health security and how individuals can protect themselves and their families from health-related threats.
13. Supporting the development and implementation of international health regulations and other global health governance frameworks.
14. Providing financial and other support to countries with weaker health systems to help them improve their capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to health-related threats.
15. Establishing mechanisms for coordinating the response to health-related emergencies, including through the development of incident command systems and other disaster management frameworks.
16. Developing and implementing plans to protect critical infrastructure and essential services, such as hospitals and power systems, in the event of a health-related emergency.
17. Establishing a national public health institute or other central body to coordinate and oversee health security efforts.
18. Developing and implementing regulations and policies to ensure the safety and effectiveness of medical products, including vaccines and other treatments.
19. Providing support and resources to public health agencies and other relevant organizations to enable them to carry out their roles and responsibilities related to health security.
20. Engaging with communities and other stakeholders to build support for health security efforts and to ensure that the public is aware of and prepared for potential health-related threats.

Bio-hazards threats, occurrences and mitigation protocols

Biohazards are biological substances or organisms that pose a threat to human health or the environment. These threats can come in many forms, from infectious diseases and toxins to genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and hazardous materials.

Biohazards can be found in a variety of settings, including healthcare facilities, research laboratories, agricultural settings, and even in nature. The potential for biohazardous threats to cause harm is a major concern for governments, public health agencies, and individuals around the world.

One of the most well-known examples of a biohazardous threat is the outbreak of infectious diseases. These diseases can be caused by a wide range of pathogens, including bacteria, viruses, and parasites. Some of the most infamous examples of infectious diseases include the bubonic plague, smallpox, and Ebola.

In recent years, the rise of antibiotic-resistant bacteria has become a major concern. These “superbugs” are able to withstand the effects of antibiotics, making them more difficult to treat and control. As a result, these bacteria can spread rapidly and cause serious illness and even death.

Another type of biohazardous threat is the use of toxins. These substances are produced naturally by certain bacteria, plants, and animals, and can have severe health effects when ingested or inhaled. Toxins can also be created artificially, either through the use of chemical weapons or by terrorists.

Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are another potential source of biohazardous threats. These organisms are created through the manipulation of their genetic material in order to produce desired traits or characteristics. While GMOs can have potential benefits, they also raise concerns about their safety and potential impact on the environment.

Hazardous materials are another type of biohazardous threat. These materials can be found in many different forms, including chemicals, radioactive substances, and biological agents. When mishandled or released into the environment, hazardous materials can cause serious harm to human health and the environment.

To mitigate the risks posed by bio hazardous threats, a number of protocols and guidelines have been put in place. These include measures to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, such as vaccination programs and quarantine procedures. In addition, strict regulations and guidelines are in place for the handling of hazardous materials and GMOs.

In the event of a biohazardous attack or outbreak, response teams are mobilized to contain and control the situation. These teams may include public health officials, law enforcement agencies, and emergency responders. In addition, emergency protocols are put in place to protect the public and minimize the impact of the threat.

Overall, biohazardous threats are a serious concern for individuals and communities around the world. By understanding the potential risks and taking appropriate precautions, we can help to mitigate the impact of these threats and protect ourselves and the environment.

Detecting and preventing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats

The world we live in today is filled with numerous potential threats, ranging from natural disasters to man-made accidents and acts of terrorism. One particular type of threat that has garnered a lot of attention in recent years is the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

CBRN weapons are a class of weapons that utilize chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials in order to cause harm or destruction. These weapons can be difficult to detect and can have devastating effects on both individuals and entire populations. As such, it is important for individuals, organizations, and governments to have strategies in place for detecting and preventing CBRN threats.

One way to detect CBRN threats is through the use of specialized equipment and technology. For example, sensors can be used to detect the presence of chemical or biological agents in the air, water, or soil. Radiological detectors can be used to detect the presence of radioactive materials, and radiation monitors can be used to monitor the levels of radiation in an area.

In addition to the use of specialized equipment, trained personnel can also play a crucial role in detecting CBRN threats. These individuals are trained to recognize the signs and symptoms of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear exposure, and can use this knowledge to identify potential threats and take appropriate action.

Once a CBRN threat has been detected, it is important to take steps to prevent or mitigate the effects of the threat. In some cases, this may involve evacuating individuals from the affected area, or providing them with protective equipment such as masks or suits to limit their exposure to the threat.

In other cases, it may be necessary to use specialized decontamination equipment to remove or neutralize the threat. For example, decontamination showers or tents can be used to remove chemical or biological agents from individuals, while specialized machinery can be used to remove radioactive materials or dispose of nuclear waste.

In addition to these physical measures, it is also important to have effective communication and coordination strategies in place to ensure that appropriate responses to CBRN threats are carried out quickly and efficiently. This may involve the use of emergency alert systems, communication networks, and emergency response plans.

Overall, the detection and prevention of CBRN threats is a complex and challenging task that requires a combination of specialized equipment, trained personnel, and effective communication and coordination. By implementing these strategies, individuals, organizations, and governments can help to protect themselves and their communities from the potential dangers of CBRN weapons.

Source HLS.Today

Last year over 1,000 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks were conducted by non-state actors, injuring over 7,150 people in more than 40 countries. Many attacks come from chemicals that criminals acquired through weak points in the supply chain – from manufacturing to storage and retail– and made into weapons.

To counter this threat, some 220 chemical security practitioners from more than 70 countries met at INTERPOL’s 3rd Global Congress on Chemical Security and Emerging Threats (25-27 October) to find ways of reducing vulnerabilities by enhancing multi sector cooperation and collaboration.

With a focus on acquisition, transportation, physical and cyber security of chemical materials, the meeting highlighted a range of security issues, such as detecting cross-border movements of regulated material and implementing regulatory frameworks.

Terrorists’ misuse of e-commerce and new technologies

The Global Congress also explored ways to counter emerging threats including terrorists’ misuse of e-commerce and new technologies to acquire toxic and precursor chemicals.

Due to the substantial growth and access to the Internet in recent years, so too we have seen an increase in digital content produced and shared through platforms such as instant messaging, social networking, blogs and online portals. The misuse of technologies can be seen as a result of this rapid growth in content, and with it a rise in suspicious activities.

Law enforcement agencies provided examples of investigative techniques that could be used to identify and prosecute the illicit purchase or sale of chemicals on the DarkNet. These lessons provided delegates with solutions to address the use of sophisticated technologies for nefarious purposes.

“As the ramifications of such heinous acts resonate beyond borders and touch every level of society, a committed transversal and global response is required.”

 – Greg Hinds, INTERPOL, Counter-Terrorism Director

“The concerted effort of global law enforcement, along with our partners, is key to combating the use of explosive precursor chemicals and chemical weapons,” Mr Hinds added.

Dual-use and precursor chemicals have a wide legitimate function in the production of consumer goods such as pharmaceuticals, cleaning supplies and fertilizers. This raises significant challenges to prevent and monitor, and remains one of the inherent threats to chemical security worldwide.

INTERPOL awareness video – ‘The Watchmaker’

In this context, an INTERPOL-produced awareness video was premiered at the meeting to engage a broad spectrum of stakeholders in understanding the importance of individuals and companies to secure dangerous toxic chemicals, including equipment.

Entitled ‘The Watchmaker’, the video highlights the need for multisector cooperation to combat these threats and will be used in a series of INTERPOL capacity building workshops and other activities related to counter-terrorism and prevention.

“Multi Sector collaboration is essential for us to tackle the threats we face from criminals who gain access to dangerous chemicals with malevolent intentions. Morocco is committed to strengthening the engagement of these issues as part of our proactive approach to combating terrorism,” said Mr. Mohammed Dkhissi, Head of National Central Bureau, Rabat.

Other measures proposed by the Global Congress Network include:

Advocating chemical security recommendations such as increased retail reporting on suspicious activity;

Expanding the INTERPOL-hosted Global Knowledge Hub, which allows members to engage in interactive discussions and access good practice guidance;

Strengthening the Global Congress Network through greater diversity of expertise and activities across regions and sectors;

Promoting decision-making tools such as a customer database, which can flag areas of security concern.

Since its inception in 2018, the Global Congress has been jointly led by INTERPOL, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and implemented in cooperation with the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

HLS.Today Source: Interpol.int

The island is the site of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), which was established by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 1954. The Island is also the site of the former U.S. military installation Fort Terry (c. 1897), and the historic Plum Island Light (c. 1869), and its automated replacement.

Plum Island is owned in its entirety by the United States government, which was considering sale of the island, but suspended the plan in February 2012. Access to the island is controlled by the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

On August 29, 2013, the United States General Services Administration (GSA) and United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced a final “Record of Decision (ROD): Public Sale of Plum Island, New York”.

After years of pressure from organizations including the Preserve Plum Island Coalition (PPIC),[3] the Connecticut Fund for the Environment, along with its permanent regional program Save the Sound[4] and Soundkeeper, Inc. Congress voted in December 2020 to block the sale and preserve Plum Island. In 2020, President Donald Trump signed the legislation.

The historic Plum Island Light Station is undergoing a project to stabilize its structure and prevent further deterioration. The project, led by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), will refurbish the lighthouse’s cast iron tower and associated components, as well as the roof of the lighthouse keep’s quarters to reflect its historical significance and confirm that both components are structurally sound. S&T is working closely with the New York State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) to confirm proper selection of materials in the stabilization project to maintain historic character and authenticity in a manner consistent with the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for Rehabilitation.

Constructed in 1869 and put into service in 1870, the Plum Island Light Station was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in February 2011. The lighthouse property also includes a brick oil house that was built around 1900 and a wood-framed storage shed that was constructed around 1920—all of which are located on a three-acre parcel on the northwestern tip of Plum Island. Various assessments over the past decade have indicated degradation in the structure and the need for significant repairs.

“The Plum Island Lighthouse holds incredible historical and cultural significance from a local and national perspective,” said Dr. Tod Companion, acting director of S&T’s Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC). “We are looking forward to confirming its stability as part of the island’s closure.” The project is expected to be completed by March 2024.

Plum Island, New York

Plum Island, New York, is located approximately 1.5 miles from the eastern end of Long Island’s North Fork. The island is wholly owned by the DHS and primarily serves as a secure and appropriate location for PIADC, DHS’s unique research facility whose mission includes the development of vaccines, diagnostic testing, and applied research to control and eradicate transboundary foreign animal diseases. The island is also home to several legacy properties of historical significance, such as Fort Terry—a former United States Army fortification—and the Plum Island Light Station, neither of which are in service nor support PIADC’s science mission.

DHS has selected ASRC Federal Field Services as the operations and maintenance contractor to perform the stabilization work. The estimated cost of the project is $1.82 million, which includes both onsite labor and support, as well as specialty subcontractors.

Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC)

Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) is a United States federal research facility dedicated to the study of foreign animal diseases of livestock. It is part of the Department of Homeland Security Directorate for Science and Technology, and operates as a partnership with the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The facility’s director is Dr. Larry Barrett.

Since 1954, the center has been tasked with protecting America’s livestock from animal diseases. During the Cold War, a secret biological weapons program targeting livestock was conducted at the site, which ended in 1969 when President Nixon declared an end to the United States’ offensive bioweapons program. Today the facility maintains laboratories up to biosafety level 3, but has remained controversial as a result of its high risk work and proximity to the New York metropolitan area.

The facility is slated for closure in 2023, with work moving to the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility under construction in Manhattan, Kansas.

HLS.Today Source: Wiki  DHS.GOV

UK Turns to Drone Power

The UK has reduced coal power generation significantly since 2013 by increasing use of natural gas, nuclear power and renewable sources. Power is distributed throughout the UK by the National Grid Electricity Transmission (NGET) via 4,000 miles of overhead high-voltage lines carried on 21,900 steel pylons. With another 330 substations to also look after, the infrastructure for power distribution in UK always has required a huge maintenance effort. This picture is likely reflected in the power distribution networks of most countries around the world.

Helicopters have carried a large portion of the workload to enable inspection of cables and insulators, with additional necessary manual inspections taking significant effort to gain access and analyze data. Helicopter time is expensive, and manual inspection processes and data analysis are tedious and time consuming.

Drones are being used for power-line inspection — flown manually by onsite operators — by many organizations in several countries around the world, including by FPL in Florida. But the real reduction in time and effort comes from automating the whole process, and gathering data that provides the detail necessary to assure defects are detected and operational integrity is maintained. The automation of data analysis and generation of useful reports is another area which could yield major savings, and bring rapid focus to areas needing immediate corrective action.

Hence, a 12-month trial is being undertaken involving ultimate approval by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) for beyond-visual-line-of-sight (BVLOS) multiple drone operations. Artificial intelligent (AI) analysis tools are being developed to determine critical changes in collected visual, lidar and positioning inspection data that might herald deterioration in pylon or other infrastructure components.

During an initial test in Nottingham, an autonomous drone was dispatched with minimal instructions. It was able to find its inspection target and complete the programmed inspection in a few minutes. A manual inspection could take up to an hour for the same task. If things go well, it is not impossible to be able to project multiple drones operating with minimal human control, taking on huge swaths of pylons, cabling, insulators and other elements during regular inspections, saving a lot of time and money.

The trials so far have also included remote inspection of the Sellafield nuclear waste decommissioning site, rail infrastructure and a telecommunications network along with investigations towards transport of medical supplies.

Sellafield is where spent fuel ends up from the UK’s 31 nuclear power plants. Also, nuclear waste from reactors in neighboring European countries is reprocessed here. Nuclear waste is processed into 50-ton concrete blocks and spent fuel is “vitrified” into huge chunks of glass, which are encased in an outside metal jacket. Both processes minimize any emitted radiation and allow the contents to safely  cool over long term. The staff uses robots inside the facility to remotely dismantle contaminated areas and load material into 55-gallon drums, which might be further processed by robot crushing machines. No one has any real idea how all this nuclear waste could be permanently disposed of, but it’s possible most will ultimately be buried in the ground.

This type of power might seem a “green” boon for humanity, but in a somewhat countrified area on the West Coast of England and in other similar sites around the world, nuclear waste disposal is costly and very, very long-term. The half-life of uranium is between 159,200 years and 4.5 billion years. Monitoring the waste could be a long-term task for drones, such as those now used to detect radiation inside the Fukushima nuclear plant. Certainly, there’s plenty of time to evolve improved drone detection capability for radiation monitoring.

Greece Employs Counter-UAS against Turkish Incursions

On a defense-related note, apparently the long-running rivalry between Turkey and Greece is, unfortunately, continuing. It seems that Turkey has been repeatedly flying its Baykar-TB2 surveillance drone over Greek islands, perhaps to monitor the movements of Greek warships or island defense installations. And Greece is a little bit more than peeved.

Having established a defense-related relationship with Israel in 2021, Greece has brought Israeli drone defense systems to the Greek islands, installing a “veritable umbrella against enemy unmanned aerial vehicles.” The Israeli system has a number of moving parts: detect and identify; generate related alerts; a directional jamming system that can disable drones in flight (presumably by jamming GPS or the control link); and a laser that can lock onto a small target and, if manually fired, can apparently destroy an intruder drone.

Because of the directional, narrow beamwidth of the jammer, Rafael claims that the system can be activated within crowded civilian airspace without affecting the navigation of other users. Good news for Greece and their popular, attractive Greek island tourist destinations.

UAV Defense Contractors Struggle — with Each Other

Meanwhile, current economic uncertainty is apparently impacting at least a couple of UAV defense contractors: Boeing/Insitu and Orbital UAV. The two made news when Orbital, as an Australian public company (ASX symbol OEC), had to halt trading. The company was then able to reinstate trading largely because of news of cancellation of a development/production agreement with Insitu.

Apparently, Orbital has previously been delivering two-engine versions to Insitu and was contracted to develop and deliver a third derivative engine. However, Insitu had to scale back Orbital’s work in February, given its sales of the popular ScanEagle and other UAVs may have fallen off in recent months.

This has affected Orbital’s revenue forecast for the year. The company now expects to lose AUD $7 million for the year. It has subsequently prepared a claim under the supply agreement for Insitu’s Termination for Convenience of AUD $1.8 million in costs incurred in the development of the third engine program, which Insitu/Boeing disputes. There will obviously be some wrangling, but hopefully both parties will settle things amicably so as not to damage their ongoing relationship for supply of the existing two engine types.

To sum up, for this month we have a trial in the UK which will hopefully lead to significant savings in effort and costs for ongoing power infrastructure inspections, along with some background on UK nuclear waste disposal. Greece is bristling and defending against unwanted Turkish drone overflight using Israeli C-UAS systems. Finally, there’s somewhat negative news for the Orbital UAV engine and Insitu ScanEagle relationship — apparently, not everything in the UAV garden is roses.

Source: GPS World

“Over the past several years, Americans have faced a series of unprecedented challenges impacting their health security, from the pandemic to natural disasters and more,” said Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas. “Our Department must be prepared to adapt to an ever-expanding, dynamic, and complex public health threat landscape. The Office of Health Security will lead our efforts to meet that charge.” 

Led by DHS’s Chief Medical Officer, the Office of Health Security will unify the Department’s medical, workforce health and safety, and public health functions under one organization.  

This reorganization will pioneer best-in-class workforce health, safety, work-life and wellness programs, and suitable, timely care for noncitizens in our care and custody. The Office of Health Security will have an organizational structure and design that enables coordination, standardization, and accountability across the DHS enterprise while helping enhance our workforce and nation’s preparedness, response, and resilience to the health impacts of terrorism and other disasters. 

“I am honored to lead the new Office of Health Security, which will unite and elevate the outstanding public health, workforce health and safety, and medical expertise that exist across the Department,” said Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Pritesh Gandhi. “We will focus on promoting a healthier and safer workforce, supporting appropriate and timely medical care for those in our care and custody, ensuring a robust health security posture, and being a strong partner and advocate with and for our interagency and community partners.”  

Department officials have collaborated closely with congressional leaders to create the Office of Health Security, building on longstanding efforts to establish and strengthen the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD). DHS has been working very closely with the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) on S.4465, to permanently authorize OHS, and to reauthorize the CWMD permanently. DHS has been working equally closely with the House Committee on Homeland Security on a companion bill for the authorizations.     

Lessons from recent years reinforce the urgent necessity for consolidating and streamlining health security activities within DHS. Since early 2020, the Department has managed a wide range of medical and public health responses, including leading Operation Allies Welcome; contributing significantly to the nation’s COVID-19 pandemic response; leading “Operation Vaccinate Our Workforce” for DHS employees; managing a significant increase in unaccompanied children arriving at the Southwest Border; and addressing the increased prevalence and impact of natural disasters. 

Source: US Gov

Günter Povoden, MSc, UNOCT Senior Consultant.

I will talk about CBRN attacks on vulnerable targets. This is a low probability but a high risk issue because they don’t happen often but if they happen they have a huge impact. So I’ll talk about the general objectives and the impacts of CBRN attacks against vulnerable targets with CBRN payload specifically and talk about some capability and technology levels. What may be expected from terrorists today? What kind of level they may have? and how to enhance unmanned aircraft systems with CBRN payloads some technical issues and finally we will talk about combating unmanned aerial systems like this because it’s a bit of a difficulty because bringing down a unmanned aerial or unmanned aircraft with a chemical payload or biological payload may lead to a release of these agents and so this needs to be taken into consideration as well.

So the objectives generally speaking of a CBRN attack is that it’s a very high threat which means the proportionality of what we can do against such an attack is accordingly high because the intention is to kill or injure people or to create a mass panic because also less toxic substances can be used.

Imagine such a drone flying above a soccer or football stadium obviously spraying a substance which may create such a mass panic that more people will be injured or die because of this panic than instead of the non-toxic agent in this case.

In addition a variety of CBRN materials are suitable for this, such as at before less lethal agents such as irritants but also highly toxic substances like, industrial materials, like chlorine hydrogen fluoride and other substances which may have a huge impact, and of course a top of the line are the chemical orbital biological warfare agents, but also radiologicals can be disseminated.

Here are just some photos from an Iranian publication of mustard gas victims. On the left hand side you also see victims in Iraq from nerve agent intoxication on the bottom, this is from Amnesty international, a photo they published, because there was an alleged use of chemical agents in Sudan some years ago.

Just to see that vulnerable targets are really vulnerable, it’s not that the military can protect themselves, they have their protective equipment, their gear but the problem is the critical infrastructure and of course the human beings, and of course the environment.

So now we’ll distinguish the objectives of a CBRN attack against critical infrastructure because this is a different approach, because for a different critical infrastructure you need more material more CBRN material to be really permanent damage. Because the idea is to have a long-lasting contamination of critical infrastructure, and a long lasting damage finally.

So typical agents for such a purpose are radiological devices, highly persistent agents up to nerve agents, like vx or even Novichok.

What can also be done is that water resources can be targeted and then also less lethal substance can be used, of course there will be a dilution effect, but we heard already today there’s also a psychological impact, and people knowing that their water resource has been contaminated which will have a huge psychological impact and nobody will drink this water anymore, even if just gasoline has been sprayed above a water resource, or something less toxic.

Another aspect is a combination with explosives and CBRN agents. We know that unmanned aircraft systems have been already deployed with explosives, and if you combine this with CBRN agents you have all these debris problems, collapsed buildings, and in addition you have contamination.

So all the first responders who are on site are in a highly dangerous area, it is very difficult to solve this problem, to rebuild arrest a structure if there’s still contamination on the ground, and this requires specific capabilities regarding urban search and rescue under CBRN conditions to make a cleanup, to build it up, and to secure the scene, and to return the scene to normal. Because that’s the major objective to return the scene to normal.

So the terrorist current capabilities are well known that they I have already used unmanned aircraft systems with explosive devices, not only for as explosive devices but also for reconnaissance and for surveillance. So the terrorists in in advance before they start the attack they also will do surveillance and to look around who is there where, is my target, is there sense something that can be obstacle to my attack, and this means that also these surveillance drones need to be detected early to prevent further action of terrorists.

In addition, the current capabilities of drones with explosives can of course be enhanced by chemical biological or radiological materials, and I give you some examples how this can be done.

What is the current situation is that these terrorists they know how to use drones they also can can manipulate drone software, because some of the drone software prevents a drone being started near an airport, but if you for example have a commercially available drone you won’t be able to launch this drone near an airport. Because this is a something that have is programmed, but apparently terrorists are able to crack and hack such a software, so they can and operate the drone when wherever they want.

The impact can be like say against, less vulnerable targets like tanks but also of course the population soft targets, vulnerable targets in general.

We have different levels of technology for CBRN attacks, if it’s a low level technology terrorists will just use what they can get, and what they can easily get are commercially available substances like chlorine, also it’s fairly easy to steal.

The low level radioactive sources, and also hoaxes can be used which means it seems to be a chemical agent but in fact it’s just an irritant because also irritants are widely available. Also they can use it like everybody can buy small scale micro UAVs and simple equipment to deliver it.

The medium level technology would also include already homemade chemical warfare agents because some of them are quite easy to produce, like sulfur mustard, we know that from the Islamic state is able to produce sulfur mustard on its own. Also toxins are somehow easy to produce.

You can expect from a medium level technology to have already sophisticated IEDs, crude biologicals and some military assets, like ammunition which has been found or something like this.

Regarding drones and unmanned aircrafts they will be small to medium size which leads us to the high level technology where you can actually expect everything.

With a high level technology you can think about biological weapons: the whole range of chemical weapons drones, drones swarms of all sizes which means that this kind of technology would need a good sponsor, like state sponsored or very rich organizations in the background which can finance such a high technology level.

You can mount on these aircraft bombs, bomb blades dispensers, missiles, rockets, bulk containers cylinders and so on and Spraying devices, and this also you can do it in a very sophisticated way, or in a very simple way, this is a simulation we did in Austria where we mounted some spraying devices on commercially available drones, and you see what can be done from from our side of course can be done from terrorist side, because this was part of a project where we tried to bring down these drones and finally, I will just show you some photos about what happens when this drone is on the ground because still the CBRN hazard is present on the ground.

Then for more impact you need spray tanks which can hold up in some cases holding up to hundreds of liters, in the military environment, but if you are thinking about terrorists capabilities, you will see that they still have the capacity to have about 10 to 20 liters.

You also find patents in the internet, so people can look into technology what is available, and they just rebuild these patents, in this case I have found a a let’s say actually planned for a helicopter but of course you can equip any kind of bigger drone with such a technology, in this case it’s a mixing of of liquids intended for riot control, because with this you mix a dye, a color with a liquid, and then you you mark the leader of the gang the leader of the pack or of the demonstration, and that cannot of course be misused in the way that you mix binary agents together, and get a chemical agent in the end, so this is available and that’s why the knowledge is out there this has to be known needs to be just have people who have some technological scientific background to implement it.

This brings me to the misuse of agricultural drones because these are available already in Europe there are some restrictions because they are only allowed if you have a special permit existing for example in Germany where you have steep hills and that you have not accessed so easily with tractors and trailers, so they are allowed to bring out these pesticides with drones, but still you can buy, them they are commercially available and the range is about 10 to 25 kilos. This means that is a lot if you have a small area to cover so it’s enough to for example contaminate critical infrastructure, it’s enough to create huge panic in a crowded place of people, and has of course huge impact if this is a toxic substance.

Another aspect are drone swarms because even easier it is to get access to smaller drones not these 25 kilo drones, but smaller ones and even if it’s a half a liter, or a liter which you carry with your drone, if you have 20 of them 50 them this is really you may consider this as a weapon of mass destruction, even if it’s a small sized drone with the swarm technology with which you can also program that they work together that they cover a certain area, this should be in my opinion also be thought about subject to the international arms control, including the software to to control such swarms, because that is a very critical aspect, even on also the same when they carry explosive charges, not only for chemicals or biologicals.

Combating drones it’s a difficult as a difficult issue it’s well companies promote that they have done a lot in this case but it’s very difficult and we simulated such a drone taking over of a control that the control of a drone in an open training field with irritant as a stimulant, you bring the drone down but the question is, where do you bring it down, so if you have a a protective a plan an emergency response plan in place you should also consider where will I bring the drone down, if it’s carrying an explosive device which means also you should detect fairly quickly, is this the drone itself just a drone, or does it carry something like an explosive payload, or a potential CBRN payload that means that you should have in mind where to bring this drone down and should have a prepared space to bring it down in a safe way.

And finally you need to also dispose of it because if the id’d improvised explosive device is still working you need the EOD operated explosive ordnance disposal operator to finally neutralize it.

Regarding prevention response, just an outlook what we need for that has been also mentioned already in former speeches, the international cooperation for developing proliferation control, because we have some gaps in this, but also we need the compliance of the industry, so the producers of such drones like especially agricultural drones, should follow the approach of know your customer which means they should have a direct contact, they should have a background check maybe this is something we we expect from the industry to be cooperative.

The next step is that detection technologies have to be improved, and it’s not yet at the stage we would require, would be required, so we should include explosive ordnance disposal procedures that they know also how to dispose IEDs this improvised explosive device like this, appropriate techniques tactics and procedures also for to take control over such drones. Finally it can happen that we need military support to defend unmanned aircraft systems, especially the larger ones but that would require also thinking about national legislation, international law, you know human rights law, that it’s proportional it’s important that it’s proportional to the threat.

Finally we have also a bright side of you unmanned aerial vehicles also unmanned ground vehicles because with that unmanned aerial vehicles which is the topic later on especially tomorrow and that we can really support the units on the ground, we can protect critical infrastructure with surveillance and monitoring and detection, that’s just the positive outlook after this more or less a bit well as a pessimistic view which I have presented but still thinking about think about it it’s a low probability but high impact incident.

Source: UN.org Webinar

The Court of Auditors is sounding the alarm about preparing for the Paris 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games. In a confidential 76-page report, revealed by Le Canard enchaîné and of which AFP has read, the Court insists on the “to anticipate a general and massive mobilisation of material and human resources to ensure the security of the Games”. A final version of this report is expected by the end of the year.

Deeming it “imperative” to accelerate the pace to meet the “considerable” security challenge represented by this event, the Court of Auditors lists all the shortcomings to be taken into account: hospital capacity, public safety, health, terrorist risks, cyber risks, problem acceptance of the games by the population…

Two years before the deadline, the President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron will meet on Monday, July 25 at the Elysée Palace with Prime Minister Elisabeth Borne and Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin in particular to take stock.

Ensure the security of the opening ceremony

The Court obviously evokes the opening ceremony, unprecedented. Ardently desired by Emmanuel Macron and the mayor of Paris Anne Hidalgo, it is designed as a great river parade on the Seine and accessible to the public. It was planned in the initial project armada of 200 boats and 600,000 spectators. Unsurprisingly, the report suggests reducing the fleet, conducting simulations ahead of the ceremony and adjusting the schedule of events on the day and the day after the opening ceremony to “relieve the pressure on the security forces “.

“We are extremely humbled by the security challenges raised by the organization of these Olympic Games and we are working in close collaboration with all the services concerned,” the organizing committee of the Olympic Games told AFP.

Reduce Torch Relay Route

Another subject of concern, the safety of the Olympic torch relay, scheduled from mid-April to July 26, 2024, a journey of 80 days for a course of approximately 12,000 km. The Court notes that the route could be reduced and recommends entrusting the responsibility to the gendarmerie, given its experience in securing the Tour de France.

Another salient point raised by the Court of Auditors, the pre-report pleads for a “global action plan” in terms of cybersecurity, because of the “massive development risks”. To prevent drone attacks, it is suggested the establishment of a “low-altitude 3D bubble to secure the airspace around sites and places of celebrations”. “There are a certain number of recommendations in this report on which we are already working”, underlined the Paris 2024 committee which already ensured in June 2022, to make security issues a priority.

Source: FranceTV

Most commercial and military C-UAS solutions rely on electromagnetic (EM) interference to detect and disrupt a UAS platform’s communications with its operator station.

Tristan Sauer, Land Domain Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “In the case of small, low-cost UAS platforms such as the commercial quadcopters employed in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, EM-based C-UAS solutions remain particularly effective as those platforms typically possess limited EM hardening capabilities to maintain affordability. As such, EM-based C-UAS systems are readily capable of detecting and disrupting radio-frequency (RF)-based communications.”

QinetiQ’s FSOC technology employs a laser to communicate data at extremely high bandwidths, reducing platform-operator input lag whilst further securing data transmissions from detection, interception or interference. Not only does FSOC’s data transmission vector render RF-based C-UAS solutions ineffective, it also makes them more secure from a range of additional electronic warfare threats.

Sauer continues: “QinetiQ has already identified the transformative potential this FSOC could have in securing communications and data transmission beyond the UAS/C-UAS market, as the technology is modular and could therefore be integrated with a range of other air, land sea and space-based platforms. However, as this technology has yet to be employed in an actual combat scenario, questions have been raised as to how effective FSOC communications will be when faced with atmospheric interference.”

As stable FSOC communication relies on optical lasers, the system must maintain direct line-of-sight for optimal effectiveness. The capability demonstration relied on a static control module, which may not always be a viable solution on highly dynamic battlefields. It could be possible for multiple UAS platforms to inter-network using FSOC in order to extend the range at which data transmission can remain secure, however this would significantly drive up the cost of UAS platforms, which would essentially defeat their purpose as affordably expendable platforms.

Sauer adds: “Despite these challenges, the FSOC technology provides optimal value in the UAS/C-UAS market as a complementary survivability solution rather than an outright alternative to RF data transmission. Integrating both technologies would allow them to complement each other based on evolving circumstances, thus providing radically enhanced communications and data transmission capabilities for unmanned systems on the future battlefield.”

Source: GlobalData

The global trade in illicit pharmaceuticals is a vast and lucrative crime area – valued at USD 4.4 billion – which attracts the involvement of organised crime groups around the world.

Over just one week (23-30 June), 94 INTERPOL member countries representing every continent launched a coordinated crackdown on illicit online pharmacies in Operation Pangea XV.

Globally, law enforcement made more than 7,800 seizures of illicit and misbranded medicines and healthcare products, totalling more than 3 million individual units.

During the week, law enforcement:

• Investigated more than 4,000 web links, mainly from social media platforms and messaging apps
• Shut down or remove more than 4,000 web links containing adverts for illicit products
• Inspected nearly 3,000 packages and 280 postal hubs at airports, borders and mail distribution or cargo mail centres
• Opened more than 600 new investigations and issued more than 200 search warrants

While results are still coming in from countries, enforcement actions have already disrupted the activities of at least 36 organised crime groups.

“Selling counterfeit or illicit medicines online may seem like a low-level offence, but the consequences for victims are potentially life-threatening,” said INTERPOL Secretary General Jürgen Stock.

“The illicit supply chains and business models behind the counterfeit medicine trade are inherently international, meaning that law enforcement has to work together across borders in order to effectively protect consumers.”

Cross-border crimes

Nearly half (48 per cent) of the packages inspected by law enforcement during the operation were found to contain either illicit or falsified medicines.

Counterfeit or unauthorised erectile dysfunction medicines comprised roughly 40 per cent of all products seized. Law enforcement in Australia, Argentina, Malaysia and the United States also seized more than 317,000 unauthorised COVID-19 test kits. The US seizures alone are estimated to be worth nearly USD 3 million.

The global trade in illicit pharmaceuticals is a vast and lucrative crime area

Illicit health products seized in Estonia

Illicit medical products seized in Costa Rica

Fraudulent products can threaten consumers’ health instead of healing them

Illicit medical products seized by law enforcement in Chile

Illicit health products seized in Botswana

Illicit medical products seized by law enforcement in Italy

Illicit health products identified by law enforcement in Iran

Criminals will stop at nothing to make a profit, including selling counterfeit pharmaceuticals and medical devices despite the dangers they cause

Criminals have sought to cash in on the COVID-19 pandemic, selling illicit or fraudulent masks

Fake erectile dysfunction tablets seized by law enforcement in Switzerland

Globally, law enforcement undertook more than 7,800 seizures of illicit and falsified medicines

Illicit medical products uncovered by law enforcement in Panama

The United States seized more than 317,000 unauthorised COVID-19 test kits, worth nearly USD 3 million

The trade-in illicit medicines extends far beyond any one country’s borders and is a significant global threat. Often, products are manufactured in one country and shipped to another, while advertisements for the medicines are hosted on websites based in many different countries.

In Malaysia alone, law enforcement identified more than 2,000 websites selling or advertising counterfeit or illegally-obtained pharmaceuticals.

Social media networks and messaging apps are also used for advertising counterfeit and illicit medicines, with Operation Pangea XV identifying more than 1,200 such ads across all major platforms.

“Two decades worth of experience has shown criminals will stop at nothing to make a profit, including selling counterfeit pharmaceuticals and medical devices despite dangers they cause,” said Jim Mancuso, Director of the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center in the United States.

“The US is committed to working closely with our international law enforcement partners and the private sector to keep counterfeit pharmaceuticals and medical devices out of the global supply chain, as well as taking down transnational criminal organizations who profit from these scams. The results of Operation Pangea XV are a warning to transnational criminal organizations that law enforcement agencies around the world will do whatever it takes to protect public health and safety,” Mr Mancuso added.

Within the framework of Operation Pangea XV, INTERPOL was supported by Europol, the UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme, health regulatory agencies and the Pharmaceutical Security Institute.

INTERPOL’s Illicit Goods and Global Health Programme works with partners to dismantle criminal networks and reduce the risk that fake and illicit pharmaceuticals pose to public health. Learn more about our vital work to keep people safe on our website at the links below.

Source: INTERPOL